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Despite a growing body of literature on the Iranian Revolution and its impacts on the region, 
scholars largely neglected Iran's connections with Palestine. This thesis is intended to fill the 
lacuna in the literature and to assist readers to unpack a history of Iran's relations with 
Palestine. To this end, I analysed connections of the Iranian revolutionary movements both 
from the perspective of the Left and the Islamic camps. In order to provide a historical 
background to the post-revolutionary period which is why main focus, I trace the genealogy 
of pro-Palestinian sentiments before 1979 as well. Moreover, the main focus in this thesis is 
on the causes and roots of Iran's post-revolutionary state's pro-Palestinian stance. I attempt 
to demonstrate that the Iranian revolutionary movements championed pro-Palestinian ideas 
mainly based on their ideological outlook, and then in the interest of the state.  
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“The conscience of Iranian intellectual should be bothered by the fact that Iranian oil 
burns in the tanks and airplanes that are killing his Arab and Muslim brothers”.  
– Jalal Al-e Ahmad
1
  
 The 1979 Islamic revolution dramatically transformed Iran‘s foreign policy 
behaviour. This transformation included a change of official Iranian attitudes towards 
Palestine – from antagonism, to cordial relations, at least on the surface. This Iranian-
Palestinian relationship has become a vital part of the political puzzle in the Middle 
East. Yet there is a lack of research on the dynamics of contemporary political relations 
between Iran and Palestine. This thesis attempts to fill a lacuna in existing academic 
literatures, and increase the understanding of relations between Iran and Palestine. The 
principal question of this thesis focuses on the roots of Iranian-Palestinian relations, and 
aims to answer the question of why the Islamic Republic of Iran has pursued pro-
Palestinian policies since the Islamic revolution in 1979. What is the rationale behind 
Iran‘s attitude towards Palestine? How does revolutionary Iran view the Palestinian 
question? And how have Iranian-Palestinian relations developed within the Islamic 
Republic? 
Theoretically, I believe that constructivism is the best approach for studying 
Iranian-Palestinian relations. More specifically, given that constructivism comprises a 
wide spectrum of theories, I adopt Alexander Wendt‘s approach in this thesis in order 
                                                 
1  David Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society and Power, London: Frank Cass, 2001, p. 
273. 
10 
to analyse Iranian-Palestinian relations
2
.  Wendt‘s approach allows me to throw light on 
this topic and support the answers to my principal questions. In this pursuit, despite of 
the absence of a stringent methodological approach, I am trying to give due attention to 
Michael Barnett‘s application of constructivism in his emphasis on the Middle East and 
to a lesser extent and without the claim to be comprehensive, Brent Steele‘s focus on 
ontological security.  
My main argument is that Iranian-Palestinian relations are guided by ideational 
and normative structures, rather than solely the materialist ones. Although I do not deny 
the significance of material factors in helping guide Iran‘s policies towards the 
Palestinian question, my assessment – based on the constructivist approach – is that 
material factors are themselves created by a self-imposed social context. In other 
words, I believe that interests are constituted by ideas and belief systems. As such, I 
argue that the Islamic revolutionary identity of Iran plays a central role in shaping 
Iranian attitudes towards Palestine, as well as helping define the Islamic Republic‘s 
national interests. As Michael Barnett pertinently argues: ―National identities are 
typically situated within a broader historical narrative.‖
3
 
Since my main concern is the nature of Iran-Palestine relations after 1979, this 
thesis will not focus upon a discussion of Iran‘s broader foreign policy. Iran‘s broader 
foreign policy will however be referred to in order to enhance my argument and within 
the framework of primary research questions. The thesis will also touch upon Iran‘s 
engagement with the Palestinian cause in the pre-revolutionary era in the literature 
review. This is not in order to compare two historical periods, but purely in order to 
analyse and present the roots of Iranian involvement in the Palestine question. Finally, 
                                                 
2
 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 
3
 Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett, Identiy and Foreign policy in the Middle East, London, Cornell University 
Press, 2002, p. 65  
11 
it should be stated at this stage that this thesis is not a theoretical project, and as such I 
shall be limiting the theoretical discussion to applying aspects of constructivism as 
outlined by Alexander Wendt. Thus, I shall not engage with theoretical debates 
between realists and constructivists. It is also vital to indicate that some of the 
quotations are verbatim as they were presented to me by my interviewees during my 
conversations with them. 
This thesis begins by evaluating and reviewing the existing academic literatures 
regarding Iranian-Palestinian relations. I aim to review the history of Iranian 
engagement with the Palestinian issue since its beginning in 1948 and identify the roots 
of Iran‘s behaviour towards Palestine, even before the establishment of Israel in 1948. 
In the section following the literature review, attention is directed towards introducing a 
theoretical framework by analysing and explaining the constructivist approach of 
Alexander Wendt. After this section, I introduce my main argument, which is divided 
into two parts. First, I emphasise the pan-Islamic rhetoric behind Iran‘s foreign policies. 
Second, I highlight the significance of material factors in constituting Iran‘s pro-
Palestinian policy. A preliminary assessment of the roots of Iranian-Palestinian 
relations is offered in the conclusion. The outline of the research plan, the 
methodological framework and fieldwork plan is offered in the final section. 
Literature review  
There is a consensus amongst scholars that Iranian-Palestinian relations can be 
dated back to Iran‘s pre-revolutionary period. From Hamidreza Dehghani‘s point of 
view, Iran‘s engagement with the Palestinian question can be traced back far earlier 
than the 1979 Islamic revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini's pro-Palestinian rhetoric. 
Dehghani‘s essay focuses on Iran‘s opposition to a ―two state solution‖, and the 
partition of Palestine advocated by the great powers. Dehghani‘s essay gives a brief 
12 
introduction of Iran‘s position with regards to the Palestinian question since 1947 until 
the end of the Shah‘s regime in 1979.  Following the migration of a group of Iranian 
businesspeople in the late 19
th
 century, Iran established a public relations office in 
Palestine - one which growingly became less functional due to financial difficulties, 




   
Dehghani indicates that Iran was appointed with eleven other countries to join the 
special committee on Palestine by the United Nations General Assembly in May 1947. 
Two suggestions were initially made. First, ‘the Minority Plan‗ proposed by Iranian 
delegates – and backed by India and Yugoslavia  – suggested the end of British 
mandate in Palestine, and the formation of a federal government that included both 
Arabs and Jews, with Jerusalem as its unified capital.
5
 The second, known as the 
‗Majority Plan‘, was proposed by Holland and Australia, and suggested the partition of 
Palestine and designating of around 56 percent of the land to a Jewish state. The 
majority plan was passed and culminated in Resolution 181 in November 1947. Israel 
occupied the western part of Jerusalem despite Resolution 194 demanding that  
Jerusalem be given a special status and controlled by the international community. The 
state of Israel was declared following the end of the British mandate in Palestine.
6
 
According to Dehghani, Iran‘s representative to the UN, Mr. Nasrollah Entezam 
visited Palestine at the time and warned that the partition of Palestine would turn the 
region into a battlefield, writing: ―I did not want to be seen as pro-Palestine but at the 
same time I wanted the resolution to meet their interests‖.
7
 Shortly after declaring its 
                                                 
4
 Hamidreza Dehghani, “Iran’s Role in Opposition to the Partition of Palestine”, The Iranian Journal of 
International Affairs, Summer, Vol. XXI, No. 3, Tehran 2009, p.40. 
5 
Ibid., pp. 44-45. 
6 
Ibid., pp. 45-47. 
7
 Ibid., p.54. 
13 
foundation, the Israeli foreign minister Moshe Shertok sent an official telegraph to 
Tehran and asked Iranian authorities to recognise the Jewish state. In response, 
according to Dehghani, the Iranian government appointed a representative to supervise 
the concerns of Iranian citizens‘ residing in Palestine. Such a response by the Pahlavi‘s 
regime created a historical mass uprising by the Iranian clergy and society that became 
the precedent for Iranian-Palestinian relations until the present day. In 1948, Ayatollah 
Abol Qassem Kashani, a prominent Iranian Shia cleric, called for popular gatherings in 
support of the Palestinian people.
8
 Ayatollah Kashani announced that  
―[b]y the support of great powers, these Jews have forcefully established an entity and 
are now naming Palestine their land and to achieve this they spill the blood of Muslims, 
day and night. Considering that the sacred religion of Islam in this situation makes it 
mandatory for all Muslims to support the oppressed Palestinian Arabs and Muslims‖, 
9
  
Ayatollah Kashani further stated that, ―[w]e Iranians will rebel even when the 
(Shah‘s) government recognised Israel‖.
10
 The mass protests ended when Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mossadeq shut down the consulate and recalled all Iranian 
officials from Palestine in 1951.  Mossadeq‘s deputy, Hussein Fatemi, stated that ―[t]his 
government is determined not to officially recognise the Israeli regime and will not 
accept any representation of that regime in Iran‖.
11
  
After the fall of Mossadeq‘s democratically elected government by the Anglo-
American coup in 1953, the Shah‘s regime resumed relations with Israel. Gawdat 
Bahgat, Sasan Fayazmanesh, and Dehghani have all respectively highlighted that in this 
                                                 
8 Hussein J. Agha and Ahmad S Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation, London: Pinter, Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, 1995; and Dehghani, “Iran’s Role in Opposition to the Partition of Palestine”, p. 33. 
9
 Dehghani, “Iran’s Role in Opposition to the Partition of Palestine”, p.70. 
10 




period, the Shah‘s secret police – SAVAK – established closer cooperation with 
Mossad until the fall of the Shah in 1979.
12
 Ayatollah Khomeini was of the opinion that 
the Shah‘s assistance to Israel – which included the provision of substantial oil supplies 
– was one of the main issues turning people against the royal regime.
13
 He announced 
that ―the Shah appropriated the oil that belonged to Muslims and gave it away to Israel. 
This has been one of the main reasons why I opposed the monarch‖.
14
   
Furthermore, Dehghani highlights that Ayatollah Khomeini‘s support for 
Palestine dates back to the establishment of the Israeli state itself in May 1948 and that 
it gained momentum thereafter. Dehgani stresses that in a speech in 1963 which led to 
his arrest and exile, Khomeini stated that ―[t]oday I was informed that a number of 
clerics have been taken to SAVAK, where they have been asked not to talk about the 
Shah and avoid mentioning Israel and saying that religion is in danger‖.
15
 Ayatollah 
Khomeini publically denounced Israel‘s occupation of Palestine at the time when 
supporting Palestine was a controversial topic. According to Hussein Agha and Ahmed 
Khalidi, in late 1968, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa supporting the Fatah's call for 
armed struggle against Israel and authorising Iranians to pay their Zakat in support of 
Palestinian fighters as part of the holy Muslim obligation to donate a percentage of 
salary to charity.
16
 Dehghani concludes his essay by indicating that Mossadeq‘s 
                                                 
12 
Sasan Fayazmanesh, The US and Iran: Sanctions, War and the Policy of Dual Containment, New York: 
Routledge, 2008, p.52;  Gawdat Bahgat, Israel and the Persian Gulf: Retrospect & Prospect, USA: University 
Press of Florida, 2008, p.41; Dehghani, “Iran’s Role in Opposition to the Partition of Palestine”, p.72. 
13 
After six days war in 1967, the Shah’s government supplied Israel with crude oil and also shipped its oil to 
the Western markets via the joint Iranian-Israeli Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline. For more information, see:   
Uri Bialer, “Fuel Bridge across the Middle East—Israel, Iran, and the Eilat-Ashkelon Oil Pipeline”, Israel Studies, 
Vol. 12, No. 3 (Fall 2007). According to Uri Bialer, the entire Israeli-Iranian pipeline project shut down after the 
Shah’s fall and the decision of the Islamic government to sever all ties with Israel. (p.50) 
14 




Agha & Khalidi, Iran and Syria, p.5. Zakat is a percentage of Muslim income that is devoted to charity. 
15 
national government cut off ties with Israel. These ties were resumed as the Shah 
regained power following the 1953 coup. He concludes that Iran‘s position towards 
Palestine has been principally based on the teaching of Islam, the Quran, and the 
directives of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. 
In another Persian-language study of the subject matter published in Iran, Ali 
Akbar Velayati, a former foreign minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1981-1997) 
and current advisor to the Supreme Leader in International Affairs, offers a brief history 
of Iran‘s policy towards Palestine in the period between 1979 to 2006 in his book The 
Islamic Republic of Iran and Palestine Developments. Velayati clarifies that, the 
―formation of an Islamic world society‖ requires supporting ―oppressed‖ against 
―oppressors‖. As such, protecting Muslim nations is a strategic objective of the Islamic 
Republic‘s foreign policy.
17
 The book emphasises that the most vital source for 
understanding Iran‘s foreign policy is the Islamic Republic‘s constitution whose articles 
are taken from the Quran and Islamic principles.
18
 Velayati points out that according to 
Verse 29 of Surat Al-Anbiya (The Prophets), which is embedded in Article 11 of Iran‘s 
constitution, all Muslims comprise a single nation. As such, the Islamic Republic is 
obliged to employ its foreign policy as a means to unifying all Muslim nations.
19
 
                                                 
17 Ali Akbar Velayati, Jumhouri Eslami Iran va Tahavollaat-e Felestin 1357-1385 [Islamic Republic of Iran and 
Palestine Development 1979-2006], Tehran: The Centre for Documents and Diplomatic History of the Foreign 
Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1386 [2007]., pp. 12-15. 
18 Ibid., p. 12. 
19
 Velayati, Jumhouri Eslami Iran va Tahavollaat-e Felestin 1357-1385, p, 54. Chapter 21:92 of the Holy Quran 
states: “Indeed this, your religion, is one religion, and I am your Lord, so worship Me” (see 
http://quran.com/21). Velayati states that the constitution of the Islamic Republic reflects the Quran’s 
teachings, and that Iran’s foreign policy is directed accordingly. Article 11 of the constitution declares that “[i]n 
accordance with the sacred verse of the Qur'an ("This your community is a single community," [21:92]), all 
Muslims form a single nation, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of formulating 
its general policies with a view to cultivating the friendship and unity of all Muslim peoples, and it must 
constantly strive to bring about the political, economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world” (“Islamic 
Republic of Iran Constitution”, Iran Online, available at: http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-
info/Government/constitution.html [Accessed 16 January 2017]). Also see Dehghani Firooz-Abadi, “the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and the Ideal International System”, p. 54 in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Reza Molavi (eds), 
Iran and the International System, London: Routledge, 2012. 
16 
According to Velayati, from the beginning of his revolutionary movement (in the 
1960s), Ayatollah Khomeini has placed Palestine at the heart of the Islamic revolution‘s 
moral principles based on the teachings of Islam.
20
 Velayati begins by quoting from the 
Ayatollah‘s speeches before and after the revolution in regard to the Islamic link 
between Palestine and Iran and states that the Palestinian issue has been the core 
element in the Islamic revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini designated the last Friday of 
each Ramadan as the ‗Yom al-Quds’ (the Day of Jerusalem) urging all Muslims to 
actively participate in protests against the Zionist state. 
21
 The PLO leadership was 
warmly received by Khomeini, and the building once occupied by the Israeli diplomatic 
mission in Tehran was handed over to Palestinian delegates. Iran furthermore severed 
its relations with Egypt due to its recognition of Israel, and fully endorsed the PLO‘s 
struggle against Israel.
22
 However, due to Yasser Arafat‘s support for Saddam Hussein 
during the Iran-Iraq war, relations between the PLO and Tehran deteriorated. Iran‘s 
pro-Palestinian policy was re-directed towards movements that were closer 
ideologically to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet although Iran began to review and 
redirect its support from the PLO to other Palestinian movements such as Hamas and 




A number of peace-proposals and agreements were rejected by the Islamic 
Republic, such as the ―Fahd Peace-Plan‖ in 1981, the ―Madrid Conference‖ in 1991, 
the ―Oslo Accords‖ in 1993, the ―Wye River Memorandum‖ (signed in 1998), the 
                                                 
20 Velayati, Jumhouri Eslami Iran va Tahavollaat-e Felestin 1357-1385, pp 24-25. 
21 Ibid., p.28.  
22
 Ibid., p.28. 
23
 Ibid., p.43. 
17 
Camp David Summit in 2000, and the ―Road-Map‖ (2002-2003). 
24
 Velayati argues 
that the Islamic Republic refused to endorse these plans because they ignored the 
fundamental rights of the Palestinian people to have their home-land liberated from 
Zionist occupation.
25
 From the Islamic Republic‘s viewpoint, the Palestinian issue is 
not only an Arab issue but also an Islamic problem, and hence Tehran has obligations 
and duties rooted in Islam to publicly pursue its policy in this area.
26
 Velayati cites 
former President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who states that ―[t]he Islamic Republic of 
Iran like many other Palestinian factions does not concur with the peace-plans because 
the agreements are not just and do not address the issue of Palestinian rights to return to 
their homeland‖. 
27
 According to Velayati, the Islamic Republic‘s key figures have 
reached a consensus regarding the Palestinian question because ―[t]he Palestinian issue 
has its place within Ayatollah Khomeini‘s ideology and it resembles a battle between 
oppressed Muslims and non-Muslim oppressors‖ ,
28
 and according to the Quran the 
Islamic Republic has its moral duty to stand and reject any domination of non-Muslim 
oppressors against oppressed Muslims.
29
  
In one of the very few articles in English about the subject which can be found in 
the edited volume, Arab-Iranian Relations, Khair el-Din Hasseb provides a conceptual 
account of Iran‘s engagement with the Palestine issue. The editor designates a chapter 
written by Ahmad Sudki El-Dajani to Iran‘s ideological position towards the 








 Ibid., p,170.  
28 
Ibid., p. 99. 
29 
Ibid., p.15. See also Quran 4:141, which states “Allah will judge between *all of+ you on the Day of 
Resurrection, and never will Allah give the disbelievers over the believers (Muslims) a way [to overcome 
them+.” (see http://quran.com/4) 
 
18 
Palestinian cause. From El-Dajani‘s point of view, the Palestine Question is significant 
to both Arabs and Iranians. Al-Dajani states:  
The attachment of our Arab and Iranian brethren to the Palestine question is a strong one, 
with deep historical roots lodged in historical memory and popular conscience. Palestine 
in popular conscious of every Arab and Iranian is a land blessed by God, it contains the 
Aqsa Mosque, associated with the prophet‘s ascension to heaven and containing the 
Mosque of Abraham, visiting it is a dream to be sought. 
30 
From El-Dajani‘s perception, the sense of belonging to a single civilization – 
‗the Islamic dominion‘ – is what binds Arabs and Iranians together. This crucial fact 
should anchor our understanding of Arab-Iranian relations. The author‘s view is that the 
place of the Palestine Question forms the backbone of Iranian-Arab relations from 20
th
 
century onwards. The Palestine Question materialised because of the Zionist colonialist 
settlement of Palestine, at a time when all elements of the Islamic dominion confronted 
European colonialism. Iranians experienced Tsarist Russian interference from the north, 
and British intrusion into their internal affairs from the South. Arab states under 
Ottoman rule, on the other hand, experienced Anglo-French colonial invasion. It was 
not difficult, according to Al-Dajani, for Iranians and Arabs to discern a correlation 
between colonialist stratagem in Palestine and what the colonial powers had plotted for 
both of them in all the Islamic dominion.
31
 In other words, history matters in 
understanding the roots of Iranian-Palestinian relations. 
A number of scholars offer equally valid points that Iranian-Palestinian ties are 
rooted in history as well as Islam. From the perspective of Eric Hooglund, ―the events 
                                                 
30 Khair el-Din Hasseb, Arab-Iranian Relations: Present Trends and Future Prospects, Beirut: Centre for Arab 
Unity Studies, 1998, p.347. 
31 Ibid., p.348. 
19 
in British mandatory Palestine coincided with a period of anti-British sentiment in Iran 
(during late 1940s) causing Iranians to identify with Palestinians as fellow victims of 
British imperialism‖. 
32
 According to Hooglund, Palestine has a historic-Islamic status 
for ―pious‖ Iranians as ―a Muslim-land that has been forcibly alienated from Muslim 
rule by non-Muslims‖. 
33
 He believes that there is a consensus amongst Iranians that 
Iran should have a  pro-Palestinian policy, despite there being varying levels of 
enthusiasm amongst different generations. 
34
 Hooglund concludes that religious 
sentiment plays a vital role in formulating Iranian behaviour towards the events in 
Palestine and Lebanon. 
35
 
A group of influential Shias such as Seyyed Tabataba‘i and Seyyed Hussein al-i-
Kashef al-Ghata' were present at the Islamic Conference in 1931, demonstrating a sign 
of Iranian historical solidarity with the Palestinian people.
36
 According to Al-Dijani, the 
prominence of Palestine for both Arabs and Iranians demonstrates that both Sunnis and 
Shias have the capacity to unite under the common banner of Islamic civilization. 
Moreover, the Arab world witnessed how the Iranian youth responded and supported 
the revolution of the Palestine Liberation Organisation since the very beginning of its 
foundation in 1964. 
37
 In Al-Dijani‘s view, the expansion of Zionism and American 
hegemony within the Islamic dominion is the backbone of the Middle East order, as 
advocated by Americans and Western elites, prompting popular resistance from both 
Iranians and Palestinians. For the Arab nation, the Palestine issue has become ‗an 
                                                 
32 Eric Hooglund, “Iranian Views of the Arab-Israeli Conflict”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1995, 
pp. 89-90. 
33 Ibid., p. 89. 
34 Ibid., p. 91. 
35 Ibid., pp. 90-91. 
36 Khair el-Din Hasseb, Arab-Iranian Relations, p.350. 
37 Ibid., p. 351. 
20 
Islamic-Arab question‘ and for the Iranians an ‗Islamic-Iranian question‘. Al-Dajani 
concludes his argument by pointing out that both Iranians and Arabs view the Zionist 
regime as a racist entity at the heart of Palestine, the heart of the Arab world, and the 
heart of the ummah. As such, a colonial entity of this kind cannot be a part of the 
regional order. It is obvious, that such books lack the scholarly acumen of Hooglund‘s 
and that they were writte within a context that was distinctly ideological and political 
geared to the politics of revolution.  
Zamel Saeedi writes from a similary partial perspective. He concentrates on 
similarities and differences between the manners in which both Arabs and Iranians have 
confronted and dealt with the issue of Palestine. From Saeedi‘s point of view, the 
similarities between the two are far greater than the differences, the Palestinian cause 
serves to unite the Islamic Ummah. 
38
 For this reason, there was a dichotomous 
relationship between the people of Iran and the Shah‘s government concerning the 
Palestinian cause. Cooperation between Iran and Israel went against the wishes of the 
Iranian people, and was one of the major causes of the Islamic revolution in 1979. The 
Palestinian cause was ever-present in the consciousness of the Iranian people in the lead 
up to the Revolution. According to Saeedi, ―revolutionary Islamic Iran always believed 
that the Palestinian cause was a just one‖. 
39
 It can be said that it was because of this 
belief that the Islamic Republic did not change its pro-Palestinian stance despite 
Arafat‘s pro-Saddam‘s position during the Iran-Iraq war. According to Bahgat, Iran 
always distinguished between the broader Palestinian people on one side, and Arafat 
and his top aides on the other. 
40
 From Al-Dajani‘s point of view, Iran‘s attachment to 
the Palestine issue remained steadfast under the most difficult of conditions, whether 
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during the Iran-Iraq war, or as the position of the Palestinian leadership towards Iran 
changed.
41
 Saeedi concludes his essay by indicating that the Palestine issue has become 
a cause close to the hearts of all Muslims, and as such a concern of all Muslims who 
refuse to forfeit Islamic land and rights. Again, this kind of approach seems to abstract 
and does not give and answer to the nuances of the Iranian position towards Palestine 
(and much less about the so called Muslim strategy).  
There is a more nuanced and scholarly approach in Houchang Chehabi. 
Althhough he is not comprehensive in his chapter on the subject matter, Chehabi 
investigates the anti-Shah Iranian opposition in Lebanon and their relations with the 
Palestinian issue in chapter eight of his edited book.
42
 According to Chehabi, most of 
the Iranian revolutionary factions were sympathetic towards the Palestinian cause, and 
as such established friendly ties with their Palestinian counterparts, supporting them 
morally in their struggle against the Zionist regime. Chehabi classifies the political 
tendencies of these Iranian opposition groups as Leftists, Mossadeqist Nationalists, and 
Islamists; examining their connections with the Palestinian rebels during the 1960s and 
1970s. He adds that the presence of many PLO military camps in Lebanon made it an 
ideal place for Iranians to organise and seek military training. The external wing of the 
Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI) – established by Dr. Mostafa Chamran, Ibrahim 
Yazdi, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, and Ali Shariati – formed strong ties with Musa Sadr, and 
began to establish an intimate relationship with Fatah in Lebanon. Arafat visited the 
LMI camps in Lebanon and, in collaboration with the Lebanese Amal, they facilitated 
training for a number of Shia youth near the Syrian border. However, according to 
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Chehabi, Dr. Chamran‘s focus was mainly on the social welfare and training of local 
youth, and as such he did not agree with the PLO‘s factional policies. 
 Chehabi rightly observes that the left wing guerrilla groups of Mujahedin-e-
Khalq (MKO) and the Marxist group of the Fadaiyan-e Khalq established ties with the 
PLO in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Mujahedin-e Khalq (MKO) contacted Fatah 
in March 1970 via a contact in Dubai, and some of its members including Masoud 
Rajavi (who later became the group‘s leader) attended Palestinian training camps in 
Jordan. After the so called ‗Black September‘ when the Jordanian authorities brutally 
ended the Palestinian military presence in Jordan, left wing Iranians left Jordan for 
Dubai. Upon being arrested, and prior to being deported, these MKO members hijacked 
a plane and landed in Iraq. In Baghdad, Fatah rescued them from being deported to Iran 
and sent them instead to Syria. In total, around thirty activists of the MKO were given 
Palestinian ID cards and were trained at PLO camps near Tartus in Syria, and in 
Beirut.
43
 According to Chehabi, two members of the Marxist Fadaiyan received 
military trainings as early as 1967 at Fatah camps in Jordan. In the 1970s, the Marxist 
Fadaiyan maintained close ties with George Habash‘s Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (PFLP), and Ahmad Jibril‘s splinter group the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC). Indeed, George Habash even 
wrote a number of prefaces to theoretical essays written by the Fadaiyan activists.  
There were close links between Mossadeqist Nationalists that established their 
headquarters near the Shatila refugee camp in Beirut, and the Palestinian fighters. Their 
pamphlets were printed in the Palestinian printing houses in both Arabic and Persian, 
and distributed amongst Iranians in Lebanon, Kuwait and Iraq.
44
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Chehabi regards the connection between Islamist followers of Ayatollah 
Khomeini and the Palestinian cause as having been very strong, deeply rooted, and 
unique. While followers of Musa Sadr were preoccupied with Lebanon‘s internal 
affairs during the Lebanese civil war, the main focus of Ayatollah Khomeini‘s 
followers was to support Palestinian factions.  In Chehabi‘s view, Ayatollah Khomeini 
attempted to break through the Shia-Sunni divide by prioritising the liberation of 
Palestine. Seyed Akbar Mohtashami once reported to Ayatollah Khomeini that there 
were some signs of hostility towards the Palestinian rebels in South Lebanon within the 
Shia local population, incited by some local clerics due to Israel‘s attacks on their 
villages. In response, Khomeini strongly rejected all forms of localism and 
sectarianism, and in October 1972 used the onset of Ramadan to issue a declaration 
calling on all Muslims – particularly those residing in areas where the Palestinians were 
active – to support the struggle against Israel. Ayatollah Khomeini stated,  
[t]oday we observe what the agents of colonialism have done to the (Palestinian fighters), 
first in Jordan and then in Lebanon. We observe the propaganda and conspiracies 
directed at them by the agents of colonialism, all with the aim of separating Muslim 
groups from the Palestinian fighters and expelling them from strategically vital 
locations.
45  
While in his Iraqi exile, Khomeini continued to pay considerable attention to the 
Palestinian cause. Chehabi characterises the Palestinian cause as an Islamic priority for 
Ayatollah Khomeini, and as such something that transcended local political conflicts 
and regional matters related to the Shia-Sunni divide. He concludes that a wide 
spectrum of Iranian oppositional groups maintained close ties with the Palestinians.
46
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For those Iranians, their activities, along with the Palestinians and Muslim Lebanese, 
were part of a wider struggle of the oppressed (mutadafin) against the oppressors 
(mutakbarun).  
Agha and Khalidi offer a thorough history of political cooperation between Syria 
and Iran since the 1979 revolution, arguing that Lebanon and Palestine proved key 
arenas for an alliance given that both Tehran and Damascus opposed Israel‘s invasion 
of Palestine and south Lebanon. 
47
 Yet Khalidi believes there to be several factors 
which helped cause the decline of the bond between the PLO and the new leaders in 
Iran. One major factor was the divergence between the PLO‘s secular nationalism and 
Iran‘s Islamic ideology (Ayatollah Khomeini and other Islamic revolution‘s leaders 
including Rafsanjani had urged Arafat to adopt Islam in his struggle against Zionism).
48
 
The readiness of the PLO to strike a deal with Israel, its opportunism in mediating 
between Iran and the West, and most importantly its support for Iraq against Iran during 
the Iran-Iraq war were also crucial factors in the decline of the Iranian-PLO 
relationship.
49
 Iran, according to Khalidi, lost faith in the PLO, but not in the 
Palestinian cause, turning instead towards the Palestinian factions that shared its 
ideological tendencies.
50
 From Khalidi‘s point of view, for Palestinian ‗rejectionists‘, 
Iran as a regional power and its stance to uphold fundamental Palestinian claims – such 
as the right to self-determination, and the right of return of all refugees, which could 
have been overlooked or abandoned – was important. This stance led Palestinian 
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Islamic factions such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad to welcome Iranian support and 
established close ties with Tehran. 
51
  
Khalidi and Agha also weave in a realist approach to their study, indicating that 
Iran has sought to create a balance of power by supporting ―Palestinian rejectionists‖ in 
order to weaken the U.S. and Israel in the region. Nevertheless, they clarified that this is 
in accordance with Iran‘s revolutionary ideology to support Palestinian Islamic 
factions.
52
 Agha and Khalidi conclude their chapter by pointing out that Iran‘s offer of 
high-spirited support contrasted with the homogenous immobility of the rest of the 




Elaheh Rostami-Povey demonstrates in chapter six of Iran’s Influence the 
connection between Iran and the Palestinian question from a distinctly scholarly 
perspective. Rostami-Povey‘s analysis can be divided into two sections. The first offers 
information regarding Iran‘s relationship with the Palestinian Islamic movement, 
Hamas, and the second focuses on Hamas‘ political structure and its position within 
Palestinian politics. The failure of the Arab states in confronting Israel and the signing 
of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt coincided with the 1979 Islamic revolution 
in Iran. According to Rostami-Povey, the revolutionary slogan of ―Iran today, Palestine 
tomorrow‖ resonated with the Palestinians. The disorganisation and lack of success of 
the secular Arab Left, and dissatisfaction with nationalism as a political force, paved 
the way for the Islamic resistance to what was referred to as Zionism and imperialism.
54
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Rostami-Povey cites Laleh Khalili in arguing that a number of Palestinian 
thinkers and intellectuals who believed in the liberation of Palestine were impressed by 
the Islamic revolution, and responded positively to its pro-Palestinian discourse.
55
 Fathi 
al-Shaqaqi who wrote Khomeini, The Islamic Solution and the Alternative, within 
which he announced that the Islamism of Khomeini was the only viable programme for 
Palestinian emancipation. 
56
     
From a comparable point of view, Michelle Browers offers a theoretical 
explanation of how the political ideology of the Arab world has been influenced by the 
Islamic discourse of the Iranian revolution. According to Browers, the Islamic 
revolution of Iran became an influential motivation for a number of well-known 
Palestinian activists with nationalist or secular tendencies as well as Islamists. For 
instance, Monir Shafiq – a Christian Palestinian and a former Marxist-Leninist activist 
(within the Democratic People‘s Front for Liberation of Palestine) – under the influence 
of the Islamic revolution began to undertake an analysis of the failure of pan-Arabism 
in resisting the Zionist regime. Shafiq converted to Islam in 1980, and pronounced 
Islam as the core element for unity among Palestinians. Shafiq joined Islamic Jihad and 
became a vital ideologue and spokesperson for Hamas.
57
 The Islamic revolution in Iran 
also influenced other well-known influential Arab thinkers such as Adil Husayn, 
Hassan Hanafi, Al-Dijani, and Fathi Shaqaqi. After the Iranian Revolution, al-Dijani, 
the Palestinian historian, began a process of reframing the Palestinian struggle from an 
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Arab nationalist framework to one that saw the conflict as the central component in a 
confrontation between Islam and the West.
58
  
Afshin Matin-Asgari narrates a captivating story of the foundation and growth of 
the Iranian student movement from the 1930s to 1979 revolution. His main analysis is 
on the evolution of the Confederation of Iranian students National Union (CISNU) and 
the Iranian students Association in the U.S. (ISAUS). Matin-Asgari highlights that the 
CISNU established itself as the voice of Iranian opposition at the global level.
59
 Matin-
Asgari magnifies the links between the Iranian student movement abroad and other 
international students movements and he elaborates how Iranian student movements 
were part of and contributed in crucial ways to the global protest movement of students 
of the 1960s. His narrative emphasises that following 1953 coup against Premier 
Mosasseq, the environment of political suppression within Iran averted the formation of 
social movements. Matin-Asgari underlines a shift from the Iranian terrain to the global 
arena, at least during the 1960s. His narrative confirms the internationalism of CISNU 
and ISAUS, in the shape of their ethical solidarity with people and movements around 
the globe, particularly with the Palestinian people.  
On the otherside of the spectrum, Meir Hatina in his book of Islam and Salvation 
in Palestine traces the rise of the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine. He thoroughly 
investigates the evolution of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad‘s ideological outlook and its 
relations with other political powers outside Palestine, specifically with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.
60
Hatina investigates how the founder of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 
Fathi Shiqaqi was influenced by Ayatollah Khomeini‘s ideological outlook.  Hatina‘s 
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narrative confirms that the Palestinian Islamic Jihad consistently embraces the position 
of the Islamic Revolution of Iran towards the Palestinian cause. In fact, I contend that 
the driving factors of Iranian-Palestinian relations following 1979 were not one-
dimensional (e.g. purely driven by material interest), but motivated by several factors 
that I will explore in the core chapters of this dissertation. Suffice it to say at this stage 
that for many Palestinians such as the aforementioned Shaqaqi, Tamimi and Sheikh 
Odeh, the Islamic revolution in Iran was a serious attempt to achieve a form of ‗Islamic 
awakening‘. Certainly, for leading activists within HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, the 
Palestinian issue was not merely a national problem but an Islamic one.
61
 The evidence 
marshalled in this dissertation seems to suggest, that such shared Islamic values 
between the Iranian revolutionaries and the Islamist factions in Palestine became a 
binding force between the Islamic revolution in Iran and Islamic Jihad and Hamas 
followers. So strong was this binding force that it affected the course of the Palestinian 
struggle, and at times it even overshadowed the so called Shia-Sunni divide.
62
 
Ultimately, Palestine served Iranian interests to project power in the region after the 
revolution of 1979. But this interest to support the Palestinian cause grew out of a 
revolutionary consciousness that was pregnant with anti-imperial and third wordlist 
ideas especially in the 1960s and 1970s, as will be suggested.  
Theoretical Framework 
Perhaps the most influential ‗constructivist‘ in recent years has been Alexander 
Wendt. Here in this section I will explain Wendt‘s constructivist theory in order to 
provide a comprehensive framework for the theoretical aspect of this thesis.  
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The key to Wendt‘s technique lies in his critique of realist, rationalist or 
materialist theories of ‗interest‘.  Materialist theories postulate that interests are 
exogenously given, and once established, never change. Wendt proposes a state-centric 
approach to IR that is advocated by Realist scholars like Kenneth Waltz. However, 
from Wendt‘s point of view the state-centric structure does not restrict the significance 
of non-state actors (whether domestic or transnational) in determining inter-state 
conflict.
63
 In this regard Wendt, states: ―it may be that non-state actors are becoming 
more important than states as initiators of change, but system change ultimately 
happens through states.
64
 And in the medium term states will remain the authoritative 
actors in the international system‖.
65
  
From Wendt‘s perspective, the debate between neo-realists and neoliberals takes 
place even though both share a pledge of ‗rationalism‘ to treat identities and interests as 
exogenous, rather than socially constructed. Both theories share the similar 
presupposition that states define their security in ‗self-interested‘ terms.
66
 According to 
Wendt, Waltz‘s main argument is that the interests of states are in turn constituted by 
material forces and that states are egoistic or ―self-regarding‖.
67
 Neo-realists and 
neoliberals regard power and interests and sometimes institutions as ―material factors‖, 
treating them as idea-free baselines. In other words, what matters for neo-realists like 
Waltz is the number and power of states. It is at this junction that Waltz‘s theory turns 
into a ―structural materialist‖ one.
68
 Waltz synthesises such a materialistic approach 
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with anarchy which means the international system is by definition a ―self-help‖ 
system.
69
 It is against this materialistic background that Alexander Wendt advances his 
―idealist‖ argument. From Wendt‘s point of view, states are to be treated as agents 
having identities, interests and rationality.
70
 Barnett confirms this point by alluding to 
the constructedness of national identities which in turn informs the interest of the state 
as defined by powerful elites.
71
 As such we can categorise four sorts of identities: 1) 
personal or corporate, 2) type, 3) role and 4) collective.
72
  
‗Personal‘ or ‗corporate‘ identity (in the case of groups or organisations) 
comprises self-systemising constructions that turn actors into individual objects. 
Corporate identity is about self-memory and presumes actors have collective 
identities.
73
 ‗Type‘ identity relates to a social description appertained to individuals that 
share some characteristics such as values, knowledge, or historical commonalities.
74
 In 
other words, type identity is about shared characteristics that have social meanings. In 
this regard Wendt classifies the state system as a type identity.
75
 Wendt argues that 
‗role identity‘ is based upon how an actor perceives itself in others‘ eyes, and therefore 
implies that actors are unable to discard this type of identity because it is contingent on 
the perception of the other.
76
 Wendt indicates that what matters in describing ‗roles‘ is 
the level of interdependence or association between the self and other. 
77
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Collective identity, according to Wendt, ―takes the relationship between self and 
the other to its logical conclusion, i.e. identification‖.
78
 In other words, the sense of 
being a part of a social or collective grouping (i.e. ‗we‘) is a social or collective identity 
providing actors with an interest in the conservation of their culture.
79
 Collective 
identity, from Wendt‘s point of view, refers to ―positive identification with the welfare 
of another, such as the other is seen as a cognitive extension of the self, rather than 
independent‖. This is the foundation for perceptions of unity, devotion, community and 
therefore for a collective description of interests.
80
   
Peter Katzenstein and Michael Barnett in the book of the Culture of National 
Security; Norms and Identity in World Politics share Wendt‘s view, stating that actors 
cannot decide what their interests are until they comprehend what they are representing 
(in other words, ―who they are‖).
81
 It can be stated that identities shape and direct 
interests, and that  interests act as motivational forces for identities. The importance of 
identity is reflected in Katzenstein‘s statement that ―identities shape actor interests or 
shape policy‖.
82
 According to him, ―many national security interests depend on a 
particular construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived identity of others.‖
83
  
Katzenstein even goes a step further, arguing that changes in state identity can advance 
significant transformation in interests that shape national security policy. Therefore, 
state policy and agency might be a straight performance or impression of ―identity 
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 This point is reemphasised by Brent Steele‘s concept of ontological security 
which posits that states follow particular foreign policies because of a sense of 
commitment and loyalty towards a cause – indeed contradicting that sentiment would 
create a sense of ―shame‖.
85
  
Steele and Katzenstein emphasise the importance of identity in domestic politics, 
and in defining norms and culture. The latter regards norms as ―collective expectation 
about proper behaviour for a given identity‖: in other words, norms function from time 
to time as regulations for identity.
86
 Culture refers to a set of appraising criteria – such 
as norms, values, rules and models – that describe how states function and impact one 
another.
87
 Katzenstein summarises his argument by emphasising that ―norm‖, 
―identities‖ and ―culture‖ matter.
88
 
Having outlined the importance of identity in international politics, we should 
now proceed to discuss Wendt‘s specific conceptualisation of ‗interests‘. Wendt 
categorises two kinds of interests: ‗Objective‘ and ‗Subjective‘
89
. Objective interests 
are requirements or operational necessities that must be satisfied if an identity is to 
survive. Wendt clarifies that all four sets of identities (as indicated in previous sections) 
require not only to survive, but also to reproduce themselves. For instance, a Western 
state cannot exist as such without solidarity with other Western states.
90
 My contention 
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is that this principle also applies to the Islamic Republic‘s solidarity with Palestine, 
given that Iran identifies itself as an Islamic state, a leader of the Islamic world, and 
ultimately as a supporter of the oppressed around the globe. Subjective interests (or 
―preferences‖)
91
 by contrast are normative values held by actors concerning the best 
ways of satisfying their identity requirements.
92
 Back to Wendt‘s formula, we can argue 
that from this perspective state behaviour is an outcome of produced desires and the 
ways it thinks it can conceivably achieve them.  
It can be understood from Wendtian constructivism that ideas are the conclusive 
tunnels that states and non-state actors travel through in order to relate to one other. 
Wendt‘s theory aims to demonstrate that ideas and cultures determine the implications 
and substance of power and interests. My understanding of Wendt‘s argument is that 
his theory tries to create a balance between the two traditional approaches of 
materialism and constructivism. It can be concluded that Wendt aims to emphasise that 
material factors should not be ignored, but be viewed according to the context of 
ideational and social structures. Throughout my thesis I shall argue that Iranian-
Palestinian relations are constituted by ideas, norms, culture and history – in agreement 
with the theories of Katzenstein and Wendt suggesting that ideas as well as material 
factors matter. In relation to Iran and Palestine, I believe and argue that Islamic shared 
values are one important factor in shaping the Iranian approach towards Palestine, to 
the degree that the Iranian state repeatedly felt an almost moral commitment to the 
cause - moral in the sense that contradicting it causes a sense of guilt as Steele 
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conceptualises it. Undoubtedly, this attituded also served and informed the material 
interest of the post-revolutionary Iranian state.  
The Main argument of the thesis 
In light of the literature review and theoretical discussion, this thesis proposes 
that the revolutionary and Islamic identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been the 
major motivational factor behind Iran‘s relations with Palestine. However, this is not to 
deny the significance of material factors and national interests. My position is that 
Iran‘s Islamic collective identity and its understanding that Palestine shares its Islamic 
values are critical for an understanding of Iranian-Palestinian relations after 1979. This 
thesis has taken a constructivist approach based on Alexander Wendt‘s theory to 
discuss the nature of Iran‘s attitudes towards Palestine. Wendt‘s argument is persuasive 
when applied to the Iranian-Palestinian example due to the recognition of material 
factors and the statement that ―identities are the basis of interests.‖
93
 Wendt‘s 
theoretical discussion emphasises that material factors should be understood within the 
framework of identity and social structure. This is not to exaggerate the role of identity 
and religion on Iran‘s behaviour towards the Palestinian cause, but to view the strong 
link between Islamic identity and interests as a motivational vehicle behind Tehran‘s 
policies since the triumph of the revolution. Analysing Iran‘s foreign policy and 
international relations in general is beyond the scope of this thesis, therefore, my 
concentration in the literature review and my exploration of Alexander Wendt‘s theory 
is specifically in relation to Iranian-Palestinian relations.  
There is a consensus amongst a number of scholars that the Islamic revolution 
brought about a transformation of the identity of the Iranian state that influenced Iran‘s 
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foreign policy. As Arshin Adib-Moghaddam observes, ―[r]evolution in Iran changed 
the state identity of the country from a monarchic-nationalist system to a revolutionary, 
Islamic-republican one.‖
94
According to Suzanne Maloney, the impact of Iran‘s 
revolutionary identity was especially clear in Iran‘s post revolutionary foreign Policy.
95
 
From Maloney‘s stand point, ―the narrative of Iran‘s dramatic transformation from one 
of the pillars of American interests in the Persian Gulf to one of its perils demonstrates 
identity and interests intermingle‖.
96
 To demonstrate the importance of identity and 
national interests in regard to Iranian-Palestinian relations, I divide my argument to two 
parts. First I examine the significant role of the Islamic agenda behind Iran‘s approach 
towards Palestine. Second, I identify the importance of the material factors in this 
regard.  
a) Islamic agenda: 
Shortly after the triumph of the revolution in 1979, the state designated itself as 
an ‗Islamic Republic‘ in order to represent a new identity at a regional and global level. 
This could imply that Iran‘s revolutionary state is rhetorically destined to bear some 
responsibility to advocate the Islamic agenda, promoting the idea of ‗Islamic unity‘ and 
lending support to fellow Muslims internationally, particularly those need protection 
and the ―oppressed‖. As Ayatollah Khomeini stated: ―[w]e support the oppressed. We 
support whoever is oppressed wherever they may be, and the Palestinians are 
oppressed, the Israelis oppress them. For this reason, we support them‖.
97
 The new 
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revolutionary constitution embedded Islamic principles and institutionalised Islamic 
values within its context. According to Ali Akbar Alikhani, the Islamic principles that 
stem from the Quran, the Prophet Mohammad‘s way of life (sunnah), and narrated 
traditions (ahadith) deemed authentic by the Shia served as the basis of the Islamic 
Republic‘s constitution.
98
 The Islamic Republic‘s constitution emphasises the necessity 
of supporting the rights of all Muslims and directing Iran‘s foreign policy towards 
promoting friendship amongst Muslim countries.
99
 The Quran contains a number of 
verses that clearly recommend Muslims to unite and act in harmony to support their 
fellow Muslims and protect the ‗oppressed‘.
100
 To that end, Ayatollah Khomeini‘s 
vision of mustazafan versus mustakberan (oppressed versus oppressor) created a central 
structure for revolutionary Iran‘s foreign policy. According to Adib-Moghaddam, the 
ideal of the millenarian conflict between oppressed and oppressor was a fundamental 
part of Iran‘s presentation of its revolutionary creed and the new character of it as an 
Islamic state.
101
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Islamic revolution  - in accordance with Khomeini‘s Islamic theory – was to act as the 
supporter of the oppressed, and rise up against all world oppressors.
102
  
We are permitted to ask what the status of Palestine is in Iran‘s Islamic and 
revolutionary rhetoric. It is clear that Palestine occupies an especially lofty status in the 
Islamic world, given that its land contains Islam‘s Muslim‘s first Qibla (direction of 
prayer), the Mosque of al-Aqsa, and that it has been ‗occupied‘ by the Zionist state of 
Israel. Certainly, this is the view held by Iran, with Ahmed El-Dajani observing that 
―Iran and the Arab nation fall within the Islamic dominion; Israel invaded Palestine 
which occupies an important place in the Islamic dominion‖.
103
 For the Islamic 
revolution, Palestine represented the ‗oppressed‘ of the world. Ayatollah Khomeini lent 
a special significance to the Palestinian question in his speeches and revolutionary 
rhetoric since the beginning of his movement. In a statement in December 1978, 
Khomeini said that  
we have always spoken of Israel and the fact that it is a usurper. Our intention has always 
been to stand by our Palestinian brothers, and whenever we gain power, we will join 
them in defending their rights like brothers standing as equals in the same line of battle 
as them. Beit ul-Moqaddas must be returned to the Muslims, the Israelis are usurpers.
104
  
According to Khomeini, Israel had occupied the distinctly Muslim land of 
Palestine, and the Shah had acted in ways which threatened the Islamic identity of Iran 
– notably by recognising the occupation of Palestine, and supporting the Zionist 
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 There is a consensus amongst the leaders of various factions of the Islamic 
revolution that Iran‘s support of Palestine cannot be compromised due to its importance 
to the Islamic world, and its synonymy with the identity of the Islamic revolution.
106
 
After the triumph of the revolution, Iran‘s leaders desired to represent their state as the 
Umm al-Qura (The Mother of the Cities in Islamic Terms),
107
 and this ideological 
tendency demanded that Iran focus its attention on the most vital challenge facing the 
Muslim world: the question of Palestine.  
One tends to agree with Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp‘s point of view that 
―[n]o cause has greater symbolic appeal in the Islamic world than the plight of the 
Palestinians. Iranian leaders see it as an Islamic issue, giving them the right to be 
involved‖.
108
 In fact, support for Palestine has become a primary source of legitimacy 
for Iran‘s Islamic revolutionary state. Iran‘s revolutionary leaders had championed the 
Palestinian cause in their rhetoric prior to the Iranian revolution, and continue to 
emphasise its importance up until the present day. According to Chubin and Tripp, the 
Islamic Republic deems it a duty to pursue a pro-Palestinian policy because  
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Iran as the Islamic republic claiming to be a role-model, could scarcely be indifferent to 
Islamic issues. Recognition of Israel, for example, was unthinkable. The Islamic republic 
would have to change its name if it wanted to do such a thing. It cannot be a Muslim 
community and concede such an injustice.
109
  
According to Adib-Moghaddam, the Islamic Republic set a foundation for future 
foreign policy given that most ideological elements of the Islamic revolution could 
agree upon its core principles. Moreover, Adib-Moghaddam argues that  
Pro-Palestinian sentiments, anti-Zionism and anti-Imperialism, Islamic 
communitariansim, third-worldism, and cultural and political independence [all] 
functioned as the ideational point of fixation reconstituting the Iranian self during the 
revolutionary process of  the 1960s and 1970s and are not easy to discard, even in the 
early years of twenty first century. 
110
  
According to Hossein Salimi, support for Islamic movements and opposing the 
illegitimacy of Israel are both common elements of the Islamic Republic‘s foreign 
policy.
111
 It is true to argue, as Adib-Moghaddam does, that there is a connecting 
junction of ―Iran‘s foreign policy culture‖ where different factions within the Islamic 
revolution could reach consensus due to their shared interests and values.
112
 From my 
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point of view, Palestine has been at the heart of Iran‘s grand strategic preferences 
because it has a special place within the revolutionary Islamic identity. 
b) Material Factors: 
To argue that the Islamic identity of revolutionary Iran is the primary force 
behind Iran‘s support of Palestinian movements is not an attempt to deny the 
importance of material factors and the Islamic Republic‘s national interests in 
influencing its support of the Palestinians. The Islamic Republic likely views its pro-
Palestinian approach also as a useful tool serving its regional interests, allowing it to 
play a key role in the Islamic world. As such, support for  Sunni-Arab Palestine could 
provide the Islamic Republic with an entry point to gain influence in the Islamic world, 
and within Sunni-Arab neighbouring countries in particular. 
The Islamic Republic is currently the only predominantly Shia state with 
Islamic-universalist aspirations, and hence it does not wish to be isolated within a 
majority Sunni-Arab states. In order to avoid potential isolation, Iran needs to appeal to 
the broader Islamic world as a way of serving its Islamic-universalist objectives, as 
advocated throughout the revolution by the country‘s leaders. It was logical for the 
Islamic Republic to explicitly define itself as the supporter of the mostazafan in order to 
carry its voice to the rest of the Islamic world, particularly to its neighbours. According 
to Mahmood Sariolghalam, ―by warmly embracing the Palestinian cause in its domestic 
and foreign policy, Iran wanted to demonstrate its readiness for cooperation with the 
surrounding Arab states‖.
113
 Chubin and Tripp agree that the Islamic Republic ―did not 
want to limit its potential constituency to the Shi‘i world, a minority in Islam, instead, it 
                                                 
113 Mahmood Sariolghalam, “Conceptual Sources of Post-Revolutionary Iranian Behaviour toward the Arab 
World”, in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), Iran and the Arab World, London: the Macmillan 
Press Ltd., 1993, p. 23. 
41 
pursued its revolutionary objective of Islamic universalism, pitting a populist Islam of 
the oppressed against the oppressor‖.
 114
   
Chubin and Tripp make a valid point that the Islamic revolutionary rhetoric of 
―carrying the banner of Islam, supporting oppressed against oppressors, anti-imperialist 
tendency and its desire to be a leading country in the Islamic world‖ was seen as a 
pellucid challenge by Iran‘s neighbouring Arab Sunni states, and particularly Saudi 
Arabia, who sees its own authority deriving from its role as the ‗protector‘ of the Holy 
Places of Mecca and Medina.
115
 As such, Tehran has entered a competition for regional 
influence that requires it to expand its influence to the wider Islamic world. In 
accordance with its Islamic identity and grand strategic ideology, it has been in the 
Islamic Republic‘s regional interest to lead an ‗Islamic campaign‘ against imperialism, 
Zionism, and hegemonic powers. As Manouchehr Mohammadi argues:  
Under the title of its anti-imperialist campaign and support for the oppressed inspired by 
the teaching of Islam and as it is stipulated within its constitution, the Islamic republic of 
Iran has the potential and actually has in its possession the required mechanism to lead 
such a campaign against the present hegemonic system.
116
  
According to Suzanne Maloney, ―Iran believes it has the historical, cultural, 
even moral weight to powerfully shape the region‖. 
117
 In other words, Iran‘s 
aspirations of leading its ideological campaign required Tehran to expand its influence 
beyond its borders and confront pro-Western regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia by 
reaching out to the Sunni-Arab majority of the region. The Islamic Republic‘s 
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leadership had been aware of the significance of the Palestinian issue since its 
beginning, and have always been staunch believers that championing the Palestinian 
cause could facilitate the spread of Iranian revolutionary influence across the region, 
paving the way for its ―spiritual hegemony‖ over Muslim populations. Consequently, 
Iran‘s position on Palestine could send a message to the Sunni world that Iran‘s 
revolutionary agenda was not confined to Shiacommunities. The Islamic Republic‘s 
leadership has therefore realised that it could foster its version of ―Islamic 
universalism‖ in the Arab and Sunni worlds by maintaining a pro-Palestinian stance. 
This stance would allow Tehran to Islamise the Palestinian cause and transform it from 
being an Arab issue to one that was Muslim, and therefore of immediate concern to 
Iran. Having confronted the Pan-Arab Baathist regime in Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq 
war on the one hand, and Yasser Arafat‘s pro-Saddam and pro-Western position on the 
other, the Iranian leadership had realised that supporting explicitly Islamic movements 
(such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad) in Palestine could both prevent Saddam from using 
the Palestinian cause as a means to mobilise the Arab street against Iran, and weaken 
Arafat‘s pro-Western position.  
Iran‘s pro-Palestinian stance can also help illuminate the salience of its pan-
Islamic outlook domestically, and how the state uses this stance to enhance the 
legitimacy of its revolutionary status among the local population, particularly amongst 
the rather more politically radical strata of society. Moreover, oppositional factions 
within the Islamic Republic have realised that by emphasising their pro-Palestinian 
credentials, they are better able to represent themselves as the ―supporters of the 
revolutionary principles‖ domestically, and therefore gain more support amongst clerics 
and members of the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) for their political campaigns. As 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri argue, ―Ahmadinejad‘s followers are 
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more religious, traditional and idealistic in terms of the lofty goals of the Islamic 
revolution.‖
118
 Therefore it is not difficult to realise that Ahmadinejad‘s continued 
reference to Palestine was part of his government strategy to build ―on his populist 
rhetoric to advance his neoconservative-inspired hard line at home and abroad‖.
119
 In 
regard to advancing neoconservative –inspired hardline policy abroad, Ehteshami and 
Zweiri clarify that  
Ahmadinejad‘s support for the Palestinian cause places Iran in the Arab heartland, an 
area Iran had not fully accessed in the past. In a region that requires leadership and a 
solution to the conflict in Palestine Ahmadinejad, through his invocations of justice and 
connections with Palestinian groups, was creating a role for himself though at the 
expense of other Arab leaders who had failed to address The Palestine issue.
120
   
In sum, one could argue that the Islamic Republic‘s support for Sunni Arab 
Palestine could counter potential criticism amongst the Arab Sunni states that the 
Islamic Republic is pursuing only ―Shia-Persian‖ interests, and underline its self-
professed status as the champion of Islamic universalism.   
A number of scholars argue that Iran‘s position towards the Palestinian issue 
stem from its ideological tendencies, and do not conflict with the ―pragmatic interests 
of the state‖.
121
  To this end, my perception is that Iran‘s pro-Palestinian position stem 
from its Islamic identity while going hand in hand with the Islamic Republic‘s national 
interests. Thus, Revolutionary Iran has been keen to develop and institutionalise its 
relations with Palestinian factions. Despite factional differences in Iranian politics, we 
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can discern a common stance on the Palestinian issue, and patterns of facilitating close 
relations with Palestinian factions that have closer ideological positions to the Islamic 
Republic.  
An Overview of Chapters 
This study offers a discursive interpretation of Iranian solidarity towards the 
Palestinian cause in post-revolutionary era. Two key questions about Iranian-
Palestinian relations are explored in detail throughout my thesis. First, what are the 
roots of Iranian-Palestinian relations, and how is the Palestinian question viewed by the 
Iranian authorities post-1979? Second, how were Iranian-Palestinian relations 
institutionalised and developed after the triumph of the 1979 revolution? The questions 
posed here form the backbone of this study and the key to understanding Iran's 
approach towards the Arab world. In my quest for the answers, I looked into the Iranian 
governmental publications, Farsi and Arabic sources, and I also conducted interviews 
with officials and delegates of Palestinian groups such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas in 
Tehran. These interviews are translated by me from Arabic and Farsi into English for 
the purpose of this thesis.  
This study begins with a chapter contextualising pre-revolutionary Iranian 
activists' solidarity with the Palestinians. Chapter 2 examines the institutionalisation of 
Iran's pro-Palestinian, anti-Zionism and ummah-centric ideas during the post-
revolutionary era, exploring Iran's relation with PLO before and after the Iran-Iraq war. 
Chapter 3 explores the impact of the Islamic revolution on the Palestinian streets, 
focusing on Fathi Shiqaqi, the founder of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Chapter 4 
explores the Islamic Republic's relations with Hamas since its establishment by Sheikh 
Ahmad Yassin. Chapter 5 follows the same path, but offers a discussion of changes and 
continuities in the post-Arab Spring era. This final chapter explores the impact of the 
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Syrian crisis on Iran's relations with Hamas, and traces Iran's reactions towards 2012 
and 2014 Wars in Gaza strip as litmus tests for the Islamic Republic's commitment 
towards the Palestinian cause. Chapter 6 concludes the study. 
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Chapter One 
Iran’s Pre-Revolutionary Opposition and the Palestine Cause 
At this stage it is essential to provide context for how Iranian opposition groups 
in the pre-revolutionary era engaged with the Palestinian cause. This chapter does not 
provide an exhaustive overview of secondary literatures examining the role of left-wing 
forces in Iran from the early 1960s up until the triumph of the Islamic revolution in 
Iran, nor their differences and strategies in toppling the Shah‘s regime. Instead, this 
chapter focuses on the attitudes of Iranian dissidents towards Palestine up until the 1979 
Islamic revolution. As this chapter comprises the first narrative of the historical 
development of relations between Iranian opposition groups and the Palestinian cause, 
it may appear more descriptive than analytical. However, my discovery, selection, 
translation and evaluation of dispersed sources, and the presentation of this data within 
a relevant framework alongside a comprehensive assessment, in itself presents a major 
analytical challenge to understand the Iranian-Palestinian dialectic. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section looks into historical 
relations between left-wing Iranian guerrilla forces – such as the People‘s Mojahedin of 
Iran (MKO), the Iranian People‘s Faday‘an, and the Palestine Group, as well as 
organised student opposition to the Shah such as the Confederation of Iranian Students 
National Union (CISNU) – and Palestine. The second section analyses the attitude of 
some of the most prominent revolutionary and distinguished Muslim figures, such as 
Ayatollah Kashani, Navab Safavi, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Mahmoud 
Taleqani, Mustafa Chamran, Ali Shariati, Ayatollah Mortaza Mottahari, and others 
towards the Palestinian question. In order to better understand the origin of relations 
between pre-revolutionary Iranians and the Palestinian cause, it is necessary to gain an 
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understanding of these figures‘ political ideas and activities. I conclude the chapter with 
an assessment of this history, and emphasise that Iran‘s pre-revolutionary oppositions‘ 
socio-political tendencies – which included stances of anti-imperialism, anti-monarchy, 
anti-Zionism and, with regard to Islamic figures, pro-Muslim preferences – guided their 
attitudes towards the Palestinian cause. In this account, I assess that  material factors 
played a secondary role in determining the relationship between these groups and the 
Palestinian cause.  
The Iranian pre-revolutionary “left wing “guerrilla movements and 
Palestine 
After the overthrow of Iran‘s democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mossadeq in the 1953 coup, and the reinstatement of the Shah‘s absolute monarchy not 
least due to American and British intelligence support, Iranian dissidents began to face 
suppression and systematic coercion. Due to coercion and political closeness, the period 
between 1953 and 1963 can be characterised as an era in which opposition groups such 
as the Tudeh party and the Mossadeqist National Front pursued less confrontational 
policies against the dictatorship of the Shah.
122
 Some historians and academics agree 
that the 1963 popular uprising under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini was a 
turning point, becoming a catalyst for emerging ‗left-wing‘ guerrilla movements in 
Iran. From Abrahamian's point of view, the roots of the guerrilla movements date back 
to the summer of 1963, when the Shah‘s regime fiercely dealt with peaceful protests 
organised by the opposition.
123
 The brutal suppression during 1963 coincided with 
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increasing activities by revolutionary and guerrilla movements in Third World 
countries, notably in Algeria, Cuba, Vietnam and Palestine. Influenced and inspired by 
guerrilla movements in other Third World countries, it was natural that younger 
members of traditional oppositional organizations such as the Tudeh and the National 
Front came to a conclusion that peaceful actions against the Shah‘s regime was a dead 
end, and that guerrilla conflict represented a better alternative. Of the emerging 
guerrilla groups, Abrahamian categorises them into two groups as being more active 
and organised: the Sazman-i Cherik-ha-yi Feda-i Khalq-i Iran (The Guerrilla Freedom 
Fighters of the Iranian People), known as the Marxist Faday‘an; and the Sazman-i 
Mujahidin-i Khalq-i Iran (The Organisation of the Freedom Fighters of the Iranian 
People), generally referred to as the ―Islamic Mujahedin‖.
124
  
Post 1963, younger members of the Tudeh party and the Marxist contingent of 
the National Front were left frustrated by the perceived failure of the Tudeh party to 
confront the Pahlavi regime. Many were inspired by anti-imperialist movements across 
the Third World and – critical of pro-Soviet Tudeh policies – began to organise 
independent groups. The Fadayi, according to Abrahamian, adopted its name in 1971, 
and came into existence through the merging of three politically active groups. The first 
group was founded from 1963-1964 by Ali Akbar Safa-i Farahani, Mohammad 
Ashtiyani, Abbas Sourki and Bezhan Jazani; all of whom active members of the Tudeh 
Party‘s Youth Organisation.
125
 The second group was led by Masoud Ahmadzadeh, 
who bore religious and pro-Marxist socio-political tendencies. The third group was led 
by Ashraf Dehqani.
126
 Safa-i Farahani wrote a handbook titled Ancheh Yek Inqelabi 
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Bayad Bedanad (What a Revolutionary Must Know),
127
 in which he drew up the 
ideological composition of the Faday‘an. In his handbook, Safa-i Farahani castigated 
the Shah‘s regime for being dependent on ―global imperialism‖, criticising the Pahlavi 
regime‘s pro-American foreign policy and particularly its ―collaboration‖ with Israel 
against Arab neighbours such as Egypt, which was causing other political conflicts in 
South Yemen, Iraq and Syria. His handbook highlighted the importance of supporting 
international anti-imperialist movements as a vital part of the Faday‘an‘s ideological 
struggle against the Shah‘s pro-western regime.
128
   
According to Sepehr Zabih, the Faday‘an was ideologically influenced by 
Marxism-Leninism, and pursued it as their official ideology. In particular, Latin 
American revolutionary writings became attractive to the Faday‘an, and its members 
were inspired heavily by the Cuban Revolution and ―anti-Imperialism guerrilla 
movements‖ throughout the Third World.
129
 The Cuban Revolution, the Tupamaros in 
Uruguay, and growth of guerrilla warfare in Palestine and Vietnam greatly influenced 
their leadership.
130
 In 1967, a few years after the foundation of Jazani‘s group, most of 
its leadership were arrested by SAVAK. Two prominent members Safa-i Farahani and 
Ashtiyani escaped to Lebanon, joining their Palestinian counterparts in Fatah and 
receiving guerrilla training for two years. Upon their return to Iran in 1969, they 
continued their struggle alongside their fellow guerrillas. 
131
 Safa-i Farahani and 
Ashtiyani managed to cross the border into Iraq by using forged documents. Although 
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SAVAK deported two Iraqi Marxist dissidents to Baghdad as a good-will gesture,
132
 the 
Iranian foreign office failed to persuade its Iraqi counterparts to extradite the Faday‘an.  
Safa-i Farahani and Ashtiyani requested permission from the Iraqi authorities to 
cross the border in order to join up with their fellow freedom fighters in Palestine. After 
spending a month in Iraqi jails, they were allowed to cross into Syria. Initially 
interrogated in Damascus, they were subsequently allowed to cross the border into 
Jordan so long as they managed to convince the Syrians that they would fight alongside 
Palestinian guerrillas. After meeting and engaging in an ideological discourse with 
Fatah delegates on the Jordanian border, they were accepted and sent to Palestinian 
camps in Jordan. Safa-i Farahani received the nickname Abu-Abbas from his 
Palestinian comrades, and became one of the commanders of the Palestinian camp, 
while Ashtiyani was appointed as the key-holder of the camp‘s warehouse. Both 
received support and training until they decided to return to Iran in winter 1969 in an 
effort to continue their anti-Imperialist struggle at home.
133
 Upon their return, the 
military training of these two proved invaluable in improving the guerrilla warfare 
capabilities of the Faday‘an. Meanwhile, a group of their fellow fighters gathered in 
northern Iran preparing for an armed struggle against the monarchy. This culminated in 
an open battle on the 8th of February 1971, known as the Siyahkal insurgency, under 
the command of Safa-i Farahani. Most of the Faday‘an fighters were either killed in the 
Siyahkal battle, or arrested and subsequently executed. 
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According to Abrahamian, Safa-i Farahani was captured and tortured to death. 
He died after refusing to reveal information about other members of the Faday‘an.
135
 
After the failed Siyahkal insurgency,  the Pahlavi state mounted a massive propaganda 




The connection between the Faday‘an guerrillas and Palestinian fighters was not 
monopolized by the Faday‘an‘s leadership however. Iraj Sepehri, a sympathizer and 
later low ranking member of the Faday‘an travelled across the Iran- Iraq border alone in 
order to join up with Ahmad Jibril‘s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command in autumn 1971. In a memoir written by Sepehri, published by the 
Faday‘an in 1977, he described his fascination and attraction to the Palestinian cause, 
arguing that the Palestinians were in fact fighting the same enemy as he was: ‗global 
Zionism‘ and international imperialism. He strongly believed that there was a close link 
between the Shah‘s regime and the state of Israel's oppression of the people of 
Palestine. According to the memoir, Sepehri fought alongside the Palestinians during a 
number of guerrilla insurgencies in the Golan Heights, alongside Ahmad Jibril‘s group 
in 1972. During his time in the Golan, Sepehri used the name Mohammad Abdul-
Qader, and was later nicknamed Abu-Saeed Irani by his Palestinian comrades.
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Abrahamian clarifies that although the Faday‘an suffered setbacks after 
Siyahkal, its new members continued carrying out a number of armed operations 
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mainly targeting the Iran-American Society, embassies of United Kingdom, Oman, and 
the United States, and Iranian police headquarters in Tehran.
138
 In examining the 
Faday‘an‘s pamphlets and handbooks such as the ones mentioned here, one can discern 
that the group had been eager to underline their connections with the Palestinian 
fighters, as well as their sympathies with the third-world guerrilla movements 
throughout their armed struggle against the Shah‘s regime. In all, according to 




Another leftist guerrilla movement that emerged during the 1960s to early 1970s 
was the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MKO), who proclaimed to be both anti-monarchy and 
anti-Imperialist. Abrahamian and Zabih agree that the roots of the Mojahedin can be 
traced back to the religious wing of the National Front, and particularly the Nehzat-i 
Azadi Iran (The Liberation Movement of Iran).
140
 The Liberation Movement of Iran 
(LMI) was established in 1961 by Mehdi Bazargan and Ayatollah Taleqani, two loyal 
supporters of Mossadeq. The movement was well-known for its radical anti-imperialist 
stance.
141
 According to Abrahamian, the 1963 uprising, together with the revolutions in 
Algeria, Cuba and Vietnam, had radicalised a group of younger members of the LMI. 
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In the late 1960s, the Mojahedin‘s study group set up a central committee and 
an ideological team, and tasked them with producing the organisation‘s theological 
pamphlets.
143
 In the early days, the Mojahedin focused its efforts mainly at targeted 
‗imperialism‘, and especially what it regarded as American imperialism, and viewed the 
Shah‘s monarchical regime as being complicit. In condemning US imperialism and its 
‗global collaborators‘, the Mojahedin publicly began to denounce the Pahlavi‘s regime 
for allying with the West, Israel, and other reactionary regimes such as those of South 
Africa and South Vietnam. For the Mojahedin, these regimes had allied themselves 
against the Third World, including Arab nations and the Vietnamese liberation 
movement.
144
 According to Abrahamian, the ideology of the Mojahedin combined 
Islam with Marxism.
145
 The group‘s leadership attempted to avoid being directly 
associated with Marxism, and instead painted itself as being more religiously inclined. 
Yet the Mojahedin‘s main aim was to highlight commonalities between Islam and 
Marxism through the shared language of anti-imperialism. Indeed, the Mojahedin were 
certainly aware that denying the validity or importance of religion in a society where 
the masses were religious would send the message that the group was out of touch, and 
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As the Mojahedin began its guerrilla war against the Shah‘s regime, its 
leadership established contacts with the PLO, and particularly Fatah, which in addition 
to being militarily capable was closer ideologically to the Mojahedin.
147
 The leadership 
of the Mojahedin were already familiar with Fatah‘s ideological tendencies through 
listening to their radio channel, al-Asefah. In autumn 1969, the MKO decided to 
establish formal contacts with Fatah by sending Hussein Ruhani to their office in Paris. 
Ruhani‘s meetings with Fatah‘s official, Mahmud Al-Hamshari, ended with no tangible 
results. The MKO central committee made another attempt at establishing relations 
with Fatah by sending some of its prominent members, including Rasoul Meshkinfam 
and Torab Haqshenas, to Qatar and Dubai in March 1970.
148
 There they managed to 
meet with Fatah officials and hold ideological discussions. After clarifying their anti-
Zionist stance and ideological beliefs, Fatah agreed to hold more discussions with 
Iranian activists in Beirut and Amman. Mojahedin delegates arrived in Jordan from 
Beirut in spring 1970 and held a number of meetings with Fatah official Abu-Hassan. 
Both sides came to an agreement, and arranged for Fatah to provide guerrilla training 
for members of the Mojahedin.  
Following their meetings, members of the central committee of the Mojahedin 
travelled to Jordan and Fatah training camps in Lebanon and Syria following ‗Black 
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  While the first group of the Mojahedin attended Fatah training camps in 
Beirut and Amman, another group of six people – including Musa Khiabani – were sent 
to Dubai with forged documents in order to join their fellow fighters. As the group 
attempted to purchase necessary items for their journey to Beirut, they were detained on 
suspicion of travelling with false documents by a British officer tasked with training 
Dubai‘s local police. After spending a few months in custody, they were due to be 
extradited to Iran.
150
 The Mojahedin leadership sent Meshkinfam, Ruhani and Sadat-
Darbandi to Dubai with a mission to investigate the situation, and upon their arrival 
they received moral support from Yasser Arafat. They subsequently obtained 
intelligence through a Palestinian judge that happened to be a PLO sympathiser in 
Dubai. Using this intelligence, they boarded the same flight as the extradited members 
of the Mojahedin and hijacked the plane, flying it to Iraq.  
In Baghdad, the group of nine Mojahedin were imprisoned and tortured by the 
Iraqi authorities on suspicion of being SAVAK agents. It was not until Fatah officials in 
Iraq intervened and convinced the Iraqis to release and permit them to join Fatah camps 
in Syria and Lebanon.
151
 Meanwhile Morteza Haqshenas, a prominent member of the 
Mojahedin, travelled to Iraq and requested that Ayatollah Khomeini, who was in exile 
in Iraq, intervene on their behalf. However, Ayatollah Khomeini refused to intervene 
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knowing that the Iraqi regime would request his collaboration in return, which he 
wanted to avoid.
152
  While the group spent a week recuperating in a Baghdad hospital, 
they refused to accept Iraqi offers to remain in Baghdad and continue their anti-Shah‘s 
activities. According to Ruhani‘s interview, the Mojahedin wanted to leave Iraq 
because they were aware that SAVAK would use their presence there in its anti-
Mojahedin propaganda.
153
 The Mojahedin were trained in Fatah‘s Hassan-Sallameh 




According to Chehabi, Mojahedin trainees at the Palestinian camps were 
provided with Fatah identity documents and enjoyed a certain amount of immunity and 
freedom of movement in Lebanon.
155
 Having improved their military capabilities in the 
Palestinian camps, the Mojahedin planned to return and organize guerrilla activities in 
Iran. However, most of its leadership and active membership were rounded up and 
arrested by SAVAK in August 1971.
156
 The captured members of the Mojahedin were 
tried by military tribunals, all charged with hijacking the plane from Dubai, arms 
smuggling, and being agents of the PLO. The Shah‘s regime also accused them of 
being Marxist-Islamist saboteurs.
157
 Those members that were not in the dock, Ruhani 
and Haqshenas, travelled extensively in order to maintain and fortify the Mojahedin‘s 
connection with the PLO, the governments of Libya and the People‘s Democratic 
                                                 
152
 Ibid., pp. 404-406. 
153 
Ibid., p. 404. 
154 
Ibid., p. 407. According to the document, the Mujahedin's Organisation claimed that the Camp of Hassan-
Sallameh was named after Meshkinfam’s nickname.  
155 
H.E. Chehabi (ed.), Distant Relations; Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years, pp. 186-187. 
156 
Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, p. 128. According to Abrahamian, the Mojahedin had planned 
to sabotage celebrations of the anniversary of 2,500 years of monarchy. However, SAVAK infiltrated the group 
and arrested thirty members of the Mojahedin a few days before the scheduled bombing.  
157
 Ibid., pp. 128-129. 
57 
Republic of Yemen, and other Iranian dissidents in exile.
158
 Meanwhile, Mohsen 
Nejathoseini remained in Lebanon and acted as the Mojahedin‘s delegate in the Sabra 




From August 1971 the Mojahedin began to publish pamphlets which 
highlighted its connection with Palestinian fighters. In a statement published by the 
MKO in winter 1972 entitled The Defence Statement of Martyr Said Mohsen in the 
Military Tribunal, the Mojahedin explicitly stated their anti-imperialist and pro-
Palestinian stance. In Said Mohsen‘s words, 
[w]e have started our uprising to build a world where there is no exploitation. This goal 
does not recognize geographical borders; it can be in Iran, Palestine, Vietnam or Africa. 
For us, martyrdom alongside the Palestinian freedom fighters or Vietnamese guerrillas 
has one meaning. To do so, we have been confronting American imperialism and the 
Shah‘s pro-capitalist puppet regime. To obtain our goal, we continue our armed struggle 
and are ready to sacrifice our lives.
160
 
Mohammad Hanifnezhad‘s statement during his trial and SAVAK 
interrogations were also publicised. During interrogations, he clarified the influence of 
the Palestinian cause on the Mojahedin‘s ideology, stating  
[w]e were mainly concentrating on studying Quran and religious books until 1967 when 
Israeli aggression and occupation of the Palestinian lands intensified. Hearing that how 
the oppressed people of Palestine became victims of international imperialism and the 
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fact that the Shah‘s regime had close relations with Israel, the main enemy of the 
Muslims, prompted us to intensify our struggle. We decided to fight against the enemies 
of Islam and follow the fatwa of Islamic clerics including Ayatollah Khomeini and send 
our fighters to Palestine.
161
 
In an effort to refute the state‘s accusation that the Mojahedin were disguising 
Marxist ideology in religious garb, the group‘s propaganda wing attempted to underline 
the organisation‘s anti-Zionist stance as the main unifying factor between Islam and 
Marxism. In 1975, the Mojahedin published a hand-out entitled Pasokh be Etehamate 
Akhir-e Regime [Answer to the Regime‘s Latest Insults]: 
The regime is trying hard to place a wedge between Marxism and Muslims. In our view, 
there is only one major enemy: imperialism and its local collaborators. Of course Islam 
and Marxism are not identical. Nevertheless Islam is definitely closer to Marxism than to 
Pahlavism. Islam and Marxism teach the same lesson, for they both fight against 
injustice. Islam and Marxism contain the same message, for they both inspire martyrdom, 
struggle and self-sacrifice. Who is closer to Islam; the Vietnamese who fight American 
imperialism or the Shah who collaborates with Zionism and imperialism?
162
 
As mentioned earlier, the Mojahedin during its early stages were influenced and 
inspired by Third World revolutions and organisations, including the Algerian 
revolution and particularly the Palestinian liberation movement. The Mojahedin 
believed that the Palestinians were fighting at the heart of the Islamic world and in an 
area where most of the regimes were conservative and pro-American. The Palestinian 
movement also served as an inspiration to the Mojahedin because it continued to 
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operate despite a series of political and military setbacks, such as 1967 Arab- Israeli 
war and Black September. The Mojahedin were aware that the Iranian public 
sympathised with the Palestinian cause, and consequently pushed the view that the fate 
of the Shah‘s regime was inextricably tied to that of Zionism.
163
The Mojahedin‘s 
political cadres translated some of al-Asifah's radio programs into Farsi, and published 
transcripts in their pamphlets.  
Two years after being re-established in 1961, following the June 1963 popular 
uprisings, the Mossdeqist National Front (NF) terminated its political activities inside 
Iran. Nevertheless, in the late 1960s some of its more radical cadres moved to Beirut 
and established close relations with Palestinian activists.
164
 Members of the NF in 
Beirut declared the establishment of Sazemanha-ye Jebhe-ye Melli-e Iran dar Khavar-e 
Miyaneh (Organizations of the National Front of Iran in the Middle East).
165
  From 
1971, NF members published a Farsi newspaper called Bakhtar-e Emruz as well as an 
Arabic language version titled Iran al-Thawra.
166
 Bakhtar-e Emruz had been printed in 
the Palestinian printing houses in Lebanon during the1970s in Lebanon. The main 
activities of these newspapers and pamphlets were to publicize relations between the 
Iranian opposition with other revolutionary movements, particularly Palestinian 
activists. The organizers of Bakhtar-e Emruz mainly conducted interviews with 
Palestinian activists, published joint statements, and publicized Ayatollah Khomeini‘s 
pronouncements on the Palestinian issue. The primary printed slogan of these 
newspapers was Pirooz baad Khalq-e Felestin, Pishqaravol-e Enqelab-e mardom-e 
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Further highlighting the methods of Bakhtar-e Emruz in publicizing the 
connection between Iran‘s pre-revolutionary dissidents with the Palestinian question are 
some of its short statements and interviews. In an interview with Bakhtar-e Emruz, 
published in February 1976, Ahmad Jibril, secretary of the PFLP-GC, praised the solid 
desire of the Iranian revolutionaries in resisting imperialism and highlighted the strong 
historical ties between the Arabs and the Iranians: 
[t]he Iranian regime, the reactionary Arab states, the Zionists and the Imperialism from 
any type that   they might be, create one unified unit. This unified unit is our natural 
enemy. The relations of the Arab home-land with Iran is not just about neighbouring 
state to state relations. But our relations have historical, economical, cultural and even a 
national basis. Therefore, we can neither exclude Iran from the Arab home-land nor the 
Arab home-land from Iran. In Iran, there are the Arab minorities and in Iraq and the 
(Persian) Gulf states, there are the Persian minorities. The ethnic Kurds also create a 
common cultural ground between Iran and Iraq. We have a similar historical background. 
I mean the Islamic common history. The Iranian and the Arab people have more than ten 
centuries of common history
.168  
In a similar interview with Bakhtar-e Emruz, George Habash, general secretary 
of the PFLP, stated that 
[a]ny victory obtained by the Iranian revolutionary movements is the triumph for all the 
anti-imperialistic revolutionary movements in the region. In fact, such organic relations 
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between the revolutionary movements have mutual and positive reflections on one 
another. Hence, when the Iranian masses manage to shake the pillars of imperialism in 




In October 1971, in response to the Black September and conflict between the 
Jordanian military forces and the Palestinian fighters, the NF issued a public statement 
in Bakhtar-e Emruz:  
[o]nce again, King Hussein, the puppet of imperialism and the collaborator of Zionism 
has attacked the freedom fighters of Palestine. The National Front of Iran conveys the 
Iranian people‘s deep sorrow on the killing of the Palestinian fighters. We strongly 
believe that the weapons of those martyrs will not remain on the ground as our people 
will not rest until the imperialism and Zionism are removed from our region.
170
 
Bakhtar-e Emruz also played a crucial role as a communication channel 
between Palestinian activists, Iranian revolutionaries and the Iranian public. In October 
1973, a public statement from Ayatollah Khomeini calling on the people of the region 
to support the Palestinian cause was published: 
The leaders of Islamic states should understand that this germinal source of corruption 
(Israel) that is implanted within the heart of the Islamic land, is not just for suppressing 
the Arab, but a hazard for all the people of the region. The purpose of Zionism is to 
dominate the rich natural resources of the Islamic countries. The only way to remove this 
imperialistic nightmare is through unity between the Islamic countries.
171
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The NF described the reasons and the roots of Iranian dissidents‘ strong moral 
connection to the Palestinian cause by stating that, 
Today, the validity of our old idea of the necessity to form strong ties between the 
revolutionary movements of the region is proven. The global revolutions view the 
Middle East as a unified organic unit. The path to the salvation of the nations within the 
region is through unity and not discord. The revolutionary struggle of the people of 
Palestine, Iran, Turkey and the (Persian) Gulf states are the prime pillars of this 
revolutionary union. The tie that has been formed between the revolutionary movements 
within the region during these years, itself proves the validity of our ideas. 
172
  
Another major activity of Bakhtar-e Emruz was to translate articles produced by 
members of other Third World revolutionary movements – particularly from 
Palestinian groups – and publish informative articles about these movements.  
Subscribing to the ideas of anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism, and holding a 
pro-Palestinian stance, was by no means limited to larger left-wing organizations. A 
smaller leftist circle calling itself Grouh-e Felestin (the Palestine Group) received 
public attention particularly when its members led by Shokrollah Paknezhad were 
arrested in December 1970 as they attempted to cross the border into Iraq in order to 
join the fight alongside guerrillas in Palestine.
173
  After being arrested by SAVAK, the 
commander of the Palestine Group made no secret of his support for the Palestinian 
people and of the inspiration that the Palestinian struggle provided for the militants in 
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 Shokrollah Paknezhad, in his defence statement titled Akharin Defa’e Grouh-e 
Felestin (The Last Defence Testimony of the Palestine Group), stated 
It is vital to clarify that most people being arrested and tried in this court have no fault 
other than being sympathizers with the Palestinian cause. By putting us on trial, the 
Iranian ruling regime is denouncing the solidarity of the Iranian nation with the people of 
Palestine and that the whole world with the Palestinian people, a unity for emancipation 
of the Palestinian land from the oppression of imperialism and Zionism. Of course our 
solidarity with the Palestinian people is not separated from our anti-imperialistic ideas. In 
fact, our anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist belief has been a motivational force in our 
struggle against the (Shah's) regime. Imperialism has chained not only the people of 
Palestine but the Iranian people and the people of the whole world. Israel is a tool in the 
hands of imperialism, exploiting and enslaving the people of the region. We are being 
tried by the Shah‘s regime because this (Shah‘s) regime is a puppet of American 
imperialism.
175
   
As well as the leftist guerrilla movements, a number of Iranian student 
organisations were notably anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist and pro-Palestinian. In 1962, 
Iranian student organisations in Europe and the United States joined together and 
established the Confederation of Iranian Students National Union (CISNU). According 
to Afshin Matin-Asgari, the CISNU created an organisational framework for 
cooperation between communists, socialists, secular nationalists and pro-Islamic 
activists that shared common ideas of anti-imperialism, anti-monarchy and anti-
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 Iranian students in the US, even before merging with their fellow students 
in Europe, began to criticize the Shah‘s pro-western foreign policy, calling on the 
regime to improve relations with Third World countries and respect the sentiments of 
Arab and Muslim nations.
177
 The CISNU supported various Third World causes, and 
advocated numerous students‘ anti-imperialist and national liberation movements in the 
Third World, particularly the Palestinian Student movement.  CISNU messages and 
declarations conveyed strong pro-Palestinian and anti-Zionist sentiments to the Iranian 
public, including Iranian oppositional groups and members of the clergy. 
178
 
From the early stages of 1963 religious uprising onwards, Ayatollah Khomeini 
focused on anti-Israel themes in his speeches and strongly castigated the Shah‘s pro-
western foreign policy. On the other hand, the CISNU intensified its anti-monarchical 
and anti-imperialistic activities. In 1968, the CISNU held its seventh congress in 
Frankfurt where it formulated and publicised its ―Policy Guideline‖, announcing the 
Confederation‘s disposition and anti-imperialistic goals: 
Unpatriotic and puppet governments, such as the present Iranian regime, cannot truly 
respond to the Iranian students‘ demands, which are directly linked with those of the 
masses. Therefore the student strata, as part of the people, along with the toiling masses, 
is in conflict with the regime and has created a movement that is democratic, anti-
imperialist, and popular. Students participating in this movement face the principal 
contradiction of society which is the one between the toiling masses of Iran and 
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imperialism. Our organization proceeds from an anti-imperialist position and takes a part 
in the popular struggle aiming to resolve the above mentioned principal contradiction.
179
 
Having declared the CISNU as an organized anti-imperialist student circle, its members 
published a number of pamphlets entitled Shanzdahom-e Azar which publicised its 
international activities abroad. In August 1969, CISNU secretaries Mahmud Rafi and 
Majid Zarbakhsh travelled to Jordan to participate in the congress of the General Union 
of Palestinian Students (GUPS). Subsequently, they visited Ayatollah Khomeini in 
Najaf to clarify the CISNU's anti-imperialistic and anti-Zionist positions. In their 
meeting, it was agreed that the CISNU would consider publishing more about the 
Islamic aspects of the struggle in Iran.
180
  
The CISNU established a close connection with GUPS and held regular joint 
meetings. The Confederation publicised the defence statements of the captured 
members of the Grouh-e Felestin in Iran, denouncing the military trial and lobbying for 
their release. The Confederation members held a number of hunger strikes throughout 
Europe and communicated with a number of organizations including Amnesty 
International. After meeting with the Austrian Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, he agreed to 
send a letter to the Shah requesting that Shokrollah Paknezhad‘s life be spared. 
Following CISNU activities and international pressure, representatives from the 




In January 1972, over 1,000 CISNU members attended the organisation‘s 13
th
 
conference in Frankfurt which publicised the Confederation‘s resolution. The resolution 
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strongly denounced the role of the Shah‘s regime as the ―gendarme of imperialism‖ in 
the region. The intervention of the Shah‘s regime against Palestinian and Omani 
revolutionary movements, alongside its anti-Arab propaganda, were also denounced 
and rebuked. 
182
 CISNU solidarity with Palestinian activists was put into practice and 
received global attention in March 1972 during the Munich Olympics, at which Israeli 
athletes were taken hostage by the Black September Organisation.
183
 After this event, 
the German authorities declared that Palestinian organisations including GUPS were 
illegal, and arrested their associate members for deportation to Jordan and Israel. The 
CISNU announced that it would defend its fellow Palestinian students and consider any 
attack on GUPS as an assault on the CISNU itself. Among the actions it took, the 
Confederation rescued Palestinian students taking refuge in the embassy of the Arab 
League in Bonn. To do so, CISNU activists secretly helped the Palestinians leave the 
embassy and go into hiding. The Iranian students took enormous risks during the 
mission, swapped their clothes with the Palestinians after entering the embassy, who 
would then depart without being recognized by the German police. Meanwhile, a 
number of Iranian and German students went on hunger strikes in Bonn, and others 




Iranian left-wing activists had reached an unwritten consensus that Iran‘s socio-
political problems (under the Pahlavi‘s regime) were the results of larger international 
dynamics – namely, imperialism and Zionism. Based on these ideas, the destruction of 
the Pahlavi‘s regime demanded a more vigorous and strong international revolutionary 
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movement, and it was this reason which led left-wing activists towards supporting 
Palestine. One may however argue that the left-wing activists‘ pro-Palestinian rhetoric 
was primarily due to the fact that they recognized the need to obtain the use of PLO 
training facilities. Yet the fact that Iranian left-wing activists would so heavily criticise 
Zionism, and glorify Third World movements and – more importantly – pro-Palestinian 
ideas, demonstrates the importance of Palestine and Third Worldism to left wing forces 
as well as the Iranian public. Iranian left-wing activists no doubt aimed to gain some 
benefit from PLO training camps, but this could be interpreted as merely a material 
factor guided by anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist ideas, and therefore of secondary in 
significance. It is vital to mention that anti-imperialism, anti-monarchism and anti-
Zionism credentials were crucial elements that leftwing activists tried to adhere to (at 
least in spirit) in order to qualify as anti-Shah opposition forces. To understand and 
recognise the importance of the Palestinian cause within the Iranian public, particularly 
within the revolutionary strata, I will analyse and discuss the attitude of some of 
prominent Islamic figures in Iran towards the Palestine question during the pre-
revolutionary period.  
Iran’s pre-revolutionary Islamists and the Palestinian cause  
Before investigating relations between pre-revolutionary Islamic figures and the 
question of Palestine, I intend to show how some of the Islamic revolutionaries 
interpreted and navigated the Palestinian cause within their discourse. Shortly after the 
establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, Ayatollah Kashani, a popular religious 
figure who was well-known for his opposition to British colonialism, denounced it and 
68 
emphasised his support for the Palestinians.
185
 In the winter of 1947, Ayatollah Kashani 
issued his first statement in relation to the Palestinian question: 
The foundation of the Zionist regime will be the source of corruption for Muslims in the 
Middle East and the whole world. The damage won‘t be limited to the Palestinian Arabs 
only, hence, this is a duty for all Muslims to do what they can to stop such tyranny 
against the Palestinian Muslims.
186
 
Ayatollah Kashani subsequently called for popular demonstrations in support of 
the Palestinians. In spring 1948, responding to Ayatollah Kashani‘s calls, around thirty 
thousand Iranians gathered in Sultani Mosque in Tehran (later renamed the Imam 
Khomeini Mosque) and protested against the establishment of the state of Israel. 
Ayatollah Kashani continuously called on the Iranian public to financially support the 
Palestinian fighters in their struggle against the state of Israel.
187
 Shortly after the 
Iranian government recognized Israel as a de-facto state in March 1950 and opened a 
consulate in Jerusalem, Ayatollah Kashani denounced the decision: ―[t]he Israeli 
government is supported by American, German and French Jews. Fighting the Jews is 
compulsory. We Iranians will rebel even though the government recognized Israel and 
we have created an organization to fight Israeli Jews.‖
188
 The protests led and organised 
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Having encouraged the Mossadeq government to renounce Iran‘s recognition of 
the Israeli state, Ayatollah Kashani began to send sympathizing messages to the Arab 
world. In a meeting with delegates of the Syrian Islamic Affairs Assembly, Ayatollah 
Kashani stated  
We have reversed the decision to recognize Israel. The previous cabinet recognized 
Israel, because it was a puppet of British colonialism. Now, all the Muslim and Arab 
states should coordinate their efforts to ensure that the land of Palestine is returned to its 
lawful and legitimate owners, the Palestinian people.
190
  
Ayatollah Kashani continued his support for anti-colonial movements across the region, 
such as Jamal Abdul-Nasser‘s attempts to nationalize the Suez Canal, and the Tunisian 
struggle against France. Kashani saw this as part of his Islamic duty, and he tried to 
convey sympathetic messages to the Islamic and the Arab world while confronting the 
Shah‘s repression at home.
191
  
While Ayatollah Kashani helped draw Iran‘s attention to the Palestinian cause, a 
group of young Iranians established the Jamiyaat Fadaeeyan-i Islam, or the Society of 
Devotees of Islam. This association was a Shia militant group active between 1945 and 
1955. The foundation of this association was announced in 1945 with a document 
entitled ―Religion and Revenge‖, written by the group‘s founder Navaab Safavi, which 
argued that Islam had come under attack and required followers to ―avenge‖ the 
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 The Fadaeeyan-i Islam considered the issue of supporting the Palestinian cause 
amongst their socio-political activities. Protesting against the government‘s ‗pro-
western‘ policies, the Fadaeeyan-i-Islam advocated enrolling volunteers to fight in 
Palestine. Ali Rahnema provides a brief biography of  Navab Safavi. According to him, 
Navab Safavi (1924-1956) was born in Tehran, he briefly attended at the British 
managed Iranian Oil Company before going to Najaf in Iraq in 1943 to pursue his 
religious studies at the seminary school.
193
 On his return, Navab Safavi founded an 
organisation of Fadaeeyan-i Islam [Devotees of Islam]. His organisation was committed 
to the application of the Shari'a, the restoration of  an Islamic Government and the 
cleaning of evil-doers and enemies of Islam.
194
 According to Rahnema, from 1945 to 
1951 Navab Safavi threw the full weight of his organisation behind Ayatollah Kashani's 
political objectives. Navab Safavi's organisation accepted the responsibility for the 
assassination of  a number of the Shah's governmental officials including Prime 
Minister Razmara ( March 1951) and in November 1956, Navab Safavi and seven of 
his followers were arrested and were sentenced to death and executed.
195
  
According to Taghavi, the only comprehensive ideaological treatisie for 
Fadaeeyan-i Islam was a book written by Navab-Safavi, entitled Ettelaitti az Barnameh 
Enqelabi-i Fadaeeyan-i Islam (Rahnamai-i Haqaeq) (An Announcement of the 
Revolutionary Programme of Fadaeeyan-i Islam). In this book, Navab-Safavi called on 
Muslims to ―rethink their religion and their surrounding world."
196
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For Navab-Safavi, Muslim unity could not be compromised. He suggested that 
there should be an organisation consisting of delegates from Muslim states designed to 
settle their disagreements and to support their economic prosperity and military 
development.
197
 On a visit to Egypt, Navab-Safavi advocated Islamic unity and 
recommended abandoning pan-Arabism, which he regarded as a part of an enemy plot 
against Muslims.
198
 Taghavi argues that the Fadaeeyan-i Islam viewed the domination 
of westerners over Muslim societies as the main factor influencing the ‗decline of 
Muslims‘. From the Fadaeeyan-i Islam‘s point of view, following the Muslim triumph 
during the Crusades, Jewish and Christian freemasonry conspired to deny Muslims of 
their superiority.
199
 It was therefore not difficult for the Fadaeeyani-i Islam and their 
zealous followers to have a sense of sympathy with Palestinian Muslims and view the 
Palestinian question as matter that the Muslim world simply could not compromise 
over.  
Navab-Safavi, in coordination with Ayatollah Kashani, organized popular 
protests supporting the Palestinians. In spring 1948 he orchestrated the enrolment of 
5,000 volunteers in Tehran to fight for the cause of Palestine. In this regard, Fadaeeyan-
i Islam issued a statement:  
The bloods of brave devotees of Islam boil in support of the Palestinian brothers. Five 
thousand sympathizers of Fadaeeyan-i Islam are ready to join their Palestinian brothers 
to liberate Palestine and to this end, we demand the government to immediately give us 
permission to move towards Palestine.
200
  




 Ibid., p.159. 
199
 Ibid., p. 159. 
200 
Razavi, Ulamay-e Shiie va Hemayat-e Feqhi va Siyasi az Filistin, p, 4. The Iranian Government did not 
approve Fadaeeyan-i Islam’s demand for going to Palestine and joining the Palestinian fighters. Also available 
72 
Navab-Safavi visited Lebanon and attended the Islamic Conference in Egypt in 1948, 
publicly stressing the importance of supporting the Palestinians in their struggle for 
freedom. Navab-Safavi travelled to Jerusalem in 1953 and attended the Islamic 
conference of Beit al-Moqaddas for six days. While attending the conference in 
Jerusalem, Navab-Safavi advocated that the only practical method of liberating 
Palestine was through martyrdom, given that its occupiers were unwilling to tolerate 
peaceful means. For Navab-Safavi, the Palestinian cause was a concern for all Muslims, 
and Muslims bore a duty to support them by any means necessary.
201
 Navab-Safavi 
held talks with King Hussein of Jordan during his visits in Lebanon and Egypt. He also 
met with Yasser Arafat, who was a young student at the time, and encouraged him to 
take up arms for the liberation of the Islamic land of Palestine.
202
 Years later, Yasser 
Arafat revealed during his visit in Tehran in 1979 that he was motivated and inspired by 
Navab-Safavi.
203
 During his visits to Egypt, Navab-Safavi advocated close spiritual 
relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, and voiced his admiration for their activities 
against imperialism and regional puppets.
204
 After being arrested, prosecuted and 
executed by the Shah‘s regime in 1955, many younger members of Fadaeeyan-i Islam 
later joined Heyat-hai Moetalefe-h Islami (the Coalition of Islamic group), which is 
considered to be the core hard-line religious group in post-revolutionary Iran.
205
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Ayatollah Taleqani was another well-known revolutionary cleric. His anti-
imperialist rhetoric, socio-political concerns and active role in mobilizing the Iranian 
public during the Islamic revolution brought him to prominence. Ayatollah Taleqani 
believed that in Islam, Jihad fi sabil Allah – struggle  in the way of God – represents a 
divine commandment, and can even be considered a form of Ibadat (worship). If one 
dies while trying to serve God, they may be considered a martyr, and their acts of 
defending land or prosperity deemed Islamically legitimate.
206
 From his point of view,  
the people of the world are divided into two types: the ones who believe and therefore 
strive in the direction of God, and those who disbelieve and strive in the way of taghut, 
there is just one way beside the way of God that is the way of taghut.
207
  
Ayatollah Taleqani defines taghut, which is repeated in the Quran almost eight times, 
as ―the one who overflows from his rightful social limits. He tramples social limits 
under his feet‖. 
208
 He furthermore argues that war is a consequence of human instincts, 
and that Islam recognizes this fact. According to Ayatollah Taleqani, 
This instinct is within you; but do not use it for murdering, theft, lustful purposes, or 
military expansionism. Use it in its proper way. Defend your rights. Defend your dignity. 
Defend your religion. Defend human rights. By and by you have to channel this instinct 
into this proper path.
209
 
Clarifying the concepts of jihad and taghut, and arguing that it was necessary to defend 
dignity, land and religion in Islam, Ayatollah Taleqani criticized the Pahlavi regime for 
its linkage with global-Zionism. When referring to the government, he states,   
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On one side they push Muslim masses into the desserts and rape the boundaries of Islam; 
and on the other hand, they take Muslim properties by different means… If a government 
opens an embassy (referring to the Israeli representative office in Tehran) for them 
without naming it as such, what is the duty of the people towards such a government? Let 
me tell you, today Zionism is the second cover of Colonialism. Colonialism is the hide of 
Zionism. Zionism has crept into the hide of Israel‖.
210
  
One can observe a linkage between taghut and Zionism in Ayatollah Taleqani‘s reading 
of the Quran: with those that establish relations with Zionism considered guilty of 
taghut, and those who resist it considered as striving fi sabil Allah. To elaborate on this 
in depth, I will now examine the history of Ayatollah Taleqani‘s spiritual support for 
the Palestinian cause.  
Ayatollah Taleqani participated in a number of conferences, including the 
Islamic Conferences during 1940s and 1950s. He subsequently visited Egypt and held 
discussions with the clerics of al-Azhar University in Cairo. Regarding his participation 
in an Islamic Conference held in Jordan, and his visits to Egypt, Ayatollah Taleqani 
states 
In 1949 when we attended the Islamic conference in Palestine, we met with a number of 
representatives from various Islamic countries. Many of them were just talking and 
pretending to be supportive, they were not proposing any tangible solutions to the 
question of Palestine. During our trip from Beit-el-Moqaddas to el-Khalil, we could see 
the Palestinian refugees behind barbed wire, waving hands and communicating with their 
friends and relatives on the other side of the barriers, under severe security measures 
implemented by the Zionist guards. We hope that one day the land of Palestine will be 
liberated by the people of Palestine and the al-Aqsa Mosque will return to its rightful and 
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legitimate people. The legitimate owners of the al-Aqsa Mosque are the indigenous 
people of Palestine, including Muslims, Jews and Christians and not the Zionist regime 
that claims the Jerusalem. Today we are not allowed holding a single meeting to voice 
our moral support for Palestine in Iran, here; we can freely have a joint voice with the 
Palestinian people for a common goal. We hope our youth study more about the cause of 
Palestine that itself is a great historical lesson in our century. We hope that our youth 
improve their relations with Palestine and make their efforts so God willingly and with 
the support of the other nations, we can accomplish this revolution that has occurred in 
two sensitive areas of the world (Iran and Palestine) victoriously.
211
  
Due to his revolutionary activities, Ayatollah Taleqani remained under SAVAK 
surveillance in 1950s and 1960s, facing the threat of imprisonment up to the triumph of 
the 1979 revolution. Ayatollah Taleqani‘s temporary release in 1967 coincided with the 
Arab-Israeli war in which the Arab states were handed a frustrating military failure. 
According to SAVAK documents, Ayatollah Taleqani increasingly focused his 
attention on the Palestinian cause, voicing his support in both public and private. For 
instance, during the religious festival of Eid al-Fitr in 1967, Ayatollah Taleqani 
delivered an emotional speech in the Hedayat Mosque in Tehran in support of the 
Palestinian people. In a symbolic gesture at the end of his khutbah, he took some 
money out of his pocket and, addressing the crowd, stated ―I pay my Zakat (the Islamic 
tax) to the people of Palestine‖.
212
 This gesture inspired and galvanized the Iranian 
crowd to follow suit and donate their own Islamic taxes to the Palestinian cause.  
It is fair to say that Ayatollah Taleqani had aimed to clarify the importance of 
Palestine in the contemporary Islamic context. He wanted to emphasise Palestine as 
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being a primarily Muslim issue, and that therefore Muslims had a duty to support it by 
any possible means, including paying religious taxes and speaking out against Zionism. 
SAVAK documents point to Ayatollah Taleqani‘s enthusiasm for supporting the 
Palestinian people, and their concern that he was making the Iranian public aware of 
their struggle. One classified report indicated that Ayatollah Taleqani delivered an 
inspiring speech in the Hedayat Mosque in autumn 1969 that urged Muslims to go 
beyond simply cursing Israel and praying for the wellbeing of Palestinians, and instead 
unite and find a solution for this vital issue.
213
 In a private meeting with other clerics 
and anti-Shah activists in 1969, he stated that  
While I was attending the World Muslim Congress in Jordan in 1959, I was asked by 
Akram Zaeetar, the delegate of Palestine and Jordan, why is Iran maintaining close 
relations with the Israelis? To which I responded, the people of Iran and their desire are 




The SAVAK documents indicate that the Iranian public – particularly among the more 
revolutionary strata – had sympathy for the Palestinians. Furthermore, alms were 
frequently collected at mosques in support for the Palestinians, particularly during 
Muslim festivals. In 1970, Ayatollah Taleqani delivered a speech in front of almost 
2,000 worshipers at the Hedayat Mosque in Tehran in which he recommended that 
religious taxes should be paid to those fighting and sacrificing themselves for the sake 
of Islam. 1970 coincided with a natural disaster in Pakistan, and after Ayatollah 
Taleqani had asked worshippers to pay their Zakat to either the Muslim people of 
Pakistan or Palestine by choosing two separate designated boxes, many chose the box 
                                                 
213
 Ibid., p. 615. 
214
 Ibid., p. 612. 
77 
for Palestine. According to SAVAK reports, many Iranians even questioned and 
castigated that ―why Ayatollah Taleqani recommends Palestine beside Pakistan? The 
world helps Pakistan and he should have just called for supporting helpless 
Palestinians‖.
215
 On the night, 16,500 Tomans were collected for the Palestinians, but 
only 1,600 Toman for the affected people of Pakistan. The collected sum for Palestine 




The Iranian public‘s sympathy for Palestine and particularly Ayatollah 
Taleqani‘s endeavour of supporting the Palestinian cause were well-received in 
Palestine, and this was reflected in Palestinian pamphlets. SAVAK reports show that a 
biography of Ayatollah Taleqani was published by al-Thawra magazine (the political 
publication of the PLO) in January 1978. The article was entitled ―A biography of a 
great imprisoned revolutionary Ayatollah Taleqani‖, and was published in the 25th 
edition of the magazine, translated into Farsi and distributed in Iran. The article 
provided a brief biography of Ayatollah Taleqani, praising him for his support for the 
struggle against imperialism. It stated that he was imprisoned by the Shah‘s regime 
because of his unwavering defence of Islam, and his fight against imperialism, and his 
support for the Palestinians.
217
 The article painted Ayatollah Taleqani as one of the first 
clerics to support the Palestinian cause, and detailed that the cleric maintained close 
relations with Palestinian representatives when attending the World Muslim Conference 
in Jerusalem. The article concludes that from the Palestinian point of view, the 
―bourgeois regime of the Shah did not manage to silence Ayatollah Taleqani and his 
followers because they struggle for the sake of the oppressed people and for the sake of 
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 Shortly before the triumph of the Islamic revolution in 
1978, Ayatollah Taleqani commented on the Palestinian question, stating ―[t]he people 
of Iran have never neglected the cause of Palestine. My purpose of attending the 
Islamic Conferences in Karachi, Cairo and Jerusalem was in fact for the sake of 
defending the Palestinians, because the enemy of the Palestinians is not just their 
enemy but the enemy of the whole Islamic world.‖
219
 
Ayatollah Taleqani‘s pro-Palestinian ideas diffused to other revolutionary 
clerics and Muslim figures. Ayatollah Murteza Mutahhari,
220
 an eminent scholar of 
Islam and key theorist of the Islamic revolution, also situated the Palestinian cause 
within an Islamic context, and presented the issue to the Iranian public as such. 
According to Mohammad Legenhausen and Mehdi Abedi, Ayatollah Mutahhari linked 
his Islamic conceptualisation of peace, jihad and ‗duty‘ to a broader moral obligation 
for the Iranian public to support the Palestinian cause.
221
 According to Ayatollah 
Mutahhari‘s reading and analysis of the Quran, ―Islam never gives permission to be 
humiliated, while at the same time strongly advocates peace‖.
222
 In clarifying the 
conditions for Jihad and peace, Ayatollah Mutahhari again refers to the Quran and 
argues that one of the conditions for Jihad was that ―the adversary must be in the state 
of aggression.‖
223
 Ayatollah Mutahhari clarifies what is meant by aggression and 
injustice, particularly in the context of Muslim suffering, and considers it incumbent on 
all Muslims to act and support the oppressed:   
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We may be in a situation whereby a party has not transgressed against us but has 
committed injustice against a group from another people, who may or may not be 
Muslims. If they are Muslims as in today‘s plight of the Palestinians who have been 
exiled from their homes, whose wealth has been seized, and who have been subjected to 
all kinds of transgression whereas for the moment the transgressor has no intention 
against us, it is permissible for us to give assistance to those oppressed Muslims and 
deliver them. This is not only permissible, but obligatory, because they are Muslims.
224
   
According to Ayatollah Mutahhari, the moral obligation on the Iranian people to render 
aid to oppressed peoples – particularly the people of Palestine – was unconditional, and 
did not require a plea for help from the oppressed to be incumbent.
225
 In clarifying the 
concept of Jihad in Islam, Ayatollah Mutahhari clarifies that defence is the essence of 
Jihad ultimately a duty for all people whose land, property, wealth and religion were 
assaulted by another nation.
226
 He links the defence of land and religion with the 
concept of martyrdom, stating ―Islam says, whoever is killed for his property or 
principles is a martyr.‖
227
 In his view, ―the value of fighting in defence lies not in 
defending one‘s self, but in defending the right‖
228
, and he elaborates further that the 
most sacred form of Jihad or defence is ―neither one‘s personal freedom nor that of the 
one‘s country, but freedom in another corner of the world‖
229
. In order to earn the 
respect of other nations, one had to demonstrate his or her strong conviction to defend 
the rights of oppressed people around the world rather than merely his or her individual 
rights, or the rights of fellow citizens. Ayatollah Mutahhari summarizes this debate by 
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stating that ―if they were ever to transcend the use of the tongue, the pen, letter, and 
lectures, and actually go to the battlefield and fight, for the Palestinians for example, 
then the world would consider them to be even more sacred.‖
230
 Ayatollah Mutahhari‘s 
arguments communicated three things to the Iranian public: First, defending the 
Palestinians was the concern of all Muslims. Second, one could defend the Palestinian 
cause using a multitude of methods, including voicing verbal and spiritual support 
through the delivery of lectures and statements, giving financial support, and fighting 
on the battlefield. Third, defending the cause of Palestine is sacred even beyond the 
Islamic context and it demonstrates the free spirit of the defender.  
     Ayatollah Mutahhari did not limit his pro-Palestinian sentiment to his 
theoretical lectures however, and instead endeavoured to put his ideas into practice via 
his political activities. Ayatollah Mutahhari collected monetary aid of the Palestinians, 
organized public gatherings, and confronted the coercion of the Shah‘s regime head-on. 
In 1970, Ayatollah Mutahhari was summoned by SAVAK because he had made 
statements in coordination with Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Tabatabai and 
Ayatollah Asadollah Bayat Zanjani that urged the Iranian public to provide financial 
aid for Palestinian refugees. According to SAVAK documents dated 2
nd
 May 1970, 
Ayatollah Mutahhari delivered an inspirational speech in the mosque of Husseini-eh-
Ershad stating that  
Europe talks about human rights and peace but is not willing to act accordingly. We 
Muslims on the other hand talk about Islam but we are not real Muslims too, sitting in 
silence and doing nothing. Isn‘t it true that the Palestinians are Muslims? So why are we 
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sympathizing with them but not acting accordingly?‖
231
 SAVAK subsequently reported 
that a number of pamphlets were distributed within the Tehran Bazaar and the University 
of Tehran, indicating that Ayatollah Mutahhari, Ayatollah Tabatabai
232
 and Ayatollah 
Zanjani had opened three Bank accounts at the Meli Bank, the Bank of Saderat and the 
Bank of Bazargani-Markaz, the Bazaar brunch, in order for the public to render financial 
aid to the Palestinians. The distributed pamphlets were titled with a quotation from the 
Prophet Mohammed saying, ―If a Muslim hears a plea for help from other Muslims and 
does not respond, he is not a Muslim‖.
233
 
The local SAVAK coordinator in the Shemiranat region had reported that due to the 
high level of local sympathy towards the Palestinian cause, and the fact that there were 
a large numbers of pamphlets and adverts throughout the city in regard to support for 




Consequently, in November 1970, Ayatollah Mutahhari was summoned by 
SAVAK and his phone line and home were both put under surveillance. Ayatollah 
Mutahhari reportedly had refused to stop collecting financial aid for the Palestinians, 
and rejected SAVAK‘s proposal that it receive all funds first and then hand them over 
to the Iranian Red Sun and Lion Society – rather than the Palestinian Red Crescent – to 
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be used inside of Iran.  In a written statement while in SAVAK custody dated 24 
November 1970, Ayatollah Mutahhari expressed the following, 
When I went on a pilgrimage to Mecca, I had a meeting with the Palestinian Red 
Crescent Association in Menna and expressed that we in Iran are willing to publicly 
render financial aid for Palestinian refugees. Hence, they recommended that we send our 
financial aid to the Association of Supporters of Palestinian Refugees in Mecca. 
Therefore I was in touch with the ambassador of Saudi Arabia in Tehran and expressed 
our willingness to send our financial aid through the Saudi embassy. We have explained 
to the Iranian people that their collected financial help is due to be sent to the 
Palestinians as they desire and we are due to provide the Iranian public with the receipt 
from the Palestinian Red Crescent. Hence, we cannot act against what we have promised 
to the Iranian public, thus we cannot accept the SAVAK proposals.
235
 
Ayatollah Mutahhari underlined that it was his religious duty to channel the collected 
financial support to the Palestinians. He argued that he had only managed to mobilize 
financial aid because the Iranian people held a strong desire to do so, and that if he 
were to accept SAVAK‘s coercive suggestion he would have betrayed both the country 
and his own Muslim duties and morality.
236
 
For Ayatollah Mutahhari, the differences between Sunni and Shi'ite 
communities were limited to the minor religious principles. To this end, he had 
emphasized that supporting Palestine should not be overshadowed by sectarian debates 
because it was the unity of Muslims which helped the Palestinian cause. There are 
reports from SAVAK reinforcing this fact. For instance, a classified report from 
SAVAK dated 19 July 1972 highlights that in one public lecture, Ayatollah Mutahhari 
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– in response to rumours that Palestinians did not share the Shi‘i view of Imam Ali‘s 
succession to Prophet Mohammed – stated that ―The Jews are the enemies of Imam Ali 
bin Abi-Talib, the first Imam of the Shi'ites not the Sunnis. The only difference 
between the Shi'ite and Sunnis is that the Sunnis recognise Imam Ali as the forth Caliph 
but they do respect and have faith in Ali.‖
 237
 Thus, for Ayatollah Mutahhari, the 
Palestinian cause was far more important than the Shi‘i-Sunni debate over the 
succession to the Prophet. 
     In the eyes of Iran‘s revolutionaries, the Palestinian cause overshadowed all 
other issues in the region and the Islamic world. In another recorded report by SAVAK, 
during a meeting entitled as the Heiaat-i Ansar el-Hussein, organized by Ayatollah 
Mutahhari on the 14th May 1970, one of the companions proposed that some financial 
aid be collected for the people in need in Algeria. This had been requested by the 
Algerian president, Houari Boumedienne, and the ambassador of Algeria in Tehran, 
Ahmed Towfiq el-Maddani, was set to receive  financial support in the form of 
charitable donations. In response, Seyed Ali Khamenei
238
 had emphasized that the 
Palestinian cause represented the foremost priority in the Muslim world, and that 
financial support should be channelled for the Palestinians in that regard.
239
 Ayatollah 
Mutahhari continued to confront SAVAK, and his public activities were under close 
surveillance. Nevertheless, his outspoken desire to publicly endorse the Palestinian 
cause remained as such until his assassination in May 1979, and his influence on his 
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followers and students became evident in the post-revolutionary era, which will be 
discussed and analyzed in the following chapters.  
It was not only the clerics that opposed imperialism and Zionism among those 
that were religiously inclined in Iran. Non-clerical religious and revolutionary figures 
like Ali Shariati and Jalal Al-e-Ahmad strongly shared such revolutionary 
commitments. Ali Shariati is best known as an advocate of the Third World movements 
in their battle against imperialism.
240
 He was one of the most influential intellectuals of 
the Islamic Revolution. His teachings continued to be felt throughout Iranian society. 
Focusing on the Islamic concept of Amr-e beh ma’ruf va nahy-ye az monkar as a social 
responsibility, commanding people to do good and forbid evil, Shariati equated 
Zionism with evil.
241
 In a similar vein, Shariati maintained that the struggle against 
international imperialism, dictatorship and colonialism were all manifestations of the 
Islamic command to forbid evil.
242
 In his reading of modern history, particularly in 
identifying the problems of the Third World, Shariati argues that information on 
liberation or nationalist movements in Europe was blemished by the vested interests of 
the proponents of ―Zionism alongside Capitalism, Fascism and Communism‖.
243
 
Hence, according to Ali Rahnema, Shariati believed that the struggle of people in the 
Third World remained unknown in the rest of the world.
244
  
       According to Mahdi Ahouie, one of Shariati‘s first commentaries on the Palestinian 
question dates back to July 1967, a few weeks after the Six Day War. In response to an article 
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written by Daryoush Ashouri in in the monthly Ferdowsi
245
 in which he had revealed his 
support for Israel, Shariati strongly castigated some Iranian intellectuals for not condemning 
the Israeli aggression against the Palestinians: 
Whoever feels sympathetic for the Palestinian refugees who have been expelled from their 
home   cities and houses and lands into the burning deserts of Jordan ...their sympathy derives 
from the bourgeosis!..Whoever feels hatred and revengeful for seeing that after all those 
[Muslims] glorious conquests in history, Jerusalem has now fallen to the hands of [Zionists] 
Jews and that the Muslims have become defenceless victims of a Jewish-Christian  [alliance] 




      According to Mahdi Ahouie, the reasons for Ali Shariati‘s hostility towards Zionism can 
be summarised as follows; (1) Israel is a Western creation in the Middle East; (2) Israel treats 
the Arab people unjustly and brutally; and finally (3) Palestine is an inseparable part of the 
Muslim world.
247
 On the combination of anti-Zionism and anti-imperialism in the Middle 
East, Ahouie highlights that Ali Shariati argued  that such a combination was quite natural 
and understandable, because of the omnipresence of imperialism. Israel was seen as an 
extension of this oppressive world order. .
248
 Shariati added that imperialism is always 
unmasked through a façade, a Trojan Horse so to say like the former [British] Oil Company 
in Iran, the East Indian Company, and Zionism in the Arab countries.
249
 From my 
perspective, it is crucial to note that Shariati believes there are strong ties between 
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colonialism, imperialism and Zionism and not least by using an emotive historical analogy, 
that is the example of the Anglo Iranian Oil Company which filled Iranians with bitter 
memories because of its role of the MI6 (and CIA) in the removal of the democratically 
elected Pime Minister Mossadeq in 1953. So Palestine was pasted into the wider narrative of 
anti-imperial resistance. The historical context that Shariati was embedded in lend itself to a 
new Thirld Worldism, with a socialist-Islamic colourings. This was the heydays of anti-
colonial agitation all over the world.   
       Furthermore, Ali Shariati draws parallel lines between Zionism and racism, according to 
Ahouie, in his rereading of the Iranian Islamic identity, Shariati dedicated one part of his 
analysis to the discussion of nationalism. He argued that Western understandings of 
nationalism stemmed from a pervasive racism and anti-Semitism, which eventually led to the 
emergence of Zionism as a defensive reaction.
250
 Zionism he argued, instigated ethnic Arab 
nationalism in the Muslim societies.
251
 In other words, Shariati perceives Zionism as a source 
for creating a Western notion of nationalism within the Islamic nations. Shariati believed 
Western imperialism and Zionism had formed a ―united front‖ against Muslims:
252
  
Our enemies in this time include imperialism, materialism and capitalism, the spirit 
of bourgeoisie, exploitation, machinism, class differences, fascism, Zionism, 
nihilism, greediness for  welfare, madness of consumption, cultural colonialism, self-
alienation, permissiveness, historical disintegration, cultural metamorphosis, decline 
of moral values, and rule of money.
253
   
      It is vital to note that Ali Shariati also regards ―world Zionism‖, ―international 
imperialism‖, ―old and new colonialism,‖ together with ―tyranny‖, ―racism‖ and 
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―Westoxication‖ as the biggest troubles of  his time.
254
 Allow me to highlight Ahouie‘s 
argument because it sheds light on the importance of the Palestinian cause within the 
Iranian revolutionary discourse. According to him throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
many new concepts such as anti-imperialism were introduced into the Iranian religious 
discourse. After 1967, Iranian religious thinkers began to use a line of reasoning as 
reflected in Shariati‘s discourse that held that Israel was the representative of Western 
colonialism and imperialism in the Middle East. A suitable ground was maintained for 
substantiating religious opposition to Israel on the basis of such modern concepts as 
―freedom-seeking‖ and in the context of a general global clash between ―oppressors‖ 
and the ―oppressed‖. In the 1960s and 1970s, when several Third-World nations in Asia 
and Africa were struggling for independence from Western colonialism, such a 
delineation of the world as being split between the oppressors and the oppresses 
appealed to so many religious thinkers in Iran, who were opposed to the Shah‘s foreign 
external and internal policies on the one hand and to the intervention of Western powers 
in Iran on the other.
255
  
   In this context, Ahouie argues that Palestinian resistance against Israel was 
taken by many Iranian Islamic revolutionaries as a sacred symbol and an example 
of the struggle against suppression both domestically and internationally. The 
question of Palestine was an issue over which leftists and Shia notions of justice-
seeking and opposition to suppression impeccably matched.
256
 Shariati 
contributed to the Iranian political discourse on Zionism by linking the outlooks 
of the earlier anti-Israeli religious figures such as Ayatollah Kashani and those of 
the Iranian socialists such as Jalal Al-e Ahmad. By underlining a type of leftist 








translation of Islam, they adopted the idea of ―Israel as the puppet of imperialism‖ 
from the left and the concept of ―standing for justice‖ from the Shia 
perspective.
257
 Shariaiti‘s emphasis on the Palestinian question can be epitomised 
in the following phrase of his own: ―We are not hostile to the Jews, but we are 
hostile to Israel. And that is not because of its religion, but because it is fascist and 
because it is a basis for Western colonialism and imperialism‖.
258
 
     Alongside Ali Shariati, Jalal Al-e Ahmad was a well known author and 
outspoken critic of imperialism. In Gharbzadegi (variously translated as ‗West-
toxification‘, ‗Westitis‘, or ‗Weststruckness‘) Jalal Al-e Ahmad harshly criticizes the 
economic and cultural dependency of the Third World in general and particularly Iran's 
dependency on the West.
259
 In other words, Gharbzadegi represented a precursor to 
discussions of North-versus-South during the 1960s and 1970s. In developing his 
theory, Jalal Al-e Ahmad saw Islam as an integral non-Western and native component 
of Iranian identity, and a conceivable route to delivering Iran from the plight of 
gharbzadegi.
260
 According to Adib-Moghaddam, the anti-dependency theory of Jalal 
Al-e Ahmad (reflected in Gharbzadegi) and anti-imperialistic ideas of Ali Shariati 
(reflected in writings such as Bazgasht beh-khish) symbolized the deification of the 
‗Third-Worldist‘, socialist and revolutionary-Islamic zeitgeist in Iranian society during 
the 1970s.
261
 Although there may not be considerable direct references to Palestine 
within the works of Ali Shariati and Jalal Al-e Ahmad,  their anti-imperialist, anti-
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Zionist and anti-colonialist ideas have created a comprehensive pro-Palestinian 
framework. In other words, having identified Ali Shariati with anti-imperialism and 
anti-Zionism and Jalal Al-e Ahmad with anti-colonialism and ‗third-worldism, it is easy 
to envision the Palestinian cause as representing a ―cosmic‖ struggle of the oppressed 
against the oppressors. According to SAVAK documents, Musa Sadr
262
 alongside 
representatives of Fatah and the delegate of the Grand Mufti of Syria participated in Ali 
Shariati‘s burial ceremony in Damascus in 1977. In his speech at the burial ceremony, 
Musa Sadr highlighted the moral connection between Ali Shariati and the Palestinian 
cause by stating that ―Shariati was always thinking of Palestine and the pains of 
Palestinians during his life, hence, God wanted him to be buried in this cemetery in 
Damascus, near Palestine‖
263
 Nikki Keddie highlights this socio-political atmosphere  
of the pre-revolutionary era by arguing that the above survey of Iranian political tought 
since the late nineteen century proposes the frequent reappearance of certain parallels 
often found in the writings of both religious and secular thinkers. One of the most 
crucial is anti-imperialism, accompanied by a determination to free Iran from Western 
economic and cultural dominance.
264
Palestine became a majot factor within that salient 
discourse, as indicated.  
     A discussion of the roots and development of support for the Palestinian 
cause in Iran during the pre-revolutionary era is incomplete without a focus on 
Ayatollah Khomeini. From Ervand Abrahamian‘s point of view, Ayatollah Khomeini 
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began his political career in 1943 with the publication of Kashf al-Asrar [Unveiling of 
Secrets], which castigated the socio-political conditions of Iran.
265
 Ayatollah Khomeini 
rose to prominence in 1963 when he publicly denounced the Shah‘s regime. At the 
outset of his political career, Ayatollah Khomeini had placed great importance on the 
Palestinian cause and conspicuously addressed the matter within his public 
pronouncements. According to Abrahamian, while Ayatollah Khomeini had been 
developing his ideas in Velayat-e Faqih: Hokumat-e Islami (The Jurist Guardianship: 
Islamic Government), he had noticeably developed his socio-political castigations of 
the Shah‘s regime by denouncing it as an ―unwitting tool of the imperialist-Jewish 
conspiracy‖ and for its ―anti-Arab‖ and ―anti- Palestinian‖ political stance.
266
 
      Before analyzing the origin of Ayatollah Khomeini‘s pro-Palestinian stance, 
it is necessary to gain an understanding of how he viewed the state of Israel. Hamid 
Algar argues that Ayatollah Khomeini‘s best known work focuses on three major 
points: the necessity of establishing Islamic political institutions, the doctrine of 
Velayat-e Faqih, and the duty of religious scholars to bring about an Islamic state and 
program of actions for the foundation of an Islamic government. 
267
 Ayatollah 
Khomeini offered a number of arguments in support of an Islamic government. He had 
developed his argument while highlighting the significance of the Quran‘s verses that 
command believers to protect the Islamic domain from non-Muslim ‗aggressors‘. 
According to Algar, Ayatollah Khomeini‘s reference to the Quran‘s verse 8:60, 
―prepare against them whatever force you can muster and horses tethered‖, is an 
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attempt to substantiate the indispensability of defending the territorial integrity of the 
Muslim nations.
268
 Pointing to the Quran, Ayatollah Khomeini states that: 
If the Muslims had acted in accordance with this command and, after forming a 
government, made the necessary extensive preparation to be in a state of full readiness 
for war, a handful of Jews would never have dared to occupy our lands, and to burn and 
destroy the Masjid al-Aqsa.
269
 
It is safe to argue that in Ayatollah Khomeini‘s reading of the Quran, there is a 
particular place designated to Palestine as the Muslim heartland. Khomeini‘s 
description of Palestine as ‗our land‘ implies a strong socio-religious tie between the 
Palestinian question and Muslim Iran. In other words, there are moral obligations for 
Iranian Muslims to support and defend Palestine.  
On one hand, Ayatollah Khomeini defines the state of Israel as an agent of the 
United States, Britain, and other foreign powers, and as a tool of imperialism used to 
penetrate the Islamic world and divide its nations into two groups (oppressed and 
oppressors). On the other hand, he castigates the rulers of Muslim nations for their lack 
of unity in resisting the agents of imperialism, and therefore being on the side of 
oppressors.
270
 For Ayatollah Khomeini, the Palestinian question transcends national 
borders, and is thus an issue with relevance to every individual Muslim as instructed by 
the Quran. On February 6 1971, in his first message to the Muslims of the world 
congregating on the occasion of the pilgrimage to Mecca, Ayatollah Khomeini 
highlighted the significance of the Palestinian question, stating: 
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[t]urn your attention to the liberation of the Islamic land of Palestine from the grasp of 
Zionism, the enemy of Islam and humanity. Do not hesitate to assist and cooperate with 
those men who are struggling to liberate Palestine.
271
  
In his ideological critique of imperialism, Ayatollah Khomeini warns the Iranian public 
as well as the Muslim nations of ―the expansionism of imperialism through Zionism‖. 
He states 
[o]ne must know that the purpose of the imperialist powers in establishing Israel is not 
just about occupying Palestine. However, if they find any opportunity, all the Arab states 
will face the same fate as Palestine (God forbid). Now that we see a group of freedom 
fighters who are struggling to liberate the occupied land of Palestine, we witness the 
puppets of imperialism in Jordan and elsewhere, are suppressing them. 
272
 
Defining the occupiers of Palestine as the ―servants of imperialism‖,
273
 Ayatollah 
Khomeini maintains that Muslims in Iran and Palestine struggle on a single frontline 
against common enemies: Zionism as the enemy of Islam, and its ‗collaborator‘, the 
Shah‘s regime.  
Israel, the universally recognized enemy of Islam and the Muslims, has been at war with 
the Muslim people for years, with the assistance of the despicable government of Iran, 
penetrated all the economic, military, and political affairs of the country; it must be said 
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In emphasizing the necessity of resisting Zionism and American imperialism, Ayatollah 
Khomeini expands his harsh criticism to include the Communist bloc also, lambasting it 
as being guilty of left-wing imperialism. In his account, the creation of the state of 
Israel was a joint action by the oppressors of both East and West:   
Israel was born out of the collusion and agreement of the imperialist states of the East 
and West. It was created in order to suppress and exploit Muslim people and it is being 
supported today by all the imperialists of Britain and the U.S.. They are strengthening 
Israel militarily and politically, supplying it with lethal weapons, encouraging Israel to 
undertake repeated aggression against the Arabs and the Muslims and to continue the 
occupation of Palestine and other Islamic lands. The Soviet Union, by preventing the 
Muslims from arming themselves adequately, by its conciliatory policy is guaranteeing 
the existence of Israel.
275
 
 Ayatollah Khomeini had expanded his criticism towards the Shah‘s regime in two 
dimensions, both internal and external. In appealing to Iranian Muslims, he attacked the 
Pahlavi authorities for maintaining relations with Israel and prohibiting people from 
voicing anti-Israeli and anti-imperialist opinions: 
[i]n this current condition, Muslims are sacrificing for the sake of the liberation of 
Palestine. The Shah is suppressing, imprisoning and exiling a number of ulama and other 
scholars and dissidents. The [Shah] regime has begun to do this in order to divert our 
attention from the war between Muslim nations and Israel. This is because the Shah‘s 
regime is fearful of the solidarity between the Iranian people and the Arab world in their 
rightful struggle against Israel.
276
    
                                                 
275
 “Message of Ayatollah Khomeini to the Muslim Students in North America, July 10, 1972”, in ibid., p. 210.   
276
 Ibid., p. 37. 
94 
In appealing to the wider Arab and Muslim world, Ayatollah Khomeini denounced the 
Shah‘s ‗pro-Israeli‘ stance.  In a statement in April 7 1964, he states, 
I pronounce to all Islamic states and Muslim nations around the world that the dear Shia 
people abominates Israel, its agents and all governments that collaborate with that state 
[Israel]. This is not the Iranian nation that collaborates with Israel, the Iranian nation is 
blameless. There are the regimes that do not have the approval of the people. Submitting 
ourselves to holy Islamic laws, nothing is more important than defending Islam by 
sacrificing our possessions and even our lives. When we witness our Palestinian brothers 
and sisters being killed in the holy land of Palestine, and when we witness that our lands 
are occupied and our homes are destroyed by the Zionists. Hence, this is obligatory for 
all Muslims to support the Palestinians financially and morally.
 277
 
Having established that the Israeli state was an aggressor and oppressor, and with his 
declaration that financial and moral support for the Palestinians was an obligation 
according to Islamic teachings, Ayatollah Khomeini refers to Quranic verses 2:192 and 
2:193 to further argue that there exists an obligation for Muslims to resist a common 
enemy.
278
 As such, he stated in November 7 1973 that 
[t]he leaders of the Islamic world should understand that they [imperialist powers] have 
created this source of corruption [Israel] in the heart of the Islamic land, not only to 
suppress the Arab nations, but, to dominate the whole region. The only way to solve this 
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nightmare is through unity within Muslim nations. If there was any regime that neglected 
such a vital obligation, it becomes a duty for other states to pressurize that regime.
279
 
A large number of Islamic scholars, religious activists and associated groups shared 
Khomeini‘s strong commitment to the plight of Palestine. For instance, the Union of 
Islamic Students 'Associations (UISA) in Europe, founded in 1964, was one major 
vocal association advocating the plight of Palestine in Europe and North America.
280
 
Having a close connection with Ayatollah Khomeini in Najaf, UISA members 
designated their socio-political activities towards supporting the plight of Palestine. In 
1967, the UISA began publishing Eslam: maktab-e mobarez quarterly which looked 
into current Islamic issues, particularly the Palestinian cause and Muslim affairs in 
Africa. Moreover, it aimed to maintain a communicating network with other Muslim 
students in Europe and North America. In its fifth general meeting in May 1969, the 
UISA announced the formation of the Committee of Palestine. Its aim was to 
coordinate financial and political aid for Palestinians abroad, and establish relations 
with Palestinian organizations in Europe.
281
 UISA statements publicly denounced the 
state of Israel for occupying Palestine, and voiced solidarity with Palestinian 
activists.
282
  The Committee of Palestine became the most active body of the UISA, and 
the blueprint of its activities were reported during its sixth meeting in May 1970 as 
follows:  
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a) Establishing relations with the Central Committee of Palestinian 
Students Abroad. 
b) Forming a joint meeting with Palestinian students and organizing an 
archive of the articles related to the Palestinian question. 
c) Rendering financial and medical aid, including sending the most needed 
medicines to Palestinian refugees and rebels. 
d) Publishing a booklet entitled Majmoo-e Kerameh.283 This booklet was a 
collection of translated articles concerning the activities of the 
Palestinian organizations such as Fatah,  the life of the Palestinian 
refugees, as well as pro-Palestinian writings specifically aimed at Iranian 
readers.
284
   
In 1971, Mostafa Chamran, a key member of the Liberation Movement of Iran, 
travelled to Lebanon.
285
 Chamran‘s prime focus was to train the local Shia youth in 
guerrilla warfare. To this end, Chamran played a key role in supporting Musa Sadr to 
form Harakat al-Mahroomin (The Movement of the Deprived) in 1973, and Afwaj al-
Moqawamah al-Lobnaniyah (also known as Amal).
286
 According to Chehabi, the 
relations between Chamran and the PLO were lukewarm. While a wholehearted 
supporter of the Palestinian struggle against Israel, he nevertheless criticised PLO 
tactics, such as its repeated raids into northern Israel which left the local people of 
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southern Lebanon vulnerable to Israeli retaliation in the form of harsh 
bombardments.
287
    
Chamran elucidated his pro-Palestinian stance in his memoir Lobnan. From 
Chamran‘s point of view, since moving to Lebanon from Jordan in 1970,
288
 some 
Palestinian fighters became preoccupied with engaging in Lebanon‘s political scene. 
This deflected their attention away from the real cause of the struggle against Israel and 
the liberation of Palestine.
289
 Chamran was rather critical of the radical left-wing 
Marxist-Communist Palestinians who had penetrated the Palestinian frontline against 
Israel, particularly among the PLO. Chamran believed that Yasser Arafat was too weak 
to prevent Marxist elements from directing PLO‘s policy-making apparatus towards the 
strategic aims of the Soviet Union. In addition to his criticism of the pro-Soviet stance 
of Palestinian communists, Chamran criticises the absence of an Islamic ideology 
within the Palestinian factions in Lebanon.
290
 Nevertheless, according to Chamran, the 
Palestinian struggle represented a just cause. Quoting his Musa Sadr on the importance 
of the Palestinian cause, Chamran wrote that ―Palestinian resistance is a sanctimonious 
flame that we will preserve with our souls and hearts‖
291
 In 1973, when the Lebanese 
Army decided to force the Palestinian fighters out of Lebanon, Musa Sadr and his 
followers intervened in order to defuse the situation and to protect the Palestinians. 
Musa Sadr made a public declaration stating ―we do not allow you (the Lebanese 
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While residing in Lebanon in the 1970s, Chamran maintained close relations 
with Fatah. Chamran and his troops within the Harakat al-Mahroomin coordinated a 
number of joint operations with Fatah, resisting the Israeli army and its affiliated 
militias that were attacking the town of Bint Jbeil in February 1977, and Taiba and 
Rob-Thalatheen in south Lebanon in March 1977.
293
 For Chamran, the pro-Moscow 
political activities of left-wing members of Fatah and other Marxist Palestinian factions 
threatened the independence and unity of the anti-Zionist groups in Lebanon. However, 
in both Chamran's and Musa Sadr‘s views, supporting Fatah represented a means to an 
ends of supporting the Palestinian cause.
294
 Chamran concludes his memoir with a 
supplication 
O‘ Lord, you are aware that we adore Palestine, the birthplace of the prophets and we see 
the liberation of Palestine from the domination of Zionism as our sacrosanct cause. To 
this end, we have never neglected to support the Palestinian Liberation Organization and 
we shall always support the Palestinian cause wholeheartedly.
295
   
Two other well-known Muslim activists that were active in supporting the Palestinians 
before the Revolution were Seyed Ali Akbar Mohtashamipur and Mohammad 
Muntazeri. Mohtashamipur was a student of Ayatollah Khomeini, and accompanied 
him in his exile in Najaf. According to Chehabi, Mohtashamipur also played an active 
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role as Ayatollah Khomeini's delegate in Lebanon, tasked with providing information 
about the problems that Palestinian activists faced when confronting the Israelis.
296
 In 
July 1972, Mohtashamipur concluded that harsh criticism from some local Shia clerics 
in Lebanon towards the Palestinian militants, blaming them for Israeli retaliations, were 
damaging the Palestinian cause. Having briefed Ayatollah Khomeini, he issued a 
formal declaration that all Muslims, and particularly local residents of south Lebanon, 
back the Palestinian fighting against Israel, warning that ‗agents of Colonialism‘ were 
attempting to divide the Muslim campaign against the Zionism.
297
 Mohammad 
Muntazeri, the son of Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Muntazeri,
298
 was a leading Muslim 
activist who had travelled to Lebanon, Pakistan and Iraq before the Revolution with an 
aim to form a unified Muslim front against imperialism. According to Chehabi, 
Mohammad Muntazeri maintained close relations with the PLO and attended 
Palestinian training camps.
299
 Mohammad Muntazeri's main goal went beyond toppling 
the Shah‘s regime, and instead extended to setting up an ‗Islamist international‘.
300
  
Other prominent high rank Shia clerics amongst the Marajii’
301
 were 
particularly vocal in expressing their religiously motivated solidarity with the 
Palestinian cause.  To further highlight the significance of the religious dimension of 
the supporting Palestine from the Marajii’s point of view, some religious statements 
during per-revolutionary period are quoted here:  
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Grand Ayatollah Seyed Abdullah Shirazi (1892-1984), in an open telegram to 




 June 1967, stated 
Dear Mr. Hoveyda, At this very moment that all Islamic states are in war against the 
occupiers of the holy-land of Palestine, This is a religious obligation for Iran which is a 
crucial part of the Islamic world and always has been in the frontline of Islamic affairs to 
support the Palestinians and severe its relations with the artificial state of Israel.
303
  
Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Mar‘ashi Najafi (1897-1990) also issued a 
number of statements in support of the Palestinian cause. In June 1967, Ayatollah 
Mar‘ashi Najafi issued a public announcement stating 
The Iranian clerics unanimously denounce the tyranny of Israel against our Muslim 
brothers. We pray to Lord to return their (The Israeli government) cruelty back to them 
and protect the Muslim nations. Our religious brothers are expected not to develop 
relations with the Jews and not to neglect supporting the Palestinian Muslims financially 
and morally.
304
   
In November 1967, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussain Mar‘ashi Najafi 
acknowledged his thanked his followers for collecting charitable donations. The 
Ayatollah‘s office had purchased 2,600 blankets and passed them over to the Jordanian 
embassy, to be distributed among Palestinian refugees. The Jordanian ambassador in 
Tehran sent a reply to Grand Ayatollah Mar‘ashi Najafi, confirming the receipt of 
money and stating ―Your holiness Grand Ayatollah Mar‘ashi Najafi, I confirm that the 
                                                 
302 
Amir Abbas Hoveyda, the Iranian Prime Minister (1965-1977). 
303 
Asnād-e Inqilāb-e Islāmī [Islamic Revolution Documents], 1st edition, Tehran: Markaz-e Asnād-e Inqilāb-e 
Islāmī *The Islamic Revolution Document Centre+, 1374 *1995+, p. 307. 
304
 Ibid., pp. 308-309. 
101 
Jordanian authorities have received your financial support for the Palestinian refugees 
in the West Bank. We are thankful to you and the people (of Iran) beyond words‖.
305
 
In June 1967, Grand Ayatollah Seyed Hadi Milani issued a fatwa stating:  
All Muslims are expected to avoid having any financial or friendly relations with the 
Israelis and not to neglect providing financial supports for their Palestinian brothers. As 
prophet Mohammed said, if a Muslim does not pay attention to the affairs of other 
Muslim brothers, he is not a Muslim. Hence, it is recommended to pay special tribute to 




Grand Ayatollah Seyed Mohammad Reza Golpayegani on June 19
th
 1967 issued a 
statement in relation to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war 
We in Iran, Marajii, religious scholars and students and all our Iranian people publicly 
denounce the brutal activities of the Israeli regime, the enemy of God, against our 
Muslim Brothers. We do not neglect supporting the Palestinian people financially and 




On August 24th 1969 after the al-Aqsa Mosque was set on fire, Grand Ayatollah 
Golpayegani issued another statement,  
You will surely find the most intense of the people in animosity toward the believers [to 
be] the Jews and those who associate others with Allah (5:82). The community of Shia 
clerics and the Hawzah of Qom condemn the tragedy of burning the al-Aqsa Mosque and 
convey its condolences to the Islamic world. To this end there will be public gatherings 
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and mourning ceremonies across Iran. We do invite the Iranian Muslims to attend these 
gatherings and denounce the crimes of the Zionist regime.
308
 
It should be mentioned that shortly after the burning of the al-Aqsa Mosque, the Shah 
had publicly announced that ―the Shah and the people like other Muslims are 
volunteering to repair the al-Aqsa Mosque and to this end, proudly pay for renovating 
the site of al-Aqsa‖.
309
 Ayatollah Khomeini subsequently lambasted the Shah‘s regime 
for issuing the statement, arguing that the Shah wanted to cover up the crimes of the 
‗Zionists‘ and neglect their anti-Muslim intentions. Ayatollah Khomeini recommended 
that ―the burnt site of al-Aqsa should not be renovated so the world can see what the 
Zionists have been doing to the Muslim Palestinians‖
310
 
Unanimously, other Marajii like the Grand Ayatollahs Seyed Kazim 
Shariatmadari
311
, Seyed Mohammed Sadeq Rowhani
312
 Seyed Abulqasem Khoei
313
 and 
Seyed Mohsen Tabatabaei Hakim
314
 all issued their own religious statements that 
denounced the Israeli aggression against the Palestinians, and called for Muslims – and 
particularly Iranian Muslims to – provide financial and moral support for the 
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Palestinians. Based on the statements issued by the Marajii  previously listed, it is safe 
to say that their Islamic opinions were a reaction to Israeli aggression (such as the 1967 
Arab-Israeli war, the 1969 al-Aqsa fire, and the 1973 Ramadan war). Hence, they saw it 
as a religious duty to communicate to their followers across the country to support the 
Palestinian cause and donate financially.  
This chapter has shown the roots and development of relations between pre-
revolutionary Iranian opposition groups and figures, and the Palestinian cause. These 
included the left-wing as well as Islamic factions, and individuals including Ayatollah 
Khomeini and his followers that all played a considerable role in shaping Iran‘s post-
revolutionary era. The pro-Palestinian ideas of Iranian-Islamic groups and prominent 
religious figures before the Revolution manifest the interrelationship of four concerns. 
First, they consider the state of Israel a pedestal of imperialism in the heart of the 
Muslim heartland. Second, Israel has occupied a crucial part of the Islamic realm that 
includes the al-Aqsa Mosque, and is systematically oppressing a Muslim people while 
in a state of aggression against other Muslim states. Given these circumstances, 
Muslims are obliged to defend their land and beliefs. Third, because the state of Israel 
had developed and maintained close relations with the Shah‘s regime, it was therefore 
also guilty of participating in the oppression of Muslims in Iran as well as Palestine. 
Fourth and finally, in the eyes of Iranian Muslims, the Palestine struggle represented a 
just cause. In the following chapter I will examine how these trends developed after the 




Iran's relations with Palestine during the first decade of the Islamic 
revolution 
You have made glory and honour for the great Iranian people and the Islamic Nation 
together. We congratulate you. You have built the edifice of Islamic civilization which is 
stipulated by our Islamic religion [dinuna al-islami] […] Your revolution is a great blow 
to American and Zionism and Imperialism and the lackey forces in the region, and 
confirms that this [Palestinian] Arab and Islamic nation will be totally victorious over all 
its racist, Zionist, and imperialist enemies. 
A letter from Palestinians in Gaza, Filastin al-Thawrah, 25 February 1979 
315
 
Delineating from the Islamic ideas of the Shia Marajii – Ayatollah Khomeini, 
Ayatollah Kashani, Ayatollah Taleqani – and to the Third-Worldism of Ali Shariati, 
and the anti-imperialism of Iranian leftists, a broad range of revolutionary Iranian 
activists have defined the revolution as the revolution of oppressed over the oppressors. 
Those who resisted the Shah‘s regime concluded that their predicament was an 
outcome of wider global phenomena, most notably Zionism and American imperialism. 
Hence, Iran‘s revolutionaries thought that the Islamic revolution would be concretely 
safeguarded by defeating the twin threats of Zionism and imperialism, particularly 
within the region. There was an unwritten consensus amongst the Iranian 
revolutionaries that their triumph would motivate other likeminded movements 
throughout the region. Iranian revolutionaries,  particularly the zealous followers of 
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Ayatollah Khomeini and Shia Marajii, were inspired by Islamic teachings that it was 
their duty to lead a resistance against the oppressors, particularly those in Muslim 
nations.  It was therefore not surprising that the Palestinian cause became a focal point 
for revolutionary Iran. In the aftermath of the revolution in Iran, many Iranian activists 
believed that it was the time for the country‘s officials to set into play a new pro-
Palestinian foreign policy. 
This chapter will examine the Islamic Republic of Iran's relations with PLO 
after 1979. Through its course, I will look at two episodes in particular: the Iranian 
hostage crisis, and the Iran-Iraq war. I suggest that during these episodes, certain 
ideological differences between Iran's Islamic leadership and the PLO surfaced. My 
intention is not to repeat the history of the aforementioned episodes as this is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. However, I offer a fresh analysis and argue that Iran's 
ideological differences with the PLO's leadership guided the relations between the two 
sides from a revolutionary engagement to an ideological estrangement. Nevertheless, 
revolutionary Iran maintained its strong support for the Palestinian cause because of an 
ideological lineage it shared with the activism of Iranians before the Revolution.  
Iran's Relations with the PLO, 1979-1988: From Revolutionary 
Engagement to Ideological Estrangement     
A few days after the triumph of the revolution in Iran, on 17 February 1979, 
Yasser Arafat became the first foreign leader to visit Tehran – unannounced.
 316
  
According to Arafat's personal advisor Bassam Abu-Sharif, as soon as news of 
Ayatollah Khomeini's return reached Arafat, he asked his pilot to prepare his private jet 
to fly to Iran. Although, the Lebanese civil aviation officials informed him of Iran's 
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airspace closure, Arafat ignored their warnings, stating impatiently that "I assume all 
responsibilities, let us take off immediately".
317
 Upon entering Iranian airspace, Arafat's 
plane was surrounded by Iranian fighter jets warning the pilot to head back. Onboard, 
Arafat signalled to the Iranian fighter jet pilots from a window. As Abu-Sharif 
describes, Arafat took his iconic Palestinian black and white head dress and waived at 
the fighter jets' pilots, aiming to show them that his jet contained the leader of the PLO. 
After a while, as the pilots seemingly contacted Tehran, Arafat's plane was given 
permission to land and escorted to Tehran's Mehrabad Airport. After landing, Arafat 
announced: 
When one comes to one's home, one does not need permission [...] The Iranian 
revolution was a major revolution and an important victory for Palestine [...] When I 
approached Mehrabad Airport, I felt as if I was landing in Jerusalem [...] The Iranian 
revolution proved that Islam and the Muslims will not bow to oppression and bullying 




Upon their arrival, the Palestinian delegates were received and warmly embraced by a 
number of high ranking revolutionaries, and the Palestinian convoy immediately moved 
towards Ayatollah Khomeini's temporary quarters. Holding the pictures of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, they chanted ―today Iran, tomorrow Palestine‖. 
The Palestinian delegation accompanying Arafat consisted of fifty-nine high 
ranking members. Importantly, all fifty-nine members of the delegation were from 
Fatah. According to Chris Ioannides, the leaders of the Democratic Front for the 
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Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Marxist and Christian PFLP, were not 
represented.
319
 We may interpret this absence as a deliberate tactic on the part of Arafat 
to demonstrate the ‗Islamic side‘ of his solidarity with Ayatollah Khomeini and Iran‘s 
revolution. According to Abu Sharif, Arafat was warmly welcomed and spent an hour 
with Ayatollah Khomeini discussing the Palestinian cause.
320
 Shortly after visiting 
Ayatollah Khomeini, Arafat in a symbolic gesture, accompanied by a Palestinian 
woman who had lost three of her sons during the war with Israel, paid homage to the 
martyrs of the Iranian revolution by visiting Behesht-e Zahra cemetery. The Palestinian 
delegates were greeted by a large number of Iranians chanting pro-Palestinian slogans. 
Choking with tears, Arafat spoke with intensity about the need for Muslim solidarity.
321
 
Arafat and his delegate also met with members of the Provisional Government's 
cabinet. During his visit, Arafat was routinely accompanied by high-profile Iranian 
revolutionaries, most notably Hojjatoleslam Seyed Ahmad Khomeini (Ayatollah 
Khomeini's son), and Deputy Prime Minister of the provisional government, Ibrahim 
Yazdi. Having established good connections with other revolutionary figures prior to 
1979, Arafat conducted private meetings with Ayatollah Taleqani and a number of left-
wing revolutionaries, including the Mujaheddin and Fadayeen.
322
  
Two days after first arriving in Tehran, Arafat alongside with Ahmad Khomeini 
and Yazdi, and a number of members of the Mujaheddin and Fadayeen arrived at the 
former Israeli consulate in Tehran, and accepted the premises as the official embassy of 
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the PLO in Iran. Arafat appointed Hani al-Hassan as ambassador of Palestine to Tehran. 
From the rooftop of the embassy, the chairman of PLO delivered a speech in front of a 
large crowd: 
In these sensitive moments, in the name of revolutionaries and Palestinian fighters, I 
pledge myself that, under the leadership of the great Imam Khomeini, we will liberate the 
Palestinian homeland together. The path we have chosen is identical; we are moving 
forward on the same path; we are fighting the same struggle, the same revolution; our 
nation is one [...] we are all Muslims; we are all Islamic revolutionaries; all fighting for 
the establishment of one body of Islamic believers [...] we will continue our struggle 
against Zionism and move towards Palestine alongside Iranian Islamic revolutionaries.
323
 
Accompanied by his PLO delegation, Arafat also held meetings at the Foreign Ministry 
of the provisional government, stating: 
I tell you that I am with you [...] we are living in an era of the people's triumph against 
imperialism and Zionism [...] We promise to work with this revolution, with all its 
humane and civilised content, in order to build this new era together – an era which 
dawned to us in this area with launching of your revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini 
[...] We will proceed two revolutions in one and two people in one [...] Together we will 




Arafat also visited a number of Iran's larger cities that had become famous for their 
anti-Shah demonstrations, such as Mashhad, Tabriz, and Ahvaz. In Mashhad, Arafat 
was greeted by local ulama, and revolutionary fighters. Ayatollah Tifli, who 
commanded the revolutionary council in Mashhad, welcomed him and stated that 
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revolutionary air-force personnel in Mashhad were in full support of their brothers in 
Palestine, ready to fight against the ‗Zionist enemy‘. Arafat thanked the people of 
Mashhad and chanted that ―it is a revolution until victory"
325
. In Ahvaz, Arafat was 
welcomed by thousands of Iranians gathered at Ahvaz Sports Stadium. Addressing the 
crowd, Arafat said "[l]et Carter know that this link between the two revolutions will 




On 23 February 1979, at the end of his historic six-day visit to Iran, Arafat 
headed to Abu Dhabi to meet with the UAE's authorities. Before leaving Iran, Arafat 
presented a model of the Jerusalem Dome of the Rock as gift to Ayatollah Khomeini. 
Accompanied by Abu Mazin and Hani al-Hassan, Arafat met with the Islamic 
revolutionary Council and spoke to Iranian radio stations. Speaking about Iran's 
relations with Palestine, Arafat stated 
Iranian-Palestinian relations started 18 years ago [...] several Iranian brothers fought 
among our ranks. The rest of the story about Iranian-Palestinian relations I will leave for 
the history to tell. While you (Iranian people) were struggling against the imperialist 
regime, you were also fighting with us [...] this revolution under the leadership of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, has changed the circumstances in the area. Kissinger will have to 
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Shortly after Arafat's visit to Iran, people throughout the region – attracted to its pro-
Palestinian stance – demonstrated in solidarity with Iran's revolution. In Bahrain, a 
large number of people carried portraits of Ayatollah Khomeini and Arafat, gathering 
around the Iranian embassy in support of Iran's revolution.
328
 Once in Abu Dhabi, 
Arafat in an interview spoke about the impressions he gained during his visit to Iran. In 
response to a question regarding Iran's stance on the Arab situation, Arafat stated:  
The faithful Iranian Islamic revolution is linked to the Arab nation with the deepest bond, 
God's almighty's holy Koran. This relation will be further consolidated as we proceed 
from our one creed, one faith and our common existence […] Everything I saw in Iran 
was above my material expectations and within my spiritual expectations. The new 
regime in Iran has rectified relations with the PLO.
329
 
There was almost excessive coverage of Arafat, wearing his iconic Palestinian 
headscarf,  embracing Ayatollah Khomeini, as well as his emotional statements in 
Iran‘s media. The Palestinian flag beside Iran's revolutionary's banner could be seen 
painted on the walls of the Palestinian embassy and Iranian governmental buildings. All 
these metaphorical momentary developments were not simply allegorical gestures, but 
rather represented the rapid invalidation and dismantling of Pahlavi's relations with 
Israel. It was a reversal of policies as new revolutionary and Islamic beliefs came to 
shape Iran's global image. To understand the foundation of Iran's relation with PLO, it 
is vital to address two fundamental questions. First, how did the Palestinians perceive 
the triumph of the Islamic revolution in Iran? Second, how did the leadership of the 
Islamic revolution envision the future of Iranian-Palestinian relations? 
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The PLO's Perception of the Islamic revolution in Iran 
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 marked a turning point in the contemporary 
history of the region. It had triumphed at a propitious time for the Palestinians, who 
were encountering an ostensibly unbeatable enemy in their battle against Israel. Egypt, 
the most populated and militarily powerful Arab state, who had engaged in direct 
military hostilities against Israel since 1948, was negotiating the Camp David peace 
accords with Israel. According to Ioannides, the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement was 
seen as a most serious blow to the Palestinian movement, for it detached Cairo from the 
line of resistance against Israel. At this time, the Iranian Revolution served to boost the 
morale of the Palestinians and compensated for the loss of Egypt.
330
In regards to the 
loss of Egypt and triumph of the Iranian Revolution, Arafat stated: 
[t]he [Iranian revolution] has reversed the strategic balance in the Middle East against 
Israel and the United States. The Camp David document will be merely ink on paper 
following the basic changes brought by the Iranian revolution, both in the region and our 
Islamic nation and in world strategy.
331
 
Yet the Palestinian perception of the Iranian Revolution is rooted in a history that goes 
back further than the Camp David accords and the subsequent loss of Egypt. The failure 
of the Arab states, who had adopted a pan-Arab ideology in confronting Israel, had sent 
a clear and bitter message for the Palestinian people that Arab nationalism had 
encountered a dead-end. For the Palestinians, the failure of the Arab states during the 
1967 war and the brutal coercion of Palestinian guerrillas by the Royal Jordanian Army 
during Black September in 1970 became precedents for the humiliation and failure 
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caused by the Camp David peace accords between Israel and Egypt. In fact, one can 
argue that Palestinian movements became frustrated with the incompetence of Arab 
states in changing the strategic balance of power that had favoured Israel in the post-
1967 era.  
Adeed Dawisha argues that before the triumph of the Iranian Revolution, Arab 
nationalism met its Waterloo in June 1967, where it was put to the test and found 
wanting.
332
 On one of the most crucial issues on the agenda for Arab nationalism – the 
rights of Palestinians – it could not deliver. To the mass Arab Muslim public, the 
victories of the Ayatollahs during 1979 and 1980 over the ‗enemies of Islam‘, 
embodied by the West and its enfeebled lackeys in the Muslim world, represented the 
advent of a new heroic age of Islamic assertion and power.
333
 The Iranian Revolution, 
with its leadership's commitment to the Palestinian cause and their anti-Zionist 
ideological tendencies, were viewed positively by the Palestinian Liberation Movement 
as a valuable asset and a reliable power capable of enlarging the circle of hostility 
around Israel. As Barry Rubin argues, the triumph of the Iran's Islamic revolution 
provided motivation for the PLO: if Ayatollah Khomeini could rise from obscurity and 
exile to conquer a seemingly invincible foe allied to and installed by the United States, 
Arafat believed he could follow the same path. In a similar vein, simply handing the 
keys to the former Israeli embassy in Tehran to the PLO delegation handed a significant 
boost to Palestinian morale: "after more than two decades of struggle, this was the first 
piece of Israeli real estate Arafat had captured".
334
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According to Babak Ganji, the PLO considered the Iranian Revolution as a major 
victory for the Palestinian cause, with Arafat hoping that revolutionary Iran would 
replace Egypt.
335
 This assessment is plausible given that the PLO leadership aimed to 
build a new anti-Israeli bloc centred on Syria-Iraq and Lebanon, with Iran acting as a 
‗strategic rear‘ for this coalition.
336
 Ganji adds that Arafat hoped the alliance would be 
empowered by the economic and political backing of Saudi Arabia. In other words, one 
can convincingly argue that Arafat aimed to draw a crescent consisting of conservative 
Arab states, pan-Arab regimes, and the Islamic Republic around the Jewish state in 
order for them to gain an upper-hand post-Camp David. In this regard, the PLO 
ambassador in Tehran, Hani al-Hassan, argued that the Iranian revolution had 
empowered the PLO to encircle Israel, and possibly to defeat it.
337
 The PLO leadership 
therefore shaped and constructed its relations with revolutionary Iran from the very 
beginning of the Islamic revolution.  
The Perception of the Islamic revolution's Leadership of the 
Palestinian-cause 
As noted and argued in the previous chapter, Iran‘s pre-revolutionary opposition 
established a historical connection to the Palestinian cause mainly based upon their 
anti-Zionist and anti-Imperialist ideologies. In the case of the country‘s religious 
leaders in general and Ayatollah Khomeini in particular, as noted, the Islamic teachings 
of supporting the Islamic ummah (Islamic community) and his opposition to the 
imperial powers became the foundation of his popular uprising, and ultimately his pro-
Palestinian stance, not least because it solidified one of the main goals of the 
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revolutionaries, that is to change the regional status quo and to establish Iran as a 
regional power. Throughout his years in exile, Ayatollah Khomeini was an active 
supporter of the Palestinian cause. At quite an early stage of the revolution, he 
explicitly authorised Shi'i religious taxes to be channelled towards supporting 
Palestinian fighters and refugees.
338
 In a statement, he announced that 
[t]oday it is incumbent upon all Muslims in general and upon the Arab governments and 
administrations in particular to safeguard their own independence, to commit themselves 
to support and assist this valiant group. They should not spare any effort in arming, 
feeding, and supplying material for these fighters. It is also incumbent upon the valiant 
fighters [themselves] to trust in God, be bound by the teachings of the Quran, and with 
steadfastness and determination persist in their sacred objective.
339
  
Hamid Dabashi is of the opinion that Ayatollah Khomeini, from the very inception of 
his struggle against the Shah's regime, explicitly focused on the Palestinian cause. 
While advising his student followers to rally around the banner of Islam as the only 
banner of unity, what rekindled Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary zeal in 1970s were 
events related to the Palestinians in Lebanon, rather than in Iran.
340
 In order to 
understand how the leadership of the revolution in Iran aimed to construct Iran's 
relations with the PLO, one conversation in particular between Ayatollah Khomeini and 
Arafat merits being highlighted. During the first meeting between Ayatollah Khomeini 
and Arafat on 18 February 1979, both leaders highlighted their strong desire to 
strengthen relationship. Ayatollah Khomeini focused on advising the PLO leadership in 
order to guide its struggle according to Islamic values. Ayatollah Khomeini specifically 
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highlights the Islamic dimension of the Palestinian cause as the most influential vehicle 
for the liberation of Palestinian land. He stated: 
I ask of God the Blessed and Exalted that our brethren nation of Palestine will overcome 
their difficulties. We are their brothers. From this movement's inception more than 
fifteen years ago, I have always, in my writings and speeches, spoken of Palestine and 
called attention to the crimes that Israel has perpetrated there. God willing, after we are 
freed from these fetters then to the same degree that we stood with you at that time and 
are now standing with you, I hope that we will confront the problems together like 
brothers. I beseech God the Blessed and Exalted to exalt Islam and the Muslims and to 
return Quds [Jerusalem] to our brothers.
341
 
Arafat, addressing Khomeini, expressed that: 
[a]n earthquake is now in the offing and may have even arrived. "When thou threwest a 
spear, it was not thy act but God's." (Qur'an 8:17). In reply to Dayan and Begin, I told 
them they could go and choose a patron and rely on America, but I too could find support 
and indeed have done so: I rely on the Iranian nation under the leadership of His 
Holiness the Grand Āyatullāh Mūsawī al-Khomeini.
342
 
Ayatollah Khomeini responded by emphasising and recommending Arafat to reinforce 
the Islamic faith within his liberation movement 's strategy: 
[t]he Shah too relied on America, Britain, China, Israel and the others, but these refuges 
are powerless. That refuge which is not powerless, but powerful, is God. God is our 
refuge. I advise you, my own people and your people, to always turn to God, not to these 
powers. Do not rely on material things but on the spiritual. The power of God is greater 
than all these powers, thus it was that we saw a nation which was weak and empty-
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handed prevail over all the powers, and, God willing, will continue to do so. When we 
are with God, we are not afraid of anything, for if we are slain in the way of God, we are 
blessed, and if we stay in the way of God, we are also blessed.... We place our hopes in 
God and do not despair of Him. God willing, we will overcome our problems, but we 
don't believe we will overcome them through material means, victory is attained through 
spiritual means. As long as our people put their trust in God the Blessed and Exalted, 




Elsewhere, in a statement aimed at Muslim nations on 25 November 1979, Khomeini 
expressed the following: 
Oh Muslims of the world! Oh you Muslims who have risen up! Oh endless sea of 
humanity! Rise up and defend your national and Islamic existence. Israel has taken Bayt 
al-Muqaddas from the Muslims and has met only tolerance from the (Muslim) 
governments. Apparently America and its corrupt appendage Israel now intend to seize 
the holy mosque and the mosque of the Prophet. Still the Muslims sit back, indifferent 
onlookers. Rise up and defend Islam and the centre of revelation. Do not be afraid of this 
ballyhoo, for today Islam needs you and you are responsible before God Almighty. Trust 
in God Almighty and march forth united.
344
 
A textual analysis of Ayatollah Khomeini‘s discourse highlights his own Islamic 
sentiments, and ultimately an emphasis on the religious dimension of the Palestinian 
cause. He was a cleric sitting on top of a partially theocratic state, after all. This 
material interest was closely married to the ideational context that I have set out, in that 
Palestine was both a mission these revolutionaries believed in and a convenient vehicle 
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to claim Iranian suzerarinty in the Muslim world. The ideological strategy is clear here: 
Khomeini‘s focus on the Shah's reliance on the United States, and other major powers 
as being the root cause for his failures served as a vehicle for castigating Arafat himself 
for having taken sides during the cold war era. By stating "I advise you and my people 
and your people not to rely on other powers but God", Khomeini clearly voiced his 
ideological-religious motivations, revealing how they had shaped his expectations of 
the PLO leadership. In other words, Khomeini highlighted the religious significance of 
the Palestinian cause, and its proximity at the heart of the Islamic world. Furthermore, 
he urged Arafat to follow the ‗Islamic route‘, and in the process underline the Islamic 
character of the Palestinian struggle rather than its pan-Arab dimensions. This was 
convenient for the new leader of a self-processed Islamic state. Additional speeches of 
Khomeini on the Palestinian cause will be examined throughout this chapter in order to 
develop my argument further. In what follows, I investigate how the Islamic Republic 
of Iran began to implement its commitment to the Palestinian cause from the very 
beginning of the Revolution. 
Implementing Pro-Palestinian Slogans as Policy: Institutionalising 
Iran's Relations with Palestine from the Early Stages of the Islamic 
revolution 
One of the major tasks of the revolution was to reverse the foreign policies of the 
previous regime, and in the process implement the interests of the state. In October 
1979, Ibrahim Yazdi, the foreign minister of Iran's revolutionary government, took the 
opportunity to clarify revolutionary Iran's policies at one of the most important 
international stages: the United Nations. This was the first time the new government 
had communicated their aims and new policies on a world stage. In his statement to the 
General Assembly, Yazdi described the Shah's regime as a "puppet of imperialism and 
118 
Zionism", and voiced Iran‘s solidarity with liberation movements throughout the 
world.
345
 According to Yazdi, the Shah's delegation at the UN had sided with 
‗American imperialism‘, racism and Zionism.
346
 Criticising Zionism and expressing 
strong support for the Palestinians, Yazdi described the former as "one of the most 
vicious forms of racism in recorded history",
347
 and sharply rebuked Western states for 
turning a blind eye on Israeli aggression against the Palestinians. Yazdi expressed Iran's 
revolutionary opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, stating: 
When Israeli bombers killed impoverished Palestinians and Lebanese, their Western 
media apologists described this genocide aggression as defensive aerial attack on 
Palestinian military bases. When the Palestinians blew up a bus in occupied Jerusalem or 
assassinated an Israeli secret agent, they were described as 'terrorists'.
348
   
The process of institutionalising anti-Zionism began with immediate effect at the outset 
of the Islamic revolution. On both international and regional levels, the Pahlavi 
attachment to Israel was entirely dismantled by the revolutionaries. According to R.K. 
Ramazani, Iran's relations with no other state in the world – including the United States 
–  were so rapidly and radically subverted as its relations with Israel. In addition to 
Israel, Iran had severed relations with Egypt primarily due to Cairo's signing of the 
Camp David Accords.
349
 The PLO was officially recognised and endorsed by the 
revolutionary government in Iran. It‘s delegation in Tehran was recognised as the 
ambassadorial representation of Palestine in Iran. A combination of Iran severing its 
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ties with Egypt, and cutting off oil supplies to Israel, are estimated to have cost Iran 
approximately $700 million in annual revenue.
350
 From an economic point of view, 
forfeiting such an amount in annual trade with Israel and Egypt at the early stage of the 
revolution meant that Iran would suffer severe economic setbacks; a choice that thus 
could not be explained with reference to purely cost-benefit or material analyses. 
Episodes such as this therefore highlight the importance of beliefs and ideas in the 
foundation of Iran's anti-Zionist and pro-Palestinian stance. 
As noted in the previous chapter, the process of institutionalising a pro-
Palestinian stance began even before the triumph of the Islamic revolution through non-
governmental and religious channels. In this regard, religious ceremonies were a factor 
in mobilising support for the Palestinian cause. We have seen previously that Khomeini 
and other Shia Marajii, and religious scholars like Ayatollah Kashani, Muttahari and 
Taleqani, designated religious taxes for supporting Palestinian activists. After 1979, 
Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers gained an opportunity to incorporate their 
position on Palestine into state agencies such as the Foreign Ministry, and by severing 
relations with Israel and recognising the PLO. Nevertheless, the revolutionary 
leadership continued to combine its new access to state apparatuses with its traditional 
approach of mobilising support using religious channels. Khomeini's most vital strategy 
was to transform the Palestinian struggle into an Islamic cause and internationalise the 
Palestinian question even beyond the Arab territories, a strategy that was also pursued 
by earlier Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood established in Egypt in 
1928. On 7 August 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini declared the last Friday of the Islamic 
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holy month of Ramadan as the international day of Jerusalem (Quds): Yom al-Quds. In 
his announcement, Ayatollah Khomeini stated 
I ask all the Muslims of the world and the Muslim governments to join together to sever 
the hand of this usurper [Israel] and its supporters. I call on all the Muslims of the world 
to select as Quds Day the last Friday in the holy month of Ramadan which is itself a 
determining period and can also be the determiner of the Palestinian people's fate and 
through a ceremony demonstrating the solidarity of Muslims world-wide, announce their 
support for the legitimate rights of the Muslim people.
351
 
In order to outline the global implications and ideological reasoning of him announcing 
Quds day, Ayatollah Khomeini designated it as "the day for the weak and oppressed" to 
confront their oppressors, and stated: 
Quds Day is an international day, it is not a day devoted to Quds alone. It is the day for 
the weak and oppressed to confront the arrogant powers, the day for those nations 
suffering under the pressure of American oppression and oppression by other powers to 
confront the superpowers... Quds Day is the day when the fate of the oppressed nations 
should be determined. The oppressed nations should announce their existence against the 
oppressors and just as Iran rose up and rubbed the noses of the oppressors in the dirt, and 
will continue to do so, so too all the nations should rise up and throw these germs of 
corruption into the rubbish bin. Quds Day is the day when the superpowers should be 
warned to stay at home and leave the oppressed alone. Israel, the enemy of mankind, the 
enemy of humanity, which is creating disturbances every day and is attacking our 
brothers in south Lebanon, must realise that its masters are no longer accepted in the 
world and must retreat. They must give up their ambitious designs on Iran, their hands 
must be severed from all the Islamic countries and their agents in these countries must 
step down. Quds Day is the day for announcing such things, for announcing such things 
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to the satans who want to push the Islamic nations aside and bring the superpowers into 




The leadership of the Islamic revolution was therefore very determined to put its pro-
Palestinian ideas, tailored mainly based on religious solidarity during the pre-
revolutionary period, into practice. This was the beginning of a new chapter in Iran's 
relations with the Palestinians. In what follows and throughout the next chapter, the 
ideological importance of declaring the Quds day, and Palestine's place in Iran's foreign 
policy, will be examined further.  
Before continuing to discuss the importance of ideology in revolutionary Iran's 
pro-Palestinian policies, our attention should return briefly to the history of Iran's 
relations with the PLO. At the beginning of the Islamic revolution in Iran, all 
indications pointed to a promising relationship between the new government and the 
PLO. On the surface it seemed that Iran had compensated Arafat for the loss of Egypt, 
and that the future of relations between Iran and the PLO was bright. However, the blue 
skies of Iranian-PLO relations became clouded shortly after the triumph of the Islamic 
revolution. In the light of this study, I suggest that two periods in particular – the 
Iranian Hostage Crisis, and the Iran-Iraq war –acted as catalysts in widening the 
ideological gap between the Islamic revolution and PLO. However, the confines of this 
study do not allow me to examine the impact of these events on Iran's relations with the 
PLO in all its facets.  
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The Takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran, and PLO’s 
Attempt at Mediation  
On 4th of November 1979, a group of Iranian students calling themselves the 
‗Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line‘ occupied the American embassy in 
Tehran, holding 52 embassy staff hostage. This takeover triggered an international 
crisis that lasted for 444 days. The militant students, morally equipped with anti-
imperialist ideas, demanded that the Shah be extradited to Iran immediately, and that 
Washington cease interfering in Iran's domestic policies. The seizure of American 
diplomats became a great concern for the White House. In desperation, the Carter 
administration sent a special envoy to Tehran to meet with Ayatollah Khomeini and to 
negotiate the release of hostages. According to Russell Leigh Moses, the Oval Office-
nominated former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, and former Foreign Service Officer 
William Miller, staff director of the Senate Intelligent Committee, were dispatched to 
conduct meetings with Iranian officials and resolve the hostage crisis.
353
     
Having received messages that Ayatollah Khomeini and the students refused any 
negotiations with American officials, the aircraft carrying Clark and Miller landed in 
Istanbul. These nominated American delegates attempted to contact Iranian officials 
from Istanbul. However, given the political dangers in Iran associated with 
communicating in even a minor fashion with US officials, this dialogue was limited to 
third parties and did not yield tangible results. As Leigh Moses noted, it became evident 
to American officials that any plans that would rely on a direct channel of 
communication between the White House and Ayatollah Khomeini would be doomed 
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 Director of the US Iran Desk Henry Precht concluded that "the Iranians 
were simply not going to knuckle under to that old American pressure"
355
. In fact, Clark 
and Miller's mission from its very beginning failed to materialise its objective of 
negotiating the release of the hostages.  
At this critical moment for the Carter administration, the PLO leadership 
contacted U.S. officials expressing their desire to mediate between Tehran and 
Washington in order to help free the hostages. In fact, before Clark and Miller began to 
prepare for their mission, PLO representatives had already communicated with 
members of the American congress expressing the PLO's willingness to intervene as a 
mediator. According to Leigh Moses, after receiving a green light from Washington, a 
three-man high level PLO delegation arrived in Tehran to discuss the hostage crisis 
with Iranian officials including Bani-Sadr and Sadegh Ghotbzadeh – both high profile 
members of the revolutionary government.
356
 Babak Ganji elaborates that on the same 
day of the embassy takeover, the PLO contacted the White House and PLO mediation 
began promptly after the hostages were seized.
357
 It is vital to mention that the PLO had 
close ties with the Mojahedin of the Islamic revolution (MIR), who played an 
instrumental role in the Iranian Revolution and formed the backbone of the 
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the most crucial armed force after 1979. Through 
MIR, which were close to the leaders of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's 
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Line – including Mohsen Mirdamadi, Abbas Abdi, Ibrahim Asgharzadeh and 
Ma'sumeh Ebtekar – the PLO aimed to facilitate the release of American hostages.
358
   
In clarifying the ideological reasons for the embassy takeover, the hostage-takers 
highlighted their anti-Zionist and anti-Imperialist beliefs as the main motivations for 
their action. As Ramazani notes, the student leaders emphasised repeatedly that their 
action aimed at "forestalling the return of both Israel and the U.S. to Iran through the 
back door".
359
 In other words, Israel was perceived by the Iranian revolutionaries as the 
illegitimate progeny of American imperialism. Ramazani argues that from the very 
moment of the embassy takeover, the Iranian revolutionaries concluded that under no 
circumstances could Iran compromise with Israel, and that it was hence necessary to 
stand against any state backing Israel. The most often repeated rationale was that "Israel 
will never make any concessions to the Arabs".
360
  
After the seizure of the U.S. Embassy, the student hostage-takers published a 
number of documents recovered from the embassy in a series of booklets named 
Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den. Some of these documents are especially 
revealing, and demonstrate the anti-Zionist motives of the Muslim Student Followers of 
the Imam's Line. Booklet no. 19, entitled Israel, Foreign Intelligence and Security 
Services, specifically focuses on the links between the Shah's government and Tel-
Aviv. Booklet no. 42, entitled U.S. Intervention in the Islamic Countries, Palestine 
concentrates on the activities of the U.S. embassy in spying on Palestinian activists 
throughout the region. In the introduction of this particular booklet, the students state 
that: 
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A lot has been told about Palestine, and the Palestinians. The story of oppression on this 
nation is an old and distressing one. Palestinian refugees, usurped lands, Deir Yasin, 
Kafr-Ghassem, Sabra and Shatila Massacres, Palestinians imprisoned in Zionist camps 
and all the oppression borne on this heroic and resistant nation, are all countless crimes 
committed by Zionists and their Imperialist supporters. Our Muslim nation is aware of 
Palestine problem, having declared our support for this homeless nation, before and after 
the Islamic revolution. Our nation has firmly decided to take revenge on Zionist enemies 
in the occupied lands. This nation's most fundamental and strategic goal is to liberate 
Quds...The Palestinian nation can liberate Quds only under the banner of Islam […] 
Nationalism and other schools of thought will not solve the problems of Palestine […] 
The Palestinian nation will hopefully be able to liberate Quds, and the Muslim Iranian 
nation will keep being on their side.
361
    
According to the documents seized from the U.S. Embassy, the American 
government monitored with great concern Palestinian connections to the Iranian 
revolutionary state.  According to classified documents, the Qatari Foreign Minister 
Ahmed bin Seif al-Thani raised his concern that although PLO was heavily dependent 
on the financial support from the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, financial support from 
revolutionary Iran could sway the PLO's leadership. Their concern was that 
revolutionary Iran's enthusiasm for liberation of the Mosque of al-Aqsa could influence 
Palestinian activists, and therefore reduce the influence of Arab states over the PLO.
362
 
Other documents also showed that during a discussion between American diplomats 
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and Ibrahim Yazdi, he clarified the religious dimension of Iran's pro-Palestinian stance. 
They state that the 
Iranians wanted the PLO to inject greater use of Islamic solidarity in its appeal. If the 
PLO continued its secular approach, victory was not assured. If the PLO created a 
Palestinian state on purely secular lines, the Marxists and radical-left Palestinians would 
move quickly to take over.
363
  
The document concludes that Yazdi made Iran's commitment to the Palestinian cause 
quite clear, as he stated "[w]e have helped them and we will help them in the future"
364
 
In another classified paper titled Palestinian Activity in Iran, the U.S. Embassy 
reports that efforts by the Palestinian Fadayeen to obtain influence in revolutionary Iran 
reflected the rivalry between more moderate elements led by Arafat and other radical 
groups led by the PFLP under the command of George Habash. The report concludes 
that Arafat's PLO seemingly had succeeded in having Fatah dominate Palestinian 
activities in Iran. On the other hand, the documents also conclude that the PFLP held 
strong ties with left-wing Iranian revolutionaries, particularly the Mujahedin and 
dissidents in Khuzestan province.
365
  
The discovery of such specific documents from the U.S. Embassy which showed 
the close observation of Iranian connections to the Palestinian cause by American 
officials in Iran had a profound moral impact on the students that had seized the 
embassy. As noted in the introduction of the pamphlets, the Muslim Student Followers 
of the Imam‘s line perceived the American actions as animosity of a "united front of 
imperialism-Zionism" against the Islamic revolution and the Palestinian cause. For the 






student activists as well as revolutionary Iranians, these documents confirmed the 
strong link between the fate of the Islamic revolution and the Palestinian cause. This 
issue further tempered their anti-Zionist tendencies. What is crucial to note is that the 
PLO's offer to mediate between the revolutionary Iranians and the White House 
happened at a time where anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist sentiments were at their 
highest on the streets of Iran.  
In her memoirs, Ma'sumeh Ebtekar – one of the leading figures of the Muslim 
Student Followers of the Imam‘s Line – mentions the PLO attempts for mediation: 
"[n]ext in line (after Clark-Miller mission) was a delegation from the PLO. That 
prospect presented us with a much more serious dilemma".
366
 According to her, from 
the earliest days of the hostage crisis, the Palestinians in Tehran had contacted Iranian 
officials in the hope of mediating. They then decided to send a senior delegation in an 
attempt to solve the issue.
367
 Despite the visit by senior PLO members, including Abu 
Jihad, to the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, they were not allowed to enter the premises as 
mediators. Ebtekar expresses the gravity of the situation and disappointment amongst 
the revolutionary Iranians, stating 
[a]t the time the PLO had a reputable image [...] The issue of Palestine and the liberation 
of Quds [Jerusalem] was a vital issue for Iranians, and had become one of the 
unwavering positions of the Islamic revolution. We saw the Palestinian cause as a sister 
revolution to our own. Some people even hoped that the PLO could put pressure on the 
U.S. They were to be disappointed.
368
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After the failure of the PLO's leadership efforts to mediate between Iranian officials 
and the White House, PLO officials promptly denied that there had been any efforts to 
mediate. Hani al-Hassan, the director of the PLO bureau in Tehran, in a speech in 
Beirut stated: 
The PLO is not an intermediary between Iran and America, Palestinians are on the same 
side as the Iranian revolution […] The Palestinian revolution and the Iranian revolution 
are in the same position, that is, both revolutions have attempted equally to fight 
imperialism [...] The Palestinian revolution position is clear. This position is 
uncompromising. We are one side of the issue, not an intermediary. Any victory by the 
Iranian nation over the influence of American imperialism in the region should be 
considered a victory for the PLO.
369
 
Nevertheless, Bassam Abu Sharif, senior advisor to Arafat, describes the PLO as the 
closest political party to the Iranian Revolution (at the time of hostage crisis), and 
clarifies the PLO's strategy to mediate during the hostage crisis: 
[n]o one had made a move to contact the PLO, however, until a few representative of the 
European countries unofficially asked president Arafat to test the waters of negotiation 
with Khomeini. Arafat agreed. This was an excellent opportunity for him. If the PLO was 
successful in getting the hostages released, it would improve the PLO's status as a strong 
power in the Middle East, especially after Menachem Begin had rejected the 
participation of PLO in the peace talks at Camp David that eventually led to a signed 
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel on September 1978.
370
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According to Ioannides, Khomeini refused to receive the PLO's special delegate Abu-
Walid, and the militant students denounced the PLO‘s mediation attempts.
371
 Both 
Khomeini and the militant students were incensed, the more so when Hani al-Hassan 
claimed credit for the 17 November release of black and female hostages.
372
 Ayatollah 
Khomeini promptly castigated the PLO for "telling lies in order to get close to the 
United States."
373
 To this end, Khomeini's office issued a strong rebuke to Hani al-
Hassan for claiming credit for this decision: 
[i]f a representative of any organisation other than the PLO has said such things, we 
would not have been surprised, but it is highly questionable that the representative of an 
organisation that fights against Israel and knows that it is the U.S. that has forced Israel 
on dear Palestine and other Arab countries, should tell these lies in order to get closer to 
the United States. Mr Hani al-Hassan knows very well that the Imam did not receive Mr 
Abu-Walid, Mr. Arafat's envoy, solely because he had pro-American proposals; this 
office strongly denies the reports in the newspapers […] and asks the Palestinian 
brothers, relying on the exalted God to stand against the United States to achieve the 
victory. They should be assured that only reliance on God can achieve victory.
374
 
Almost as soon as the PLO‘s efforts at mediation begun, they backfired. 
Ioannides elaborates that Arafat's mediation attempts not only angered the Iranians, but 
also caused disagreements within the PLO. A number of PLO's internal bodies – 
including the PFLP, the Sai'qa, the DFLP, and even Arafat's own Fatah – announced 
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solidarity with Iran and backed the embassy's takeover.
375
 Arafat appeared to the 
Iranians as acting on behalf of the American government against the interests of 
Khomeini, and ultimately a revolution that undermined US and Israeli interests in the 
region. Ioannides describes Arafat's mediation attempt as counterproductive, arguing 
that in the eyes of revolutionary Iranians and anti-imperialist Palestinians, Arafat 
appeared willing and ready to aid the Americans in recovering from Khomeini's 
humiliating blow by seeking the release of hostages.
376
 Fearing the loss of his anti-
imperialist image, Arafat not only denied that PLO had made attempts to mediate, but 
also offered his unconditional support for Khomeini‘s stance. On 7 December 1979, 
Arafat in Beirut announced: "[t]ell our great Imam to give the order and we will all 
obey and move to strike imperialism at any time and in any place. The day will come 




After the failure of Arafat to convince the leadership of the Islamic revolution to 
release the hostages, the PLO's leadership abandoned its pursuit of acting as a mediator. 
According to Barry Rubin, although Arafat exaggerated his role, he undoubtedly did –
unsuccessfully – discuss freeing the American hostages with the Iranian officials, and 
passed on information to Washington about developments on the ground during the 
crisis.
378
 Rubin also argues that Arafat was eager to please the Iranians, as he believed 
the Revolution offered him the opportunity to coordinate a regional alliance of Soviet-
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backed Arabs and Iran to confront Israel and the United States.
379
 Yet, as Babak Ganji 
has shown, the Soviets were instrumental in changing Arafat‘s position. Ganji argues 
that the Soviet Foreign Minister Andre Gromyko strongly discouraged Arafat from 
pursuing mediation efforts, expressing that Moscow did not wish to protect American 
interests. Shortly afterwards, Arafat changed his position.
380
 Ironically, a few years later 
in 1986, in an exclusive interview with the journal of Palestine Studies, Arafat 
confirmed that he attempted to help release the hostages 
I received an official request from high-level, official American sources asking me to 
help them, and I agreed. I sent a high level delegation to Iran that succeeded, on the first 
day, in releasing the first thirteen hostages. Later we engaged in mediation...I was going 
to continue my efforts but too many people had gotten involved, and I told the American 
government that too many cooks spoil the broth, but no one listened. We did receive 
official thanks for what we did in Iran for them [Americans] in Iran.
381
 
Khomeini, always also the Machiavellian politician, was aware of Arafat's 
manoeuvring. Arafat returned to Tehran on 11 February 1980 to attend the celebrations 
of the first anniversary of the Revolution, visiting Ayatollah Khomeini in hospital as he 
recovered from a mild heart ailment. This time Arafat's presence received little 
attention from Iran's state media.
382
 There was a tension at the heart of the PLO‘s 
priorities. On the one hand, its leadership endeavoured to gain recognition from the 
Americans and alter its image among US allies – especially Western European states. If 
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successful, this would enable Arafat to play a role within any possible future 
developments and negotiations orchestrated by the White House, such as the Camp 
David accord between Egypt and Israel. On the other hand, it was vital for the PLO to 
maintain its alliance with Iran: a vital, energetic non-Arab and revolutionary Islamic 
state that could compensate the loss of Egypt and play a major role in the anti-Israeli 
front. The PLO's approach to the Tehran hostage crisis showed that its leadership failed 
to consider the significance of the role of religious and revolutionary ideologies as a 
driving force behind Iran's pro-Palestinian stance. Equally, the leadership of the Islamic 
revolution seemed unwilling to digest the rationale behind Arafat's mediation attempts. 
In other words, regardless of the nature of reasoning behind the PLO's mediation 
efforts, an ideological gap between the two sides became apparent during this episode. 
As noted previously, Iran‘s perception of the PLO as the legitimate representative of 
the people of Palestine was shattered during the PLO‘s attempts at mediating between 
Iran and the ‗American empire‘.  Nevertheless, the Islamic revolution did not publicly 
denounce the PLO, and continued its strong support until a second regional 
development – the Iran-Iraq war – widened the ideological gap between the two sides 
even further.  
The Iran-Iraq War and its Implications for Iran-PLO Relations 
Iraqi armed forces, under the command of its Baathist leadership, conducted a 
full-scale invasion of Iran in late September 1980. The war would last for eight years. 
Almost immediately identifying the potentially devastating impact of the Iran-Iraq war 
on the ‗anti-Israeli front‘, and the possible relegation of the Palestinian cause to second 
place in the region, Arafat rushed to mediate between the two sides. According to Ali 
Akbar Velayati, the Iran-Iraq war was perceived by the PLO leadership as a spoiler for 
133 
the Palestinian cause for the following reasons:
383
 First, the war between two Muslim 
nations would divert attention away from Palestine, and consequently pave the way for 
Israeli aggression (as Tel-Aviv did by invading southern Lebanon in the summer of 
1982). Second, the economic and military powers of these two nations were likewise 
being diverted away from defending Palestine towards a war waged by Saddam 
Hussein against Iran. Third, the war between Iran and Iraq threatened unity amongst the 
anti-Israeli camp of Arab states. The Arab states were divided to two lines: Syria, Libya 




Arafat audaciously began his intense mediation efforts as soon as the war erupted 
between Iran and Iraq. From the early stages of the conflict, Arafat attempted to remain 
impartial. On the day of the Iraqi invasion, Arafat cut short his visit to Bulgaria and 
sent a cable to the Iranian president Bani-Sadr and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein 
expressing his concerns, 
[w]ith good intentions everything can be solved, and with will and faith we can find a 
solution for everything. Jerusalem is calling you, Palestine needs you and our nation 
wants your safety and its own. From my committed position, I appeal to you through 
your principled and responsible stands, filled with hope that this appeal which comes 
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On 24 September 1980, Arafat left Beirut to Baghdad and Tehran to meet with leaders 
of both states involved in the war. Accompanied by Hani al-Hassan and Abu Mayzar – 
the latter in charge of Fatah‘s foreign relations – Arafat arrived in the northern Iranian 
city of Rasht from Baghdad by way of Baku in the Soviet Union. The PLO delegation 
had talked earlier with Saddam Hussein and was due to meet Iranian officials in an 
attempt to end the war.
386
 Arafat conducted separate meetings with Ali Akbar Hashemi-
Rafsanjani, speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly,
387
 Bani-Sadr, and Prime 
Minister Mohammad Ali Raja'i to discuss the Iraqi invasion of Iran and related 
developments.
388
 According to Bani-Sadr, Saddam Hussein assured Arafat of the 
outcome of his war against Iran and peremptorily informed him; 
[d]o not concern yourself about that, it will last only a few days; it will be a simple 
exercise. The Palestinians will be the first to benefit from this war because a victory this 
quick will frighten the Israelis.
389
 
According to Velayati, the PLO proposed a roadmap in which the Iraqi regime was 
required to withdraw its armed forces from occupied Iranian territories immediately and 
postpone its land dispute with Iran. In return, Iran was required to accept bilateral 
negotiations with Iraq to resolve their disputes. Moreover, the proposed bilateral 
negotiations were to be conducted in a neutral country.
390
 Despite intensive discussions, 
Arafat – unable to persuade Iranians to agree to an immediate ceasefire – left Tehran 
empty-handed. On the one hand, the ill-fated mediation efforts of Arafat caused the 
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PLO to shift its policies away from favouring Iran and tilt more towards the Baathist 
regime. On the other hand, following Arafat's mediation efforts, the Islamic Republic's 
leadership lost even greater confidence in the intentions of the PLO. 
It is necessary to take into consideration two factors before proceeding to 
conclusions: the main roots of the PLO's shift from favouring Iran to favouring Iraq, 
and the reasons that the Islamic Republic rejected mediation efforts and the proposed 
‗ceasefire‘. I suggest that ideology was pivotal in Iran's denunciation of mediation 
attempts. Equally, Arafat‘s pivot away from Iran towards Baathist Iraq had its roots in 
pan-Arabism. To this end, some related announcements and speeches of the leadership 
of the Islamic revolution are worthy of attention. From the very beginning of his first 
tour visiting Iran since the start of Iran-Iraq war, Arafat was confronted with Iran's 
uncompromising and ideologically driven position. On 29 September 1980 Ayatollah 
Khomeini's son, Seyed Ahmad Khomeini in a joint public interview with Arafat, 
elaborated Iran's position by announcing 
[t]he main issue we are facing now is the issue of war. We are determined to continue 
this war [...] Of course, we are not fighting with Iraq; in  fact we are fighting with 
America[...] What matters to us is to say 'no' to the superpowers, saying 'no' to force and 
oppression [...] Our position against Israel and the issue of occupied Palestine comes 
first. Twenty years ago, when there was not much mention of Israel's danger and even the 
heads of the Islamic countries were almost all quiet, the Imam talked about this danger. 
Secondly, Iran after the victory of the revolution cut all its relations with Israel, cut the 
oil, and recognised the PLO as the sole representative of the nation of Palestine and 
changed the equation throughout the world in the interest of the nation of Palestine. What 
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country has changed its position like this after its victory? Thirdly, the issue of Palestine 
is a holy issue in Iran and Palestine is as important to Iranians as Iran is.
391
   
Seyed Ahmad Khomeini explicitly clarified Iran's expectation from the PLO's 
leadership on the issue of the Iran-Iraq war 
I told brother Yasser Arafat; What I expect you is that you clearly define your stance in 
regard to the issue of Iran-Iraq without any political confrontation, because our people 
and we acted in the same way in our relationship with you. In no way is it in your interest 
to talk about negotiation and other things that I am sure you will not. I hope you are 
successful. To sum up in a word, be certain that we will not make the slightest change in 
our direction because what is important to us is the essence of Islam.
392
 
Arafat continued his restless efforts to mediate a conclusive ceasefire between 
Iran and Iraq by actively working with the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO). The 
ICO formed a special committee on 26 September 1981, and two days later, Arafat 
alongside Pakistan's president Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq and Habib Chatty (the General 
Secretary of ICO) visited Baghdad and Tehran.
393
 On 21 October 1981, Arafat and 
other members of the ICO committee visited Ayatollah Khomeini to discuss the peace 
initiative with the Iraqi regime. Ayatollah Khomeini invited the heads of ICO member 
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As the ICO's ‗Peace Committee‘ expanded its membership, Arafat remained 
among the highest-levelled and active participants. The ICO committee continued its 
efforts, conducting a number of visits to the capitals of states involved in the mediation 
efforts throughout the 1980s. Working hard to accomplish a ceasefire, Arafat expanded 
his efforts beyond the ICO and worked through the channels of the Non-Aligned 
Movements (NAM). In the winter of 1980, NAM formed a committee consisting of 
delegates from Cuba, Yugoslavia, India, Algeria, Pakistan, and the PLO, and 
established an operative office in New York in December 1980.
395
 To this end, Arafat 
played a diligent role in political networking, and conducted meetings within the 
members of the ICO and NAM to put political pressure on Iran‘s leadership to accept 
the proposed ceasefire and enter into bilateral negotiations with Baghdad. Still, Arafat's 
intensive mediation efforts failed to yield fruit. The war between Iran and Iraq became 
a bitter dilemma for the PLO's chairmanship. Iran‘s position remained firm and 
truculent, and they unanimously expected Arafat to explicitly denounce Iraq's 




Following Iran‘s refusal of a ceasefire with the Baathist regime, the PLO's 
relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran entered a downward spiral and subsequently 
cooled. Shireen Hunter argues that given the imperatives of the Arab nationalist ethos, 
Arafat and the PLO could not condemn Iraq. Moreover, material factors, such as the 
PLO's financial dependency on the pro-Iraqi Arab sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, 
were a catalyst in PLO choosing the Baathist regime of Iraq as its regional ally.
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397
According to Ioannides, Arafat could not go so far as to denounce a brother Arab 
nation at war with a non-Arab country.
398
 He adds that the other factor that influenced 
the PLO's pro-Iraqi position related to a new Arab alignment, formed around Jordan-
Iraq and Saudi Arabia against the Islamic revolution of Iran. The new Arab alignment 
was based on the common idea that the Islamic revolution undermined the legitimacy 
of their ruling elite, and therefore must be stopped. Arafat could not ignore this new 




As the war between Iran and Iraq continued, Arafat explicitly sided with Baathist 
Iraq. Arafat conducted regular meetings with Iraqi officials in Baghdad to the war and 
inter-Arab issues. In 1984, Saddam Hussein supported Arafat visit's to Egypt, which 
had been isolated since the Camp David accords. In fact, Baghdad backed Arafat's 
efforts to bring Egypt back into the ‗new Arab-alignment‘.
400
 Egypt was received by 
Jordan and Iraq as a vital part of the pan-Arab alliance against revolutionary Iran. 
Revolutionary Iranian officials perceived Arafat's political closeness to ‗pro-American‘ 
King Hussein of Jordan and Egyptian government as being incompatible with its anti-
imperialist rhetoric and ideology. In October 1982, Mir Hussein-Musavi, Iran's prime 
minister, expressed regret saying ―[i]n recent months, certain moves by the PLO 
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leadership, which have been observed, are not congruent with the course of an all-
encompassing, revolutionary and ideological organisation‖.
401
 
In April 1984, Arafat publically stressed the PLO's support for Iraq in its "just" 
struggle to "defend" its land and sovereignty, and achieve a "just peace".
402
 Moreover, 
Baghdad provided the PLO with facilities to run a broadcasting station inside Iraq 
called the Voice of Palestine Radio.
403
 In November 1984, addressing Palestinian 
National Conference held in Amman, Arafat clarified his perception of the Palestinian 
struggle as ideologically Pan-Arab, and publically announced his pro-Jordanian and 
pro-Iraqi positions: 
When we demand independent national Palestinian decision making, we do not mean to 
be regional [...] we say this because of our Pan-Arab position in all its dimensions, 
ramifications and roots [...] this revolution is Palestinian in character, Arab at heart [...] I 
thank His Majesty King Hussein, his government, his army and all those worked with us 
to make this session successful [...] I send my gratitude to my brother the knight, Saddam 
Hussein. I tell him that this war will end with the efforts of the Muslims and non-aligned 
states so that we will move together with the Iraqi army, God willing to Jerusalem. I 
thank him because when I went to him in Baghdad before coming to His Majesty King 
Hussein [...] he said: Baghdad, Iraq and the Iraqi people are the Palestinian people's 
brother. Do not ask me, decide and impose on us, on our people, brother Abu-Ammar.
404
 
Meanwhile, PLO officials conducted meetings with the MKO, who by this point 
opposed the Islamic Republic and its revolutionary leadership. The PLO-MKO 
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meetings occurred at a time that Arafat conducted intensive mediation efforts between 
Tehran and Baghdad. In August 1981, Hani al-Hasan left Tehran and a month later in 
Paris he visited the leader of MKO, Masoud Rajavi, who began an open war against 
clerics that supported Ayatollah Khomeini. Although the PLO issued a statement 
expressing that the meeting between Hani al-Hassan and Masoud Rajavi was not 
authorised by the PLO's leadership, this meeting did not help Arafat in regaining Iran's 
trust.
405
 Another vital element that contributed to Iran's ideological estrangement with 
PLO was Arafat's willingness to accept a peace plan proposed by Saudi Crown Prince 
Fahd in August 1981. In this regard, Arafat‘s willingness to engage with pro-western 
Arab states was perceived by the Islamic Republic of Iran an indication that it had 
transitioned from a revolutionary movement to being a ‗moderate‘ political force.  
The Road to Jerusalem Passes through Karbala; Battling Baathists All 
the Way to Resist Against Zionism  
The Iran-Iraq war was a yardstick for measuring Iran's ideological support of the 
Palestinian cause. There is a sizable literature concerning the Iran-Iraq war. However, 
little attention has been paid to the ideological impact of the Palestinian cause on Iran 
during the Iran-Iraq war.
406
 It is worth evaluating two questions here: First, how did the 
Islamic Republic continue to perceive the Palestinian question while engaged in an 
imposed war with an Arab state, and as it observed the PLO getting closer with Iraq? 
Second, what was the rationale for Iran to refuse mediation with the Baathist regime? 
Without constructing a narrative of the Iran-Iraq war, I argue briefly that the Islamic 
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revolution maintained its support for Palestine even as it was deeply engaged in war 
with Iraq. Moreover, the Islamic Republic's leadership refused to accept mediation and 
ceasefires because it misperceived its own abilities. Khomeini had to be persuaded by 
his generals that victory was impossible before he took the chalice of poison as he put 
it. At the same time, and indicative of this hubris was the attitude that the Khomeini 
seemed to truly believe that the liberation of Palestine was contingent on battling the 
Baathist regime of Iraq.  
In their official propaganda, Iran's revolutionary leadership depicted the Baathist 
regime of Iraq as the collaborator with Zionism, and a tool in the hands of American 
imperialism in countering the Islamic revolution. Khomeini and his followers 
presentedp the war as the direct result of collusion between Zionism and the Baath 
party This was in the interest of the state and its desperate efforts to rally support in the 
Arab world for its regional vision. In his speeches, Khomeini explicitly elaborated 
Iran's ideological perspective of the Iran-Iraq war, and its connection to the Palestinian 
cause, 
[w]hat we find most regretful about this imposed war is that the forces which should be 
used  to put an end to Israel and save the great Beit-al Muqaddas, have, through the 
collusion of the great Satan and the international Zionism with the Iraqi Baath party, 
been continued to be used to attack the stubborn enemy of Israel and America.
407
   
Khomeini described the Iran-Iraq war as an opportunity for Israel to weaken the Islamic 
revolution of Iran and to expand its domination of Palestine, stating 
[w]hat is most regrettable is that the superpowers, America in particular, by deceiving 
Saddam into attack our country, have kept the powerful government of Iran busy with 
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defending its land in order to give the usurper and criminal Israel an opportunity to push 
forward its evil plan to create a greater Israel from Nile to the Euphrates.
408
  
Hence, Arafat's urging of the Islamic Republic to accept the ceasefire and combine its 
forces with Iraq to combat Israel was dismissed by the Islamic Republic's leadership. In 
Ayatollah Khomeini's point of view, such proposals were attempted to seek a bribe 
from revolutionary Iran to fight against Israel. He expressed that 
[t]hese people in the Iraqi government are using the issue of Israel as an excuse to escape 
the gripe of divine revenge and justice. They are using it as an excuse saying; if you want 
us to give permission to go and save us who are drawing, you must first overlook the 
crimes we have committed against you. The path Saddam wants to lay before us is one 
that (he hopes) will lead to him being saved, not one that will lead to Israel [...] if we 
accept then peace will be established and people like Saddam in this  world will be saved 
and if we refuse, then, it will be clear that we do not really want to embark on a holy 
war...we accept but move aside and let the experts to come and asses that what you have 
done to this country. But for us to condone the crimes because we want to do something 
for you, this is one of the absurdities that will remain in the annals of history.
409
  
The Islamic Republic's leadership explicitly disapproved of Arafat's efforts at 
communicating with conservative Arab states and the superpowers of the Western and 
Eastern blocs. In its arrogance, the revolutionary state expected the PLO to maintain a 
―revolutionary stance‖ and tilt more towards Islamic ideas in its campaign against 
Israel. As indicated, it can only be in the interest of a self-proclaimed Islamic state to 
―Islamicise‖ a conflict like this. Ayatollah Khomeini clarified his position on PLO 
policies since the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, and publically announced that  
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I advise the Palestinian leaders to stop shuttling to and from, and with the reliance on 
God the exalted, the people of Palestine and their own weapons fight Israel to the death. 
For these comings and goings will cause the combatant nations to lose faith in you. Rest 
assured that neither the East will be of use to you nor the West.
410
 
In Khomeini's point of view, the war between Iraq and Iran was the result of a 
conspiracy of Zionists, imperialists and Baathists against the Islamic principles of the 
revolution in Iran. He truly believed in this and this belief was also transmuted into the 
strategic preference of the state. In his view, it was propagated that the Quran clearly 
urged Muslims to battle against the oppressors and support the oppressed. In his 
speeches during the war, he called on the ‗oppressed‘ to rise up against the superpowers 
of East and West and their agents, and to view the Iranian people as the means for 
resisting and overthrowing the agents of the superpowers (e.g., the Shah's regime). He 
thus claimed leadership of a whole host of movements and events. From that rather 
self-indluging perspective, Islam had come under attack by the unified "Zionism-
imperialist front", and the laws of the Quran were being ignored. Emphasising the 
Quran's verses (3:103) that state "hold fast all together to the rope which God stretches 
out for you, and be not divided amongst yourselves‖, and (8:46) that express "[f]all into 
no disputes, lest ye lose heart and your power departs", he interpreted such messages as 
progressive political decrees which – if acted upon – could bring the Muslims 
prosperity and global supremacy.
411
  
In order to discredit Saddam Hussein, Khomeini represented Zionism and 
Baathism as two sides of the same coin: both were invaders against whom Muslims had 
a religious duty to fight. Ironically, it was not Saddam Hussein who received weapons 
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from Israel during the war with Iran, but the Iranians which led to the so called Iran-
Contra affair. Of course, Saddam Hussein also used the Palestinian cause for purposes 
of his state with all its disastrous pan-Arab ambitions. But Khomeini and his supporters 
were adamant to continue their propaganda. Perceiving the Baathists and Zionists as a 
united front against the Muslim nations, Ayatollah Khomeini stated  
[w]e must rise up together. We are all duty bound to rise up for God, to rise up to protect 
the Islamic countries against these two cancerous tumours, one of which is the corrupt 
Baath party of Iraq, and the other Israel, and both of which issue from America.
412
 
In this propaganda, the final defeat of Baathist Iraq would pave the way for the final 
destruction of Zionism, and the victory of the Palestinians. In other words, he believed 
that the road to Jerusalem ran through Karbala.   
While Iran was involved in an all-out war with Iraq, the leadership of the Islamic 
Republic continued to emphasise the importance of supporting the Palestinian cause. 
Khomeini viewed Saddam's regime as the enfeebler of Islamic fronts against 
Zionism.
413
 On 14 April 1982, at a time when Iran began to gain an upper hand in its 
war against Iraq, he delivered a speech which re-emphasised his support for the 
Palestinian uprisings: 
[t]he Quds problem is not a personal one, nor is it a problem peculiar to just one country 
or to Muslims of the world in the present age. Rather it is a matter which has concerned 
the monotheists of the world [...] and will continue to concern them in the future [...] 
Now that the revolutionary and brave Muslims of Palestine are, with great determination, 
roaring out from the place of ascension of the last messenger with the divine call to the 
Muslims to rise up and unite against global unbelief, what excuse does one have before 
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God almighty and the aware human conscience for remaining indifference to this Islamic 
ordinance? [...] Blessing upon Quds and al-Aqsa mosque. Blessing upon the people who 




On the battlefield, Iran‘s armed forces conducted a series of offensive operations. 
One of the largest military operations during the early stages of the war was 
symbolically code-named Tariq-al-Quds – ‗the Road to Jerusalem‘ – and conducted on 
29 November 1981, in which Iranian armed forces liberated key strategic areas.
415
 
Subsequently, Iran‘s military leadership conducted a series of chained-operations – 
code-named Beit-al-Moqaddas (‗the Grand Mosque of al-Aqsa in Jerusalem‘) – in May 
1982, in which it forced the Iraqi army to retreat. These operations resulted in Iranian 
fighters liberating important strategic areas, including the city of Khoramshahr, which 
changed the military balance of the war in favour of Iran.
416
 Through emphasising the 
idea that the road to Jerusalem passed through Karbala,  Khomeini tried to directly 
appeal to the Islamist-revolutionary strata of Iranian society, particularly those within 
the Revolutionary forces on the frontline fighting the Baathist regime. By naming key 
military operations on the battleground Quds and Beit al-Muqaddas, Iran‘s leadership 
exhibited the moral importance of Palestine to Iranian soldiers in order to boost the war 
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 The propaganda implied that the war possessed a sacred aim; namely, to 
liberate Jerusalem and Baghdad.   
  Since the war began, the Iranian officials mainly used the designation Doshman-
e Baathi-Sehyounisti – the Zionist-Baathist enemy – when referring to the Iraqi regime. 
In this regard, the issue of Palestine was not marginalised as some may expect. Rather, 
the religious and sacred dimensions of the liberation of Quds became a motivational 
vehicle for mobilising Iran‘s fighters against the Iraqi regime. In other words, by 
emphasising the liberation of Quds, the Islamic republic demonstrated the importance 
of the religious dimension of Quds for the Iranian fighters on the ground. Palestine 
became a tool to boost Iran‘s war efforts. The propaganda partially worked. According 
to Mohammad Amaanollah-zad, the Iran-Iraq war was perceived by veterans and 
revolutionary Iranians as a foreign-imposed conflict designed to prevent Iran from 
exporting its Islamic ideology and revolution abroad.
418
 In his words,  
[t]he Iranian veterans wholeheartedly regarded the Palestinian cause as the "just cause". 
The moral support for the Palestinian cause was not exhibited solely in the post-
revolutionary era, but it did exist in the hearts of people during the Pahlavi's regime. The 
invasion of Iran and the occupation of Palestine were all regarded by the Iranian veterans 
as interconnected matters concerning the Islamic Umma. This is a moral duty to act and 
maintain the revolutionary ideas and fight against the invaders.
419
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The importance of Quds is reflected in the wills left by a number of Iranian veterans 
who lost their lives during the Iran-Iraq war, regarded as shahid (martyrs) by the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Here, I indicate a few of these to demonstrate the prominence 
of Palestine in their worldviews. For instance, Shahid Hassan Binayian in his will states 
―O, youth! You have the accountability to support the oppressed people of Palestine, 
Lebanon and Iraq; rise up and support them to become liberated from tyranny".
420
 
Shahid Ahmad Akbari in his will expressed that "I hope not only that we will root out 
the corrupt Baathist regime of Iraq, but also that we root out the occupiers of Quds in 
the future".
421
 Shahid Hassan-Quli Tarahomi called on Iranian parents to permit their 
sons to participate on the battlefield against the Baathist and Zionist regimes. He stated 
"[s]end your sons to the frontline to support the Muslim fighters and to liberate 
Karbala, and from there liberate dear Quds. That is the first Islamic Qibla [Noble 
Sanctuary], and this dear Quds is under occupation of criminal Zionists who are 
creating tragedies against the Muslims every day".
422
 Shahid Mehdi Budaghi urged his 
brothers in his will to rise up and fight against Israel and liberate Quds.
423
 Needless to 
mention that as noted in the previous chapter, many of these Iranian fighters were 
involved in the struggle agains the Shah's regime and were motivated by anti-Zionism 
and anti-imperialist ideas of the period.  They were a ready-made object of 
Khomeinism and its ideological precepts as indicated.  
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The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Fahd Peace Plan, and the 
Islamic Republic's Response 
Israeli armed forces invaded Lebanon in early June 1982. Seemingly, the invasion 
was triggered by an attempt to assassinate the Israeli ambassador to the UK on the night 
of 3 June 1982. According to Dilip Hiro, the assassination attempt was masterminded 
by an Iraqi intelligence officer named Nawal al-Rosan, which would lend credence to a 
theory that the Iraqi regime orchestrated the killing in order to provoke the Israelis to 
invade Lebanon and create the conditions suitable for an immediate ceasefire in the 
Persian Gulf.
424
 As noted before, the invasion of Lebanon came at a time when Iran had 
made a sequence of strategic victories on the battlefield against Iraq.  
According to Chehabi, in early June 1982, the news of the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon reached Tehran as the Pasdaran's Unit for Liberation Movements hosted a 
conference entitled "World Dispossessed" [Mostaz'afan] Day.
425
 Lebanese delegates 
participating in the conference asked for Iranian support, and both the governments of 
Syria and Lebanon urged the world to intervene. The Iranian government duly 
responded. In this regard, Velayati elaborates on the Islamic Republic's foreign policies 
in support of the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples facing Israeli aggressions. 
According to him, by invading Lebanon, Israeli hardliners pursued two major 
objectives: first, to destroy the PLO's military capabilities and force its army out of 
Lebanon, and second, to create a buffer zone in southern Lebanon and undermine any 
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resistance within its immediate neighbourhood.
426
 Castigating the Arab states' "silence" 
during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Ayatollah Khomeini called on the Muslim 
governments to form a unified front against Israel: 
[w]e hope that by defeating America's recent plot for preserving Saddam and the Aflaqite 
Party [Baathist-Party of Iraq], our brave forces will, with the final defeat of the Iraqi 
government, pave the way for an advance towards Beit-al Muqaddas [...] Today beloved 
Lebanon is being put into the gullet of these world-devourers and their vassals, and the 
same will happen to the other dear countries in the near future. For the umpteenth time 
we turn to the Muslim governments [...] and ask them, indeed advise them...to unite with 
us, the Syrian government and the Palestinians and present a single front to defend the 
glory and honour of Islam and the Arabs; and to sever for evermore the hands of these 
criminals from their rich countries.
427
 
On the battleground, the Islamic Republic sent a high level delegation including the 
Minister of Defence and Commander of the Pasdaran to Syria to investigate how Iran 
could help and subsequently strengthened its ties with Damascus.
428
 According to 
Brigadier- General Moin-Vaziri from the Defensive Science Research Centre in Iran, 
on 7 June 1982, two groups of special forces – the 58
th
  Commando- Brigade, and the 
27
th
 Special-Brigade of Mohammad Rasoul-o-llah (named after Prophet Mohammed) – 
were designated to support Palestinian and Lebanese fighters.
429
 These special brigades 
formed a combined force named as Niroohay-e Quds (the Quds Forces), and were sent 
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 According to Ramazani, as early as December 1979, Hojatolislam 
Mohammad Montazeri had already sent between two hundred and three hundred 
Iranian volunteers stationed in Syria to support the Palestinians in their fight against 
Israel. However, they were stationed in a Fatah military compound about fifteen miles 
from Damascus, and not permitted to engage on the battlefield.
431
 
According to Chehabi, six days after the invasion of Lebanon, the High Defence 
Council, chaired by then President Ali Khamenei, appointed the commanding officer 
Ahmad Motevasselian to lead the combined special forces.
432
 On 11 June 1982, the 
Iranian brigades arrived in Syria and were greeted by the Iranian ambassador Ali-Akbar 
Mohtashami and Syrian officials. The Iranian troops were assigned in Zebdani to the 
Lebanese border, and were greeted by the local residents. Shortly after arriving in 
Zebdani, the Iranian commanders held a number of meetings with Syrian officials to 
decide on how Iranian troops could help the Palestinians and Lebanese against Israel. 
However, when President Assad's brother, Rifaat al-Assad, visited the Iranian troops 
and repeatedly drew attention to the proclaimed Israeli ‗ceasefire‘ on 11 June, the 
Iranian commanders realised that the Syrian authorities would not facilitate their 
departure to the battlefield against Israel. In fact, the Syrian authorities seemed content 
to merely use the presence of the Iranian troops for propaganda purposes.
433
 This 
occurred at a critical moment for the Iranians, when the frontline required as many 
troops as possible and it became obvious that there was no direct role for them to act in 
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Lebanon. The commanders sought advice from the Islamic Republic's leadership. 
Ayatollah Khomeini translated the Israeli invasion of Lebanon as a Zionist plot to 
divert Iran's attention from the battlefield against Iraq. As Chehabi rightly argues: 




The invasion of Lebanon resulted in the PLO moving its forces out of Lebanon, 
split them across the region and – more importantly – relocated its headquarter to 
Tunisia. As Iran's foreign minister, Velayati attended the UN's General Assembly 
meeting and the Islamic Conference Organisation, announcing Iran's strong 
condemnation of the invasion of Lebanon. The Islamic Republic also condemned 
regional states' silence and disapproved of the PLO withdrawing its forces from 
Lebanon.
435
 Iran's foreign ministry announced 
Because of the treacherous acts of some regional governments, the Zionist-imperialist 
front succeeds in forcing the Palestinian fighters out of Lebanon and spreading them 
throughout the region. The massacres committed by Israel against the defenceless 
Palestinian people in west Beirut proves that our position against the conspiracies to 
force the Palestinian fighters out of Lebanon was right.
436
   
The Islamic Republic also directly denounced the PLO leadership‘s ‗compromising‘ 
gesture of withdrawing from southern Lebanon. In particular, Iran believed that Arafat 
was responsible for abandoning the PLO‘s foundational revolutionary principles of 
fighting Zionism, and disapproved of the PLO having left Palestinian refugees 
defenceless in Lebanon. As Speaker of Iran‘s Parliament (Majlis), Rafsanjani criticised 
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the PLO's stance in his meeting with the PLO ambassador in Tehran, stating "[w]e do 
not see our duty of fighting against Zionism as having ended with the PLO retreating 
from southern Lebanon, we believed that the PLO should have maintained its forces 
and resisted".
437
 There was widespread condemnation from Iranian officials of a diverse 
political spectrum against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the PLO's decision to 
withdraw from the south of the country. The members of the Islamic Republic's Majlis 
unanimously issued a statement denouncing Israel and the US government for 
pressurising the Palestinian fighters in southern Lebanon, and viewed the Israeli 
invasion as a part of a larger conspiracy to undermine and destroy the resistance against 
Zionism. In an interview, Iran's ambassador in Damascus, Ali-Akbar Mohtashami, 
stated that ―the U.S. and Israel have no fear from PLO, because in the past, they (PLO) 
have signed everything that would guarantee Israel's security and now we see no action 
from PLO in fighting against Israel or American interests‖.
438
 
    Many critics would cite the ‗Iran-Contra affair‘ as an instance when Iran 
compromised its support for the Palestinians. Inevitably, my argument brings up the 
question about Iranian conduct during this period. As Said Amir Arjomand rightly 
argues: during the early 1980s, Iran had secret arms deals with the United States and 
Israel.
439
After the American national security advisor, Robert McFarlane‘s visit to Iran 
in 1986, the deal came to be known as the Iran Contra Affairs or ‗Irangate‘.
440
 During 
1985-1986, Iran traded over 200 spare parts of HAWK missile batteries for three 
American hostages held in Lebanon.
441
 During the visit of the US delegate to Tehran, 
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     But the weapons deal has to be seen within the context of the Iran-Iraq war 
and the Islamic Republic‘s desperate need for weaponry. There have been periods in 
Iran‘s foreign policy when short term, pragmatic, tactical manoeuvres were meant to 
serve long term, strategic goals. In this case, the Iranian leadership accepted the deal in 
order to make advances on the battle-front. Khomeini was a Machiavellian politician, 
no doubt. But obviously, the weapons trade was not meant to to cosy up to Israel and 
the United States, but to bring the country closer to victory in Iraq, which was seen as a 
stepping stone towards supporting Palestine as well. In an interview with me, Hussein 
Royvaran explained that 
The Islamic Republic of Iran urgently needed weapon spare parts during the war with 
Saddam Hussein. Unlike Iraq that was well-equipped by the Soviets, most of the arms 
used by Iran during the war were bought by the pre-revolutionary government from the 
U.S. and Israel. The Islamic Republic needed to re-equip its revolutionary armed forces 
and to do so such limited trade was not against the Islamic Republic‘s principles. During 
early Islam, the Prophet Mohammed (pbuh) signed a number of agreements with the 
hostile non-Muslim tribes, such as the Al-Hudaybiyeh treaty. However, this did not mean 
that the Prophet compromised on its sacred mission and on Islam. Conversely, the 
Prophet permitted this because at that moment it was in the interest of the Islamic 
community. This did not mean that the Prophet was changing his course. The same 
rationality appeals to the Islamic Republic under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. 




The Islamic Republic did not and will not compromise on its ideological and strategic 
values and did not and will not recognise the occupation of the Palestinian land.
443
 
From this point of view, the Iran Contra Affairs did not alter Iran‘s ideological outlook. 
It was a tactical manoeuvre which fed into a larger strategy, i.e. supporting Palestinian 
movements in their quest for independence. After almost three decades since the Iran 
Contra Affair, the Iran and the U.S. remain at odds over the Islamic Republic‘s 
continued support for HAMAS, Islamic Jihad (and Hizbullah) and Iran has not 
fundamentally altered its approach to Israel. Iran continues to present itself as one the 
major supporters of the Palestinian Islamic movements because it is in the interest of 
the ruling elites to do so. One can conclude that beliefs inside the Islamic Republic help 
formulate the state‘s strategic actions. Thus, each governmental cabinet within the 
Islamic Republic may utilise a different narrative but nevertheless remain supportive of 
the Palestinians, at least at this moment of history 
The Fahd Peace Plan 
The Islamic Republic's disapproval of the PLO's stance during the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon was followed by Tehran's strong rejection of peace proposals such the Fahd 
Plan, and criticism of the PLO's leadership for its willingness to accept it. In August 
1981, Saudi Arabia proposed a peace plan known as the Fahd Plan. The Saudis 
produced an eight points agenda in it, of which the seventh clause drew most attention 
as it confirmed  ―the rights of the states of the region to live in peace".
444
 From 
Dawisha's point of view, the seventh clause of the Fahd Plan was seen by many Arabs 
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as an implicit recognition of Israel. This divided opinion within the PLO's leadership. 
On the one hand, Arafat was willing to discuss and consider the plan further. On the 
other hand, Farouq Qaddoumi, head of the Organisation's  political department, was 
more critical towards the proposed plan.
445
According to Ioannides, the Fahd Plan was 
endorsed by six nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and – more 
importantly – Arafat appeared willing to discuss it.
446
 Despite Arafat's posturing, the 
plan was opposed mainly from within the PLO and Syria, and subsequently collapsed 
during the Arab Summit in Fez in November 1981.
447
 The Islamic Republic reacted 
strongly against the Plan. Ayatollah Khomeini described it as an attempt by the 
‗imperialist Americans‘ to prevent the people of the region from taking control of their 
own affairs, and believed that it was incumbent upon Muslims of the region to condemn 
all peace plans in the same vein as the Fahd Plan. He specifically elaborated his 
opposition to the "American-backed" peace proposals, stating 
[d]o you expect us to remain indifferent towards America, Israel and other superpowers 
who want to devour the region? No, we will not compromise with none of these 
superpowers or powers. We are Muslims and intend to live as Muslims. We prefer a poor 
life if it means that we are free and independent. We do not want this progress and 
civilisation which calls for us to stretch out our hands to foreigners. We want a 
civilisation which stands firmly on the foundation of dignity and humanity, and it is on 
this basis that we want peace preserved. The superpowers wish to control the humanity 
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of the human beings and you and I are duty bound to resist, to refuse compromise and 
reject such plans as those of Sadat and Fahd, as indeed is any Muslim.
448
 
The Islamic Republic's officials unanimously criticised Arafat's willingness to 
undermine and alter the anti-Zionist foundation of the PLO. Iran's acting Prime 
Minister, Mir Hussein-Mousavi, acknowledged the divisions inside the PLO on the 
matter of considering peace plans, clarifying that "the Islamic Republic condemns the 
compromising policies of  some of the PLO's leadership and stands with those that 
understand the danger of the Fahd Plan"
449
  Ayatollah Khamenei, the acting President, 
declared that 
[w]e view the Palestinian cause as an essential  part of our revolution. Hence, we do not 
accept any peace-proposal that do not recognise and serve the Palestinian cause. Anyone 
that thinks to compromise with Israel is perceived by us as traitors to the Palestinian 
cause even if that person is Palestinian.
450
   
Less than a year later at the reconvened Arab summit in Fez, the Fahd Plan with some 
amendments was accepted as a set of proposals that constituted the Arab conditions for 
peace with Israel.
451
 In response to the outcome of the Fez summit and Arafat's 
"compromising" policy, Rafsanjani proposed during Friday prayers on 27 November 
1981 that an active force named the ―Liberation Army of Quds" be established to fight 
Zionism.
452
 He suggested that Arab states needed to act economically, politically and 
militarily to fight Zionist expansion. From his point of view, the only solution left for 
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the Arab states was to consider the Islamic Republic's advice on cutting their supply of 
crude oil, and sever political relations with Israel‘s supporters and ask other Muslim 
nations to demonstrate their sympathy with the Palestinian cause.
453
 The Islamic 
Republic's Foreign Ministry condemned the outcome of the Fez summit and declared 
that "accepting any proposal that recognises the Israeli state will serve Israeli and 
American interests and it will undermine the Palestinian cause".
454
 In fact, the presence 
of Arafat at the Arab summit in Fez and approving the outcome of the summit was 
resented by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and further widened the gap between two 
sides. On the basis of this assertion, the Islamic Republic opposed every peace 




There are some suggestions in the scholarly literature for evaluating how Iran's 
relations with the PLO cooled down. According to Aburish, the Iranians began to doubt 
Arafat's motives at the time they held US embassy staff as hostages. He believes that 
Arafat was blind to everything except Palestinian consideration, misjudging the depth 
of anti-US feeling in Iran, and that Arafat hoped to gain recognition from the American 
administration. At the same time, the PLO's ‗money men‘ – Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – 
played a vital role in Arafat's policies towards Iran. Aburish concludes that the 
contradictions in Arafat's behaviour, playing both the peacemaker and the revolutionary 
leader at the same time tripped him up. In this instance, he was convinced to sever 
relations with Iran despite the pro-Iranian sentiment of the Palestinian people and most 
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of the guerrilla groups.
456
  Bahgat believes that the disagreement between Iran and the 
PLO proved to be deep. He draws two valid conclusions: first, the Islamic Republic has 
always distinguished between the broad Palestinian population on one side, and Arafat 
and his top aides on the other. Second, the troubled relations between Tehran and 
Arafat did not lead to better relations between Iran and Israel (and thus, the two issues 
were detached from one another).
457
 Bahgat views Iran's strong opposition to Israel as 
being based on both ideological and strategic considerations. Ideologically, the Islamic 
Republic perceives the Palestinian cause as a struggle between Islam and the oppressive 
powers of the world – namely, Zionism and US imperialism. This perception implies 
two things. First, the political legitimacy of the Islamic Republic is strengthened by its 
antagonism towards Israel and resistance to any peace proposals that recognise Israel's 
legitimacy. To this end, neither Arafat nor any other leader has the right to give away 
"even an inch of the Islamic land of Palestine".
458
 Strategically, the Islamic Republic 
views the peace plans as political tools that serve the American government by boosting 
its hegemony in the region.
459
 Shireen Hunter highlights the role of Pan-Arabism, and 
Arafat‘s financial dependency on Gulf states, as the main vehicle which led the PLO to 
support Iraq against Iran. However, she acknowledges that Iran differentiated between 
Arafat and the Palestinian people. Despite the actions of the PLO, Tehran permitted the 
movement to maintain its embassy in Tehran, established Quds day, and continued its 
support for the Palestinian cause.
460
 Furthermore, Elaheh Rostami-Povey also argues 
that while Arafat's support for Saddam's regime undermined Iran's relation with PLO, 
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the Islamic Republic continued to maintain its pro-Palestinian policy, openly supporting 
Muslim Palestinian groups such as Hamas
461
 and Islamic Jihad.
462
  
I suggest that the ideological differences between the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and the PLO's leadership was the pivotal cause of Iran's estrangement with the PLO's 
chairmanship. Yet the Iran-Iraq war did not prevent the Islamic Republic from 
continuing its support for the Palestinian cause. Rather, Iran's clerical leadership 
perceived and conceptualised the Iran-Iraq war as one front in the Muslim world's 
wider battle against the influence of Zionism and imperialism, not least to mobilise 
Iranians for the war and to claim the leadership of the Islamic world. In fact, support for 
the Palestinian cause remained the central theme even at a time when Iran was heavily 
bogged down in the war with Saddam Hussein's Ba‘thist state. I agree with Michael 
Barnett's argument that shared values and common identity are the foundation of 
alliance formation, or maintaining partnerships.
463
 In the case of Iran's relations with 
PLO, the incompatibility between the clerics‘ ideology of Islamic universalism and 
Arafat's pan-Arabism and pro-Baathist ideas – as well as the PLO‘s shift away from 
militancy – undermined ties between revolutionary Iran and the PLO. However, and as 
we will see in the following chapters, this shift strengthened Tehran's connection with 
Islamist Palestinian groups. 
In the next chapters I examine two factors more closely: the ideological and 
strategic position of the Palestinian cause within Iran's foreign policy following the 
Iran-Iraq war, and  Iran's relations with Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In doing this, I 
concur with Zamel Saeedi that the Iran-Iraq war unveiled a bitter relationship between 
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Iran and the PLO. Indeed, many Iranians were disappointed by the PLO's policies, but 
choose to keep their frustrations in check. For Iran‘s leadership, Palestine remained a 
Muslim territory that had been occupied and subjected to aggression From this 
perspective, the Islamic Republic opposed any debate on the core of the matter or the 
principles associated with the Palestinian cause.
464
 One of these principles was the need 
to repel Zionism from what was perceived to be the Islamic Holy Land. To this end, 
Tehran began to strengthen its relations with Muslim Palestinian factions that 
subscribed to Iran's Islamic shared principles.
465
 Palestine was cut and pasted into the 
interest of this Iranian state because it rallied public opinion behind the revolution and 
it boosted the morale of Iranian soldiers at the battlefront. This shows that the material 
interest of the state was cultivated in an ideational context that was pro-Palestinian – 
Iranian society genuinely feeled for Palestine and the post-revolutionary state readily 
tapped into these sentiments.  
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Chapter Three 
Iran's Relations with Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
This chapter provides an insight into Palestinian Islamic Jihad's ideological 
relations with the revolutionary state in Iran. Here I provide an introduction to the 
ideological outlook of Islamic Jihad's founder Fathi Shiqaqi. I will argue that the 
triumph of the Islamic revolution in Iran and its pro-Palestinian stance from the 
inception profoundly inspired Palestinian activists, and in the process revitalised the 
Islamic dimension of the Palestinian cause. To this end, I will also suggest that the 
Islamic Republic of Iran became the principal enabler of Palestinian Islamic Jihad's 
growth and development beyond the Occupied Territories. Before discussing Iran's 
relations with the Islamic Jihad movement, it is important to also grasp how Islamic 
Jihad likewise perceived Islamic Republic of Iran. I suggest that the leaders of 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad were motivated by the triumph of the Islamic revolution in 
Iran. In what follows, I show how revolutionary messages of Khomeini and others were 
absorbed with great enthusiasm by Fathi Shiqaqi, whom highlighted the Islamic 
discourse of the Palestinian cause after 1967.  
Islamic Jihad – A New Page in the Palestinian Struggle 
The emergence of Palestinian Islamic Jihad and its ideology is a compelling 
subject, particularly given its  influence on Palestinian politics since its emergence in 
early 1980s. When it comes to Palestinian Islamic Jihad, we are faced with a lack of 
comprehensive academic sources. This can often lead to an over-reliance on selective 
media reports. Palestinian Islamic Jihad was established in the early 1980s by Dr Fathi 
al-Shiqaqi. Shiqaqi was born in the Fara'a refugee camp to a large and poor family 
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originating in the village of Zarnuqa, in the Ramala district. In his early life, Shiqaqi 
was greatly influenced by pan-Arab ideas, which by his own account precluded him 
from being influenced by socialism. Grasped by a feeling of destitution in the wake of 
the 1967 defeat, he quite naturally turned to Islam.
466
 The 1967 defeat was later 
characterised by Shiqaqi as "more difficult than the fall of Baghdad by the Tatars, 
Andalusia to the Spanish Christians, or Jerusalem to the Crusaders."
467
 In 1974, Shiqaqi 
travelled to Egypt to study medicine at Zaqaziq University. While studying in Egypt, 
Shiqaqi came into contact with a group of Palestinian students and established ties with 
Egyptian students from the Islamic Associations, and shared these students' incisive 
critique of the Ikhwan's (Brother's) for their reformist orientation and disregard for 
other Islamic groups.
468
 At the early stages of their comradeship in Cairo, Shiqaqi and 
his student comrades studied the works of modern Islamic thinkers such as Jamal al-
Din Afghani, Hassan al-Banna, Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr and Ali Shariati thoroughly. 
Each of these thinkers brought about a specific message. For instance, Ali Shariati's 
ideas provided a model of "Just Muslim society".
469
 
According to Kasra Sadeqi-Zadeh, the period between 1974-1981 in which 
Shiqaqi resided in Egypt was the most important period for the Palestinian Islamic 
movement. In Egypt, Shiqaqi and his followers moved towards an independent path 
from the Ikhwan and created the nucleus of what was the Palestinian Islamic movement 
within the University of Zaqaziq. By 1980, the first group of students under Shiqaqi's 
supervision – consisting of 60 Palestinian members across Egypt‘s universities – laid 
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the cornerstone for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the heart of Gaza and West Bank.
470
 
It was against this background of frustration with the Ikhwan and the triumph of the 
Islamic revolution in Iran that Shiqaqi authored a book, al-Khomeini: al-Hall al-Islami 
wa al-Badil (Khomeini: The Islamic Solution and the Alternative), which was published 
by the pro-Iranian monthly al-Mukhtar al-Islami. According to Meir Hatina, Shiqaqi's 
book depicted the Islamic revolution as "a historically unique model of a humane 
revolution" and praised Ayatollah Khomeini.
471
 The book's pro-Iranian orientation was 
to become the identifying tag of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad several years later.
472
 
Shiqaqi's book al-Khomeini was authored and published on 16
th
 February 1979, 
and the first written book in Arabic on the Islamic revolution in Iran.
 473
 It is believed 
that all its copies were distributed and sold shortly after its publication in Egypt. 
474
According to Azzam Tamimi, despite receiving an order from the Ikhwans' 
leadership to not write a book about the Islamic revolution, he refused to obey. 
Consequently Shiqaqi was expelled from the Ikhwan while studying in Cairo in 1979, 
and ostensibly because he had published writings on Ayatollah Khomeini and praised 
the Iranian Revolutionary leadership.
475
 Tamimi argues that the Ikhwan's actions 
against Shiqaqi were chiefly due to his critique of the organisation‘s  lack of a 
                                                 
470 Kasra Sadeq-Zadeh, Shahid Doctor Fathi Shiqaqi [Martyr Doctor Fathi Shiqaqi], Tehran: Markaz-e Asnaad-e 
Enqelab-e Islami [The Centre for Islamic Revolution Documents], 1389 [2010], pp. 85-86. 
471 Meir Hatina, Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement, Tel Aviv:  The Dayan Centre for 
Middle Eastern and African Studies, 2001, p. 24. 
472 Ibid. 
473 Sadeq-Zadeh, Shahid Doctor Fathi Shiqaqi, p. 86. 
474 Ibid. 
475 Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters, London: Hurst & Company, 2009, p. 43. 
164 




The Palestinian cause was not the major priority of the Ikhwan during the late 
1970s, as their attention focused more on other Islamic issues such as the provision of  
social welfare and education for the poor.
477
 Shiqaqi strongly believed in prioritising 
the Palestinian cause as the mother of all causes.
478
 This brought Shiqaqi and his friends 
into an ideological confrontation with the Ikhwan, and as a result Shiqaqi set up a new 
Islamic-oriented organisation which recruited members from within and beyond the 
Ikhwan. Shiqaqi's disappointment with the Ikhwan's lethargy towards the Palestinian 
question coincided with the triumph of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Inspired by 
Khomeini's pan-Islamic ideas, al-Khomeini represented Shiqaqi‘s ideological 
manifesto. His main aim was to introduce and present his beliefs to the Arab and the 
Palestinian street.  
Following the publication of the book al-Khomeini, Shiqaqi was detained in 
Egypt for four days. He was rearrested in July 1979 and detained in the al-Qalaa prison 
for four months. Al-Khomeini was subsequently banned by the Egyptian authorities in 
an attempt to prevent the spread of its revolutionary message.
479
 Upon his release, 
Shiqaqi authored a number of editorials for al-Mukhtar al-Islami mainly focusing on 
the Palestinian question, signing his articles with the pseudonym 'Izz al-Din 
Faris'.
480
During his residence in Cairo, Shiqaqi continued his critical debate on 
Ikhwan's inaction over the Palestinian question and began writing for al-Forsan (the 
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Horse-Riders) in response to the Communists propaganda pamphlet al-Jiyad (The 
Horses). Here he criticised their left-wing policies, and castigated the absence of 
religious-rhetoric in their political agendas.
481
 Shiqaqi's political activities further 
exposed him and his circle of friends to the suppressive excesses of the Egyptian 
government, particularly at the time of Sadat's assassination in 1981. Nevertheless, 




After returning to Gaza from Egypt, Shiqaqi worked as a physician at Augusta 
Hospital in East Jerusalem and later opened his own private clinic.
483
 In Gaza, Shiqaqi 
was particularly active in organising an Islamic movement that was ideologically 
influenced by Ayatollah Khomeini's pan-Islamic rhetoric. The majority of recruits were 
largely students who had been expelled from Egypt for their activism against the 
regime. Among the most prominent members of Shiqaqi's movement were Sheikh Abd-
al Aziz Awda, and Ramadan Abdullah Shalah – the latter one of the group‘s first 
recruits outside of the Ikhwan, and eventual successor to Shiqaqi after his assassination 
in 1995. Like Shiqaqi, Sheikh Awda came from a disfranchised Palestinian family that 
had migrated to the Jabaliyya refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. After obtaining bachelor 
and master's degrees in Arabic and Islamic Studies from Cairo, he was expelled from 
Egypt for membership to a "radical Islamic society" in 1975. After returning to Gaza in 
1981 from the UAE, Awda served as Imam in the Sheikh Izz al-Din Mosque in Bayt 
Lahina, where he was able to attract and recruit new members. 
484
 Shiqaqi actively 
recruited new members for the purpose of fighting Israeli forces, and soon clashed with 
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the Ikhwan. According to Tamimi, Shiqaqi was not specifically interested in competing 
with the Ikhwan in the areas of social welfare and education. Where he did wish to 
compete with them was in an area he always believed they had abandoned as one of 
their prime responsibilities: "the jihad to liberate Palestine".
485
  Milton-Edwards 
elaborates that Islamic Jihad was the first group to emerge in the early 1980s led by two 
Palestinians from Gaza (Shiqaqi and Sheikh Awda).
486
 The faction is described as the 
largest of the Islamic Jihad groups in the 1980s with its central bases in the Gaza Strip. 
The armed sections of this faction, as Milton-Edwards characterises them, were "the 
catalyst for the Palestinian uprising in December 1987".
487
   
Due to his noticeable success in recruiting new members, Shiqaqi was identified 
by the Israelis as a potential threat. He was subsequently imprisoned in 1983 for 11 
months.
488
 According to Tamimi, during his first brief detention, he became acquainted 
with a number of Palestinian activists possessing various operational backgrounds that 
were of potential use to Shiqaqi's movement.
489
 In the meantime, Shiqaqi successfully 
forged an alliance with a group of Islamic-oriented members of Fatah – Saraya al-Jihad 




Shiqaqi's Books – the Ideological Manifesto of Palestinian Islamic Jihad  
It is necessary to evaluate Shiqaqi‘s ideas in order to better understand the fabric 
of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's ideological outlook, and the nature of its connections 
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with the Islamic revolution in Iran. Besides writing various articles for the monthly al-
Mukhtar al-Islami, and publishing and distributing pamphlets, Shiqaqi authored three 
major books that specifically echoed his appreciation towards the Islamic revolution in 
Iran. As previously mentioned, his first book was al-Khomeini. The second book was 
entitled al-Sunnah wa al-Shia, Zhajah Moqtaneah (The Sunnah and The Shia: an 
Artificial Noise), and the third Muqadamah Hawl Markaziyah Filastin wa al-Mashro'a 
al-Islami al-Muaser (An Introduction to the Centrality of the Palestinian Cause and the 
Contemporary Islamic Project).
491
    
Al-Khomeini is organised along three principal themes: a history of Iranian 
uprisings since the Constitutional Revolution in 1906, Ayatollah Khomeini's ideas and 
the Shias ideological outlook, and the internal politics of Iran. The last theme is cross-
cutting, and discusses the contemporary history of Islamic movements in the region and 
analyses the challenges ahead for them. Shiqaqi begins by critically evaluating post-
colonial Muslim states' suppression of Islamic movements. He argues that after the 
demise of the Ottoman Empire, the colonial powers realised that controlling the region 
by direct military involvement was too costly and impractical. The colonial powers 
accordingly divided the region into smaller states and supported local agents that would 
grab power and rule in the newly established states. Their main aim was to prevent 
Islamic unity amongst the nations in order to maintain their hegemony in the region.
492
 
He specifically refers to the role of military juntas in coercing the Muslim nations. To 
this end, he argues that military figures like Kamal Ataturk in Turkey and Muammar 
Qadafi in Libya were brought to power by the colonialists in order to suppress the 
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Islamic identity of their nations.
493
 From Shiqaqi's point of view, the Arab revolts 
against the Ottoman Empire were engineered by the British colonial rulers in order to 
undermine Muslim unity. In his view, Islamic groups were the most effective 
opposition to the colonial powers in the region, and he pointed to a number of Islamic 
movements as examples – such as the Sheikh Izzadin-Qassam movement in Palestine, 
and Algerian revolutionaries that were the champions of emancipation from 
colonialism and foreign invasions. In contrast, he argues that the "westernised thinkers" 
within the Muslim and Arab worlds became instruments of the colonial powers, and 
paved the way for foreign domination.
494
Shiqaqi goes further and argues that Arab and 
Muslim nations were left disillusioned with liberals and nationalists after their failure to 
defend Palestine. According to him, the colonial powers masterminded a number of 
military coups in the post-colonial Arab states in order to prevent the Islamic 
movements from gaining power. Shiqaqi argues that the socialist and left-wing activists 
also failed to understand the importance of ideas and identity in history by devaluing 
the role of religion in combating colonialism in Muslim lands.
495
 
Having introduced the anti-colonialist role of Islamic movements in the region, 
he expresses strong disappointment with the agendas of secularist and liberal 
movements. It was against this disappointment that Shiqaqi began to evaluate the 
Islamic revolution in Iran, and study Khomeini's ideas. In structuring his book, Shiqaqi 
provides a historical account for his readers on Iran's socio-political situation since the 
1906 Constitutional Revolution right up to 1979 Islamic revolution. According to 
Shiqaqi, Iran‘s Muslim clerics played the most prominent role in Iran's Constitutional 
Revolution. In his rather partial narration of Iranian history, he draws a parallel between 
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Pahlavi's attempts to modernise Iran and Ataturk's anti-Islamic and secular tendencies, 
architected by the western powers in order to deprive these nations from achieving 
independence.
496
 Shiqaqi describes the social policies of the Shah of Iran as endeavours 
to de-Islamise society and divorce the nation from its religious identity.
497
   Shiqaqi 
describes two main pillars of power in the Pahlavi regime: its army, backed by the 
West, and its notorious intelligence agency SAVAK. He underlines the connection 
between Israel and SAVAK, reminding Arab readers that Israeli intelligence services 
were the major source of training and support for it. In analysing pre-revolutionary 
opposition groups, Shiqaqi shows an appreciation for the powerful influence of the Shia 
Marajii and their uncompromising stance in upholding Islamic values. He specifically 
castigates secular and nationalist factions for their lack of understanding of Islam.   
In his book, Shiqaqi also examines the international reaction to the Islamic 
revolution in Iran, and in particular from the United States, Israel and Soviet Union. By 
doing this, Shiqaqi attempts to show a link between foreign interventions in Iran, and 
the foreign occupation of Palestine. He argues that the main priority in the region for 
the United States is to safeguard the state of Israel, and also maintain a pro-American 
equilibrium. He also criticised the Soviets' anti-Islamic propaganda during the Islamic 
revolution in Iran, and praised Ayatollah Khomeini's independence from foreign 
influence. Saudi Arabia's regime is described by Shiqaqi as the closest ally of 
Washington in the region – even more than the Shah's regime. He further argues that 
the charismatic leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini significantly troubled the White 
House and its regional allies, such as the House of Saud.
498
In evaluating Israel's stance 
on the Islamic revolution in Iran, Shiqaqi goes further to argue that the animosity 
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between Shia Muslims and the Jews has roots in Islam‘s history, dating back to when 




It is clear that Shiqaqi was influenced by the Shia clerics in the Holy Cities of 
Qom and Najaf – specifically Ayatollah Khomeini – in their support for the Palestinian 
cause.  In his book, Shiqaqi echoes Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwas and religious decrees 
which denounced Israel, and called on Iranians and Muslims to support the cause of 
Palestine as their own. In this narrative, the Shah's regime represented the only vital 
ally of Israel in the region and a vital element on the frontline that opposed the 
emancipation of Palestinian land from Israeli occupation. From his point of view, the 
demise of the Shah's regime was the crucial step towards the liberation of Palestine 
under the banner of Islam, and proof that resistance was the only solution to the 
Palestinian predicament. 
What is central in Shiqaqi's writings is the influence of Khomeini on his own 
ideological outlook. In al-Khomeini book, Shiqaqi categorises the Shia clergy into two 
groups: ‗traditionalist‘ –  also referred to as ‗isolationists‘ – who believed in the 
separation of religion from politics, and ‗activists‘ who under the charismatic 
leadership of Khomeini advocated that religion and politics were inseparable.
500
 
Shiqaqi saw in Khomeini a figure that was calling on Muslims to actively seek justice, 
and unafraid to state that Islam belonged to those proactively seeking freedom, 
independence and justice.
501
 In sum, he believed that Khomeini's understanding of 
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Islam was wider than most: inspirational, unique and admirable. Shiqaqi praises 
Khomeini for his criticism of traditionalist clerics that only interpreted Islam as a 
spiritual religion, with no relevance to the political life of the Muslims. In this regard, 
Shiqaqi is particularly inspired by the fact that Khomeini believed such ulama 
prevented Muslims from progressing politically and neglecting the socio-political and 
economic dimensions of their faith.
502
 In fact, Khomeini's critical approach inspired 
Shiqaqi to criticise the Ikhwan's inaction towards the Palestinian issue. According to 
Meir Hatina, Shiqaqi concluded that such traditionalist clerics – in contrast to figures 
like Izza al-Din al-Qassam who rebelled against the British and the Jews in Palestine in 
the 1920s and Ayatollah Khomeini who led the struggle against imperialism and 
formed the Islamic revolution in 1979 –were unsuited to lead believers.
503
 In portraying 
Islam as the faith of emancipation from foreign intervention, Khomeini deeply inspired 
Shiqaqi to react against the inactivity of conservative Sunni Muslim clerics on the issue 
of armed struggle in Palestine. Furthermore, Shiqaqi highlights Khomeini's emphasis 
upon Islamic unity in the umma as the key liberating element against imperialism and 
colonialism. Panegyrising Khomeini the most for his uncompromising stance against 
the invaders of Palestine, it is no wonder that Shiqaqi believed that Iran's relations with 
Palestine stemmed from religious and revolutionary ideas that were being advocated by 
prominent Iranian Shia clerics. In order to draw his readers' attention to the roots of 
Iranian pro-Palestinian activism, Shiqaqi underlines the pre-revolutionary history of 
Iranian support for the Palestinian cause, citing a number of religious decrees issued by 
Khomeini during the 1960s and 1970s. Shiqaqi concludes his argument by defining the 
Islamic revolution in Iran as "purely Islamic", compatible with the Quran's teachings, 
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and belonging to all revolutionary Muslims who believe in freedom and justice 
regardless of their sect or faction.
504
  
Shiqaqi authored his second book al-Sunnah wa al-Shia, Zhajah Moqtaneah 
under the pseudonym Dr Islam Mahmood, and its first edition was published by al-
Mukhtar al-Islami in 1982 in Cairo.
505
 Shiqaqi's endeavour was to respond to some of 
the radical Sunni clerics who were propagating against the Islamic revolution in Iran; 
dismissing it as a purely sectarian-based uprising with no transcendent agenda beyond 
its Shia constituents. Conversely, in his book, the Islamic revolution in Iran is presented 
as the vanguard of Islamic unity. Shiqaqi begins his argument by reprimanding regional 
powers for joining the "imperialist campaign" against the revolution in Iran. In doing 
so, some conservative regional states exaggerated and incited sectarian divisions in the 
Muslim world.
506
 Reviewing the history of Muslim nations since the demise of the 
Ottoman Empire, Shiqaqi argues that the Islamic revolution in Iran triumphed at the 
time that the Muslim nations had almost lost all hope of regaining their past glory.
507
  
From his perception, the triumph of the Islamic revolution in Iran made Muslim nations 
less fearful by proving that imperialism could be defeated and that justice could be 
restored through resistance and unity.  
Shiqaqi goes on to argue that sectarianism was the most powerful instrument of 
imperialism and colonialism against the unity and independence of the Muslim nations. 
Here, imperialism and its agents were believed to be tirelessly attempting to incite a 
division between Sunnis and Shias in order to prevent the ideological expansion of the 
Islamic revolution amongst the majority Sunni populations of regional states. In his 
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view, the aim of imperialism was to safeguard Israel against the unity of the Muslim 
neighbouring states and to regain its foothold in the region.
508
 Shiqaqi is specifically 
critical about some radical Sunni clerics that incited sectarian hatred by using language 
in line with that of the imperialist powers, and those that were blind to the commonality 
between Sunni and Shia teachings. Shiqaqi structures his argument by referring to 
various historical religious decrees issued by prominent Sunni clerics in support of 
unity between Sunnis and Shia‘s. In a similar vein, Shiqaqi highlights historical 
relations between the Ikhwan and various Shia' clerics and thinkers. Hassan al-Banna, 
for instance, endeavoured to bring Sunnis and Shias together as one united umma. 
Shiqaqi underlines Abdul-Karim Shirazi's book Wahdat Islami (Islamic Unity) which 
defined a true Muslim as a person who believes in almighty God, and in his last 
messenger, Prophet Mohammed, and the holy book of the Quran and the day of 
resurrection.
509
 In other words, Shiqaqi was convinced that there were significant 
commonalities between Sunnis and Shias that would overshadow their disagreements.  
In underlining the historical relations between the Ikhwan and the Shia clerics, 
Shiqaqi is specifically fascinated by Navab Safavi's pan-Islamic ideas, support for the 
Palestinian cause from its inception, and historical visits to Syria and Egypt. 
510
 Shiqaqi 
refers to the prominent Sunni scholar, Fathi Yakan,
511
 who regarded Navab Safavi as a 
great martyr sacrificing his life for the sake of the Islamic umma.
512
 Shiqaqi quotes 
Yakan sentiments that the Arabs needed to search for Navab Safavi's ideological 
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brothers in Iran in order to unify the Islamic umma. However, according to Yakan, 
Arabs states failed to understand that the only reliable force capable of supporting the 
Palestinians from beyond the Arab world were  Islamic movements.
513
 Appealing to his 
Arab readers, Shiqaqi then raises the following question: for what reason, given that 
Khomeini (who possessed the same ideology as Navab Safavi) have some in the Arab 
world been reluctant to consolidate a relationship with revolutionary Iran? Shiqaqi also 
cites Sheykh Mahmud Shaltut, the Grand Imam of al-Azhar who encouraged 
harmonious interactions between the Sunni and the Shia and recognised the Shia as one 
of the main legitimate Islamic schools besides the Sunnis.
514
  
Furthering his pro-umma argument and challenge those advocating sectarianism, 
Shiqaqi goes beyond the al-Azhar institution by referring to another eminent Sunni 
scholar, Mohammed al-Ghazali.
515
 Shiqaqi specifically highlights al-Ghazali's 
reference to the Quran's verse which states:   
Indeed, those who have divided their religion and become sects - you, [O Muhammad], 
are not [associated] with them in anything. Their affair is only [left] to Allah; then He 
will inform them about what they used to do.
516
   
According to Shiqaqi, al-Ghazali effectively argued that the differences between the 
Shia and Sunnis were on minor issues, and that both schools were in agreement on the 
core principles of Islam. In other words, all Islamic schools were equal although they 
possessed diverse methodologies for interpreting Islamic contexts.
517
 Shiqaqi also 
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refers to broader Sunni scholars such as the prominent Sunni jurist Sheikh Abdul-
Wahab Khalaf (1888-1956), Muhammad Abu-Zahra (1898-1974) and Anwar al-Jundi 
(1917-2002) that all recognised the Shia as a legitimate sect, and likewise emphasised 
the necessity of consolidating unity between both branches of Islam. 
After concluding his argument that no major differences existed between the Shia 
and Sunni schools, Shiqaqi describes the Islamic revolution in Iran as a contemporary 
Islamic revival. In particular, he believed that it was the duty of every Muslim who has 
faith in the unity of umma to condemn Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran.
518
 Shiqaqi 
argues that many activists in the Muslim world including the Ikhwan could see a link 
between Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran and the desire of the major powers to attack 
the unity of the Islamic umma. Shiqaqi praised the Islamic movements‘ and Ikhwan's 
anti-Saddam's positions towards the Iran and Iraq war. He argues that supporting the 
Islamic revolution against Saddam Hussein's invasion was the equivalent of supporting 
the Palestinians in their struggle against the Israeli invaders.
519
 Shiqaqi concludes his 
book by citing Khomeini's idea that those advocating sectarianism within Islam were 
neither Sunni nor Shia, but in fact agents of imperialism aiming to pave the way for the 
imperialists to dominate the region.
520
  
My point is that the aim of the Islamic Jihad movement is to avoid entering the 
historical aspects of the Sunni-Shia divisions by mainly concentrating on their essential 
commonalities. To this end, Shiqaqi encouraged his followers to downplay inter-
religious disputes and to emphasise Khomeini's pan-Islamic messages and some 
prominent Sunni scholars' unionist ideas. Meir Hatina is right to state that from 
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Shiqaqi's perception, efforts by Arab regimes to batter the Iranian Revolution by 
inflaming the hostilities between Shia and Sunna distort the historic truth and only 
serve Western imperialism.
521
 In fact, Shiqaqi in his book demonstrates that he was a 
prolific opponent of sectarian divisions as he repeatedly calls for unity amongst the 
Muslims in confronting the state of Israel.  
The last book by Shiqaqi, entitled Muqadamah Hawl Markaziyah Filastin wa al-
Mashro'a al-Islami al-Muaser, was published in 1989 in Beirut. Shiqaqi began writing 
this book in June 1985 while imprisoned in an Israeli jail cell. The book provided 
ideological guidance for Palestinians on the vital role of Islam in confronting Israel.
522
 
In this book, Shiqaqi divides his narrative into three interlinked sections. In the first 
section, Shiqaqi analyses the Palestinian question through a religious lens, highlighting 
the importance of the Palestinian question in contemporary Islamic history. Shiqaqi 
begins his argument by alluding that the Palestinian question is the most crucial 
contemporary issue for the Islamic world. Yet Arab regimes had in fact used the 
Palestinian cause in order to manipulate their Arab and Muslim constituencies, and gain 
legitimacy without taking concrete steps in unifying the umma and combating Israel.
523
 
He is also critical in this book of Arab regimes for having joined the capitalist and 
communist camps, and ultimately neglecting the potential unifying power of Islam. 
Shiqaqi castigates post-colonial pan-Arab regimes for abandoning the Palestinians and 
surrendering the holy mosque of al-Aqsa to the Jewish state without solid resistance. In 
his view, nationalist regimes in the Arab world attempted to disconnect the Palestinian 
struggle from its Islamic core in order to suppress Islamic movements. In highlighting 
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the Islamic dimension of the Palestinian question, he accentuates the importance of 
Jerusalem in Islam. Shiqaqi refers to the Holy Quran and underlines Surat al-Asra (the 
chapter "Night Journey") as it states:  
Exalted is He who took His Servant by night from al-Masjid al-Haram to al-Masjid al- 




Shiqaqi argues that this verse emphasises the importance of the land of Palestine in 
Islam as a link between the most holy mosques in Islam: Mecca, Medina and 
Jerusalem. In his view, the verse implies that all three mosques are equally sacred.
525
 In 
his book, Shiqaqi continues referring to the Quran and highlights two more verses that 
state:  
And We conveyed to the Children of Israel in the Scripture that, "You will surely cause 
corruption on the earth twice, and you will surely reach [a degree of] great haughtiness. 
526
 So when the [time of] promise came for the first of them, We sent against you 
servants of Ours - those of great military might, and they probed [even] into the homes, 
and it was a promise fulfilled.
527
 
By referring to this verse, Shiqaqi argues that Jewish animosity against Muslims has its 
roots in history, and that there subsequently is a link between the current predicament in 
Palestine and historical antagonisms. Shiqaqi refers to various Muslim narratives of the 
Jewish presence in the Arabian Peninsula during the Prophet Mohammed‘s era, and 
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revises the history of the first years of Islam.
528
 Shiqaqi highlights that the Jews took 
advantage of the compassion shown by the Muslims by unifying with pagan Arab tribes 
against the Muslims. He was certainly fascinated with early Islamic history which 
focused on how the Jews and the pagan Arabs – despite their power and wealth were 
eventually defeated by a small number of Muslims. This was because the latter had 
faith in God and his messenger, the Prophet Mohammed.
529
 Shiqaqi believes that the 
history of Islam is particularly inspiring for the Palestinians, who had faith in religion 
and freedom from occupation and discrimination. Shiqaqi therefore believes that the 
Palestinian question has a special status in contemporary Islamic history and could not 
be compromised or neglected.  
Elsewhere in his book, Shiqaqi examines the contemporary history of the region. 
He identified that colonialism and imperialism had waged a war against the Muslims 
since the beginning of the 19th century. He argues that the Muslim world faces attempts  
to spread consumerism and undermine the foundation of Islamic values through 
spreading liberal principles in societies. In doing so, Shiqaqi argues that secular pan-
Arab regimes and pro-western activists act as agents of the foreign powers. In his book, 
imperialism and Zionism are presented as two sides of the same coin, and the secular 
Arab regimes as a fifth column acting against the interests of Muslims. He believes that 
the failure of the Arabs in 1967 war with Israel was caused by the apathy of the secular 
Arab regimes. Zionism is considered an equal partner of imperialism.
530
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Shiqaqi's books are best read as discursive tracts between him and the ‗Arab 
street‘, and particularly with his fellow Palestinian countrymen. With these texts, 
Shiqaqi initiated a new inter-Palestinian dialectic about the potential role of Islam in 
liberating Palestine and the centrality of the Palestinian cause in contemporary Muslim 
affairs. For him, there was no room for sectarianism and ethnic-divisions. One can 
argue that he shared many of his ideas about the centrality of Palestine in Islam with 
Khomeini, producing a kind of hermetic sense of identity. Shiqaqi's writings also 
became ideological charters for Islamic Jihad activists, and to this day remain the 
roadmap for his followers. In this sense, Shiqaqi's pro-Iranian orientation formed the 
ideological backbone of Islamic Jihad several years later.
531
  
The impact of the Islamic revolution was not limited only to Shiqaqi and his 
immediate circle. A number of other Palestinians that had no direct contact with 
Shiqaqi were also influenced by Khomeini's ideas. Loren Lybarger provides an account 
on the ideological influence of the Islamic revolution on the Palestinian streets,
532
 and 
specifically highlights the biography of Ibn Fadlallah – a Palestinian activist who began 
in the secular movement of Fatah in the early 1980s.
533
 Ibn Fadlallah's strong desire to 
fight against the occupation motivated him to join Fatah and undertake military training 
in its camps. After being imprisoned for 15 years, Ibn Fadlallah began to distance 
himself from the secular movement as he came to believe that Fatah‘s members were 
not "fully committed to Islam".
534
 Expelled to southern Lebanon in 1992 by the Israeli 
army, he came into contact with Iranian advisors and members of Hizbullah. Having 
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met Ibn Fadlallah for an interview, Lybarger found posters and photographs of 
Ayatollah Khomeini plastered across his doors and walls.
535
  
Ibn Fadlallah was disappointed by a number of characteristics of the secular 
resistance: endemic corruption, disregard for Islam, and in particular the PLO's desire 
to enter into negotiations with Israel. According to Lybarger, Ibn Fadlallah's ideological 
metamorphosis coincided with a reassessment of the situation among Maoist-oriented 
leaders in Fatah's ‗Student Brigades‘ in the wake of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and 
the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut three years later.
536
 Those activists – led by a 
Christian, Munir Shafiq – argued that against the backdrop of the striking triumph of 
the cleric-led Iranian revolution, their efforts at using leftist ideology as a catalyst for 
leading and winning the Palestinian struggle for liberation had ended in failure.
537
 
Inspired by the Islamic revolution, these activists argued that Islam could provide the 
essential symbols and language for reigniting the Palestinian struggle on a much wider 
level.
538
 By this point, the PLO had lost credibility in the eyes of some Palestinians due 
to its corruption, authoritarianism, and more importantly for abandoning its arm 
struggle against Israel.
539
 Ibn Fadlallah's revolutionary rededication to the struggle 
passed instead through the militancy of Iran and Hizbullah, and the core symbols of that 
militancy.
540
 Iran and Hizbulah's successes gave legitimacy to those symbols, and Ibn 
Fadlallah adopted them in order to redefine the aspirations and approaches of the 
Palestinian cause.
541
 Ibn Fadlallah's admiration for Iran and Hizbullah not only drove 
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him to downplay Shia-Sunni divisions, but also to learn from the symbols of 
martyrdom in the form of the Twelve Shia Imams. For Ibn Fadlallah, Palestine 
demanded the revolutionary spirit possessed that he thought the Iranians and Hizbullah 
commanders had: 
[t]heir action spoke louder than any words. They brought us [...] better tents and wood to 
build beds. The [Iranian] Revolutionary Guards brought these things to us over a distance 
of eight kilometres over steep mountains and under cover of darkness to avoid detection 
by the Israelis. They also brought us an electrical generator, TVs with satellite reception, 
special videos about the resistance [...] They also gave each of us five hundred dollars for 
our personal expenses. If anyone needed medical care, they took us to Imam Hospital in 




Lybarger is right to hypothesise that the emergence of Islamism in Palestinian society 
epitomised a generational transfer in the political identities of the activists who, in 
earlier periods, would have allied with one of the PLO factions.
543
 Lybarger argues that 
the foundation of this alteration lay in occurrences which radicalised the Islamist milieu 
–specially the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the invasion of Lebanon by Israel, and the first 
Intifada of 1987-93.
544
   
The Importance of Iran and the Centrality of the Palestinian Cause in the Ideas of 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
Let me return to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's moral connections with 
revolutionary Iran. As I have argued above, the triumph of the Islamic revolution in 
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Iran inspired Shiqaqi to establish Palestinian Islamic Jihad. According to Meir Hatina,, 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad views the Islamic revolution of Iran as the major historic 
turning-point in the Muslim struggle against the domination of the Western powers.
545
 
The removal of the pro-western regime of the Shah – one of Israel‘s closest regional 
allies – proved to Palestinians like Shiqaqi, that the change was achievable. Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad expressed frustration with Sunni-Arab states' suspicions and antagonistic 
reactions against the Islamic revolution, viewing this opposition to Iran as being 
orchestrated by the imperialists. In the eyes of Islamic Jihad, such political campaigns 
aimed to prevent the umma from uniting. According to Meir Hatina, the leadership of 
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad aimed to construct a wider Sunni consensus around the 




Islamic Jihad's founding leaders appreciated that despite the geographical 
distance, Khomeini treated the Palestinian question as an internal problem.
547
 Their 
appreciation of the Islamic revolution surfaced during the Iran-Iraq war, as they felt that 
the liberation of Palestine should be the first and foremost priority for all Arab states, 
including Iraq.
548
 Shiqaqi believed that the Western powers had supported Saddam 
Hussein in order to prevent the Islamic revolution from expanding its influence 
throughout the region.
549
 Palestinian Islamic Jihad just viewed the invasion of Iran by 
Iraq as resembling – at least morally – the invasion of Palestine, and that both events 
                                                 
545 Meir Hatina, Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement, Tel Aviv:  The Dayan Centre for 
Middle Eastern and African Studies, 2001, p. 53. 
546 
Ibid., p. 56. 
547 
Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
548 
Iyad Barghouthi and Lisa Hajjar, “The Islamist Movements in the Occupied Territories: An Interview with 
Iyad Barghouthi”, The Middle East Report, No. 183. Political Islam (Jul-Aug 1993), p. 10.  
549 
Sadeq-Zadeh, Shahid Doctor Fathi Shiqaqi, pp. 120-121. 
183 
were interlinked in a wider conspiracy against Islamic movements. Islamic Jihad‘s 
leaders criticised Saddam Hussein for repressing Muslim activists in Iraq, such as 
Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, and for his secular discourse. According to Meir Hatina, the 
Islamic Jihad's leadership accused the Iraqi regime of recruiting Arab and Western 




  It is vital to note that in contrast to the PLO (which turned its back on Iran 
during the Iran-Iraq war by supporting Baghdad), Islamic Jihad remained staunchly 
pro-Iranian. This was due to Palestinian Islamic Jihad's ideology having motivated its 
leadership further to stand by the Islamic revolution. Here, transnational ideas of 
Islamic solidarity were the main vehicles behind Islamic Jihad's decision to denounce 
Saddam Hussein and support Iran. Not only did the Iran-Iraq war not undermine 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad's ideological ties with the Islamic revolution – it in fact 
inspired it even more.  According to Islamic Jihad, Islamic Iran stood on one side as it 
confronted the arrogance of Israel and Pro-American Arab conservative states. Islamic 
Jihad saw itself as an accompaniment to the Islamic revolution. The fact that Iran‘s 
military forces demonstrated strong resistance against the well-equipped Iraqi army 
motivated Palestinian Islamic Jihad to follow the same path, and to conduct armed 
struggles within the Occupied Territories. Meir Hatina argues that Shiqaqi observed 
and admired Khomeini and Iran‘s unwavering resistance against a superior military 
power that was nourished by a powerful faith in the triumph of Islam.
551
 In other words, 
Iranian resistance – similar to Hizbullah's successful campaigns against Israel‘s 
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invasion of Lebanon – awakened Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and encouraged the 
outbreak of the Intifada in 1987.
552
  
The Intifada of 1987: The Islamic Dimension of the Palestinian Struggle 
Shiqaqi was not only inspired by Khomeini's ideas to establish an Islamic state, 
but also Iran‘s resistance against its adversaries. Inspired by the formation of the 
Islamic revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran, and Hizbullah's popular 
mobilisation in Lebanon, Shiqaqi in 1981 established Saraya al-Quds – the al-Quds 
Brigades – which would be Islamic Jihad‘s military wing.
553
 From the very beginning, 
Saraya al-Quds conducted armed struggles throughout the Occupied Territories, and 
routinely confronted the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF).  
The word ‗Intifada‘, or uprising in Arabic, entered the political discourse and 
academia in 1987 following a popular uprising in Palestine. In May 1987, six members 
of Islamic Jihad succeeded in escaping from Gaza Central Prison. According to Khaled 
Hroub, the six remained in the Gaza Strip and carried out a series of audacious attacks 
on Israeli armed forces. Four of these individuals were killed by the Israeli army during 
an ambush in October of that year. Following the wounding of dozens of students at the 
Islamic University campus by the Israeli Army – where students had gathered for 
prayers dedicated to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's members who were killed by the 
Israeli armed forces
554
 - Palestinians erupted in anger. On 6
th
 December, a member of 
Islamic Jihad engaged in an armed confrontation with Israeli settlers, and two days later 
an Israeli truck crashed into a number of Palestinian labourers on their way home – 
injuring nine and killing four. On the same day, mass protests erupted and 
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spontaneously spread to other areas. 8
th
 December is now considered to be the official 
start of the Intifada.
555
  There was a strong sense of solidarity between young members 
of Islamic Jihad and their imprisoned mentor, Shiqaqi, whose imprisonment galvanised 
them to increase their armed activities prior to the Intifada. As Shiqaqi was imprisoned, 
his followers intensified their armed operations. In October 1986, three young followers 




Meir Hatina argues that although the Intifada was principally a public uprising 
incited by nationalist motivations and socio-economic grievances, it drew its validity 
from Islam as an integral element of Palestinian cultural identity.
557
 According to Meir 
Hatina, the Intifada was characterised in Islamic Jihad literature as a ‗revolution‘ 
(thawra) rather than impetuous revolt, perceived by the movement as yet another stage 
of an Islamic struggle against the Zionist presence in Palestine.
558
 Henceforth, the year 
preceding the Intifada was declared by Shiqaqi as "the year of Islam".
559
  
     Indeed, from the earliest stages of the Intifada, the role of Islamic Jihad was 
visible. Islamic Jihad's underground printing-houses actively published and distributed 
pamphlets throughout the Occupied Territories, and in the process incited protests. On 
11th December 1987, it was Islamic Jihad that first published a leaflet appealing for the 
Palestinians to hold a general strike.560 Such pamphlets during the early stages of the 
Intifada demonstrated Islamic Jihad's widespread activism. At the same time, I do not 
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intend to imply that the Intifada was monopolised by Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Indeed, 
even Shiqaqi stated that the "Intifada broke out with the bloodshed by Islamic Jihad's 
martyrs. Later, other forces joined in".
561
 Shiqaqi thus never claimed that Islamic Jihad 
was the only vehicle behind the Intifada, and recognised that  other Palestinian factions 
– including the PLO and the Muslim Brotherhood – took part. 
562
 Moreover, Azzam 
Tamimi argues that the Intifada caught the PLO leadership in Tunis off guard.
563
  
Although Yasir Arafat and his advisors were active in promoting the image of the PLO 
image to the world as a peacemaker, they recognised a great opportunity in supporting 
the Intifada. According to Tamimi, the PLO aimed to seize control of the Intifada in 
order to gain recognition by the United States as "the sole legitimate representative of 
the Palestinian people, with whom alone peace was to be negotiated".
564
 To do so, the 
PLO began competing with Islamic groups and mobilising its members and supporters 
to help fuel the Intifada – transforming the occupation of Gaza and the West Bank into 
a daily nightmare for the Israelis.
565
 
Islamic Jihad expressed frustration with the inaction and lack of support from 
regional leaders in supporting the Intifada. Strong support for the Intifada was only 
shown by two states – Lebanon and Iran. Here, the people were free to exhibit their 
solidarity without fear of being reprimanded by the authorities.
566
 Mass rallies held 
frequently in Tehran and Beirut exhibited an awareness of both populations that "it was 
the fighters in Palestine who defended the last Islamic wall-Jerusalem and its 
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 For Islamic Jihad, the failure of Arab leaders' to express strong 
sympathy towards the Intifada was because they feared the spread of the transnational 
Islamic message of the Intifada.
568
  
Following the outbreak of the Intifada, Islamic Jihad‘s cells became major targets 
for the Israelis. Key figures and leaders of Islamic Jihad were either imprisoned or 
forced into exile, and both Shiqaqi and Awda were expatriated to Lebanon in 1988. 
Although the expulsion of Islamic Jihad's leadership created a vacuum amongst its 
cadres in the Gaza Strip, it also created a new momentum for its leadership to become 
closer with the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hizbullah. According to Hatina, with the 
move to Lebanon and Syria, the ideological link of Islamic Jihad to Revolutionary Iran 
was cemented as a close political and organisational bond.
569
 Through the Iranian 
Embassy in Beirut, and through Hizbullah, Islamic Jihad‘s leadership received 
logistical support and was able to revitalise its anti-Israeli military activities from 
Lebanon. As Nasser Abu-Sharif, the High Representative of the Leadership of 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Iran, stated 
[f]rom the very beginning of the formation of Islamic Jihad and during the first 
Intifadathere was no official connection between Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. In the view of Islamic Jihad, the Islamic revolution was a successful example that 
the Palestinian Muslims could follow in liberating their Islamic Land. Nevertheless, there 
was no institutionalised relations between Islamic Jihad and Iran at a diplomatic level. 
The official relations between both sides began after Shiqaqi and other high ranking 
figures of Islamic Jihad were expatriated to Lebanon in 1988. The Islamic Jihad 
leadership contacted Iranian officials in Lebanon and strengthened Islamic Jihad's 
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connection with revolutionary Iran. Islamic Jihad also officialised its connections with 
Hizbullah's leadership as it viewed the Hizbullah's liberation project similar to its own. 
Nevertheless, the relations between Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Republic of Iran began 
officially by establishing the Islamic Jihad's representative office in Tehran in 1991 
which operates at a very high level. 
570
 
Moving to Lebanon opened a new window of opportunity for Islamic Jihad, which had 
suffered from Israel's military campaigns. Along with wide support for the Intifada, 
Iran nurtured political links with the exiled Islamic Jihad leadership.
571
 Iran's support 
became the primary enabling force behind Islamic Jihad and other exiled Palestinians in 
Lebanon. This support allowed Islamic Jihad to grow an infrastructure in Lebanon and 
in Syria, and included help to build training camps, develop military capacity, and 
assistance with publishing the movement‘s literature.
572
 Meir Hatina argues that, like its 
patron Iran, Hizbullah devoted its full support for the Palestinian cause and placed itself 
alongside the Palestinians on the frontline of the struggle of Muslims against their 
oppressors.
573
 Meir Litvak is also of the opinion that moving to Lebanon enhanced 
Islamic Jihad's ties with Iran and Hizbullah; with Iran the main financial sponsor, and 
Hizbullah the provider of logistical aid and military training. Thanks to Iran and 
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Islamic Jihad's proximity to Hizbullah transformed the movement into a quasi-
military organisation, complete with a military hierarchy and even a military 
spokesman. The centrality of the Palestinian cause galvanised Islamic Jihad and 
Hizbullah to conduct joint military operations in southern Lebanon against Israel. In 
April 1992, Islamic Jihad and Hizbullah conducted a joint military attack on the Israeli 
army in southern Lebanon, followed by the issuance of a collective statement 
announcing: "[w]e made an alliance with Allah, the Imam Khomeini, the leader of the 
Islamic nation al-Sayyid Khamene'i [...] to continue jihad, despite the great sacrifices 
which may be required."
575
 Returning briefly to the beginning of this chapter, which 
assessed the impact of the Islamic revolution of Iran on the Palestinian struggle and 
Islamic Jihad, the sentiments expressed by Nasser Abu-Sharif are noteworthy 
[f]rom Islamic Jihad's perception, the triumph of the Islamic revolution in Iran had 
profound effects on the Islamic World in general and the Palestinian cause in particular. 
Islamic Jihad perceives the victory of the Islamic revolution as the victory for the 
Palestinian cause. Iran (during the Pahlavi era) was one of Israel's friendly states and 
turned to become one of the major supporters of the Palestinian nation. Such 
transformation not only altered Iran but also the Islamic nations. Within a year after the 
triumph of the Islamic revolution, the Palestinian Islamists won the Student elections 
within the Universities and became the major popular rivals for the Palestinian 
mainstream nationalists. Also, in the early eighties, the Palestinian Islamic groups began 
adopting  the revolutionary Islamic discourse into the Palestinian struggle against the 
Zionists.  Islamic Jihad also began to adopt the idea of revolutionary Islam as a method 
for changing the Arab home land. When the book of Al- Khomeini: Al-Hall al-Islami wa 
al-Badil (Khomeini; the Islamic Solution and Alternative) was authored by Fathi Shiqaqi 
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in Egypt, the ideological links between Islamic Jihad and the Islamic revolution of Iran 
was shaped based on their common Islamic identity.
576
  
Shiqaqi and his followers were thus certainly fascinated with and imbued by the 
revolution, the radical ideas of Khomeini in particular, and with the history of Iranian 
support for the Palestinian cause. Hatina highlights that Islamic Jihad viewed itself as a 
promoter of Iran's pan-Islamic and anti-imperialistic vision, with Iran providing both 
ideological inspiration and political backing.
577
 Yet this does not mean that Islamic 
Jihad were totally dependent on Iran; instead the movements sees itself as independent. 
While in exile, Shiqaqi maintained his loyalty to the Islamic revolution in Iran, 
enhancing Islamic Jihad's relations with Hizbullah until his assassination in 1995. The 
assassination is widely believed to have been the work of Israel's intelligence services 
(Mossad).
578
 According to al-Quds Brigade, Mossad agents were well aware of the fact 
that Shiqaqi visited Iran frequently via direct flights from Syria. Due to the fact that 
Iran and Syria had protected Shiqaqi, the Mossad planned to assassinate Shiqaqi outside 
Damascus. In October 1995, Shiqaqi  travelled to Libya via Malta in order to attend an 
international conference on guerilla warfare. On 26 October 1995, Shiqaqi – while 
carrying a Libyan passport bearing the name Ibrahim Al-Shawesh – was assassinated by 
two Mossad gunmen outside a seaside hotel in the town of Sliema in Malta.579 Shortly after 
the assassination, Iran's Supreme Leader Seyyed Ali Khamenei denounced Israel's "crimes 
against the Palestinian people", and praised Shiqaqi for achieving martyrdom. He issued a 
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public message of condolence: "I offer my congratulations and condolences over the 
great martyrdom to dear Islamic Jihad and his respected family as well as his prideful 
companions and the overall Palestinian nation".
580 
Khamenei's condolences were 
followed by similar messages from Hizbullah's leadership and Shia clerics and public 
figures in Iran and Lebanon. A day after his assassination, posters and photographs of 
Shiqaqi and the Palestinian flags were plastered across the walls of schools and public 
buildings in Tehran. In addition, Tehran‘s municipality named a street close to the 
Palestinian Embassy after Fathi Shiqaqi.   
The killing of Fathi Shiqaqi was neither the end of Islamic Jihad's war against 
Israel, nor the end of its close relations with Iran. Shortly after Shiqaqi's assassination, 
the Islamic Jihad's committee nominated and selected Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, 
Shiqaqi's loyal companion, as its General Secretary. Similar to Shiqaqi, Ramadan 
Shallah believes that military resistance is the only avenue for the liberation of 
Palestine. He is specifically critical of PLO's ‗soft‘ approach towards Israel. As I will 
argue in the following chapter, Ramadan Shallah continues Shiqaqi's path by placing 




Shiqaqi was a singularly crucial character in Palestinian political history, not 
merely because he established the Islamic Jihad movement. I have suggested that 
Shiqaqi lambasted the passivity of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic scholars. 
Shiqaqi presented a new discursive debate between Palestinian activists through 
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highlighting the revolutionary Islamic resistance as the most reliable alternative to 
nationalist discourse. Inspired by the Islamic revolution in Iran, Islamic Jihad 
appropriated the discourse of resistance and imbued it with Islamic rather than 
nationalist or secularist values in order to distinguish it from other forms of resistance. 
The triumph of the revolution in Iran served as evidence for Shiqaqi and his followers 
that revolutionary Islam was the only alternative to the passive Muslim Brotherhood, 
and to the pan-Arabism of the PLO. What is central to my reading of the first Intifada is 
that it marked a new page in the history of the Palestinian struggle. Unlike previous 
conflicts and rebellions against the occupation of Palestine, the Intifada was not 
dominated by nationalist or secular discourses, and thus marked the end of their total 
hegemony on the Palestinian political stage. In fact, the Intifada reflected the Islamic 
dimension of the Palestinian movements, and projected it as part of a wider context. By 
championing the Intifada, Islamic factions highlighted a powerful religious discourse 
that was hidden under the veneer of nationalism since the beginning of the Palestinian 
struggle.  
One of the most important outcomes of this process of Islamicisation was the 
formation of the Islamic Resistance Movement, known in Arabic as Harakat al-
Muqawama al-Islamiya: Hamas. The emergence of Islamic Palestinian factions further 
encouraged the Iranian leadership to deepen its pro-Palestinian stance. The Islamic 
Republic viewed Palestinian Islamic factions as being closer to its own ideological 
outlook than the PLO. To this end, Tehran did not hesitate to try to deepen and 
institutionalise its relations with exiled Palestinian leaders whom it viewed as better 
alternatives compared to the PLO. In the following chapter I will discuss the foundation 
of Hamas, and further analyse the Islamic Republic's relations with Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad and Hamas during the post-Intifada period.    
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Chapter Four 
Relations between Iran and Hamas (1987-2011) – Strategic 
Partnership, Shared Values, and Ideological Differences  
 Hamas has rapidly emerged to be the leading Muslim group active in 
Palestinian political life. While much attention has been given to Hamas‘ political 
structure, military activities, and political disagreements with the PLO, far less is 
known about its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran – one of its staunchest 
supporters. This chapter provides an overview of Iran's relations with Hamas and 
examines this relationship within a strategic and ideological context. It begins with an 
analysis of Hamas' emergence in the 1980s, before moving on to address the main 
dimensions of its relations with the Islamic Republic, and Iran's own behaviour towards 
Hamas. Using a political and historical analytical framework, this chapter traces Iran's 
relations with Hamas within two historical periods: first, from the establishment of 
Hamas during the first Intifada up until Hamas‘ electoral victory in 2006, and second, 
from its 2006 electoral victory through to the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011, and 
during the subsequent crisis in Syria.
582
 I contend that despite several ups and downs 
that Hamas seeks to consolidate its ties with Iran as Tehran proves to be a reliable 
regional ally for Muslim factions in Palestine. At the same time, drawing on fieldwork 
in Iran, and formal interviews with Hamas high representatives in Tehran, and Iranian 
officials active in the Palestinian field, I argue that the discourse of ‗Muslim solidarity 
and common values‘ are the ideational foundation of Iran's support for Hamas.  
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The First Intifada and the Emergence of Hamas  
The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood faced a range of challenges and 
opportunities within the Occupied Territories between 1979 and 1987. The triumph of 
the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and the subsequent emergence of Shiqaqi's 
Islamic Jihad led to an overhaul of the group's political strategy. The Muslim 
Brotherhood chose to engage more actively in resistance, including armed struggle, as a 
way of deterring the occupation and restoring the rights of Palestinians. According to 
Azzam Tamimi, from 1979 to 1981, the Ikhwan‘s younger members inside Gaza and 
the West Bank – inspired by the activities of Islamic Jihad – expressed one tenacious 
question: "[w]hy are we not involved in the military resistance to the occupation?"
583
 
Pressured from within their own ranks, and subject to an increasing criticism from 
ordinary Palestinians of the Ikhwan's inaction, the leadership of the Palestinian Ikhwan 
attempted to recapture public trust. Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the spiritual leader of the 
Palestinian Ikhwan, planned to arm some of his supporters and conduct their first 
military activities in 1982. According to Tamimi, only Yassin and a very close circle of 
his followers were aware of the plans, and other members of the Ikhwan remained 
strongly opposed to military actions within the Occupied Territories.
584
 Yet Sheikh 
Yassin's military plans failed to achieve its goals, and his followers were stopped by 
Israeli agents while attempting to obtain weapons. Sheikh Yassin was subsequently 
arrested and imprisoned. Although sentenced to a long-term prison sentence, Sheikh 




                                                 
583 Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters, London: Hurst & Company, 2009, p. 44. 
584 Ibid., p. 45. 
585 Ibid., p. 47. 
195 
Azzam Tamimi explains that from 1982 onwards, two groups dominated the 
Palestinian Ikhwan‘s political strata. The first group was comprised mostly of older 
members of the Ikhwan, thus consisting of a generation influenced by a school of 
thought prevalent in Jordan which believed in awaiting for the appearance of an Islamic 
government which would then lead to the liberation of Palestine .
586
 The second group 
included younger affiliates of the Ikhwan – who had debated against leftist and 
nationalist tendencies among students on campus - that were inspired and invigorated 
by the Iranian revolution.
587
 These younger members were frustrated by the Ikhwan's 
inaction, and more than anything else dismayed by the incongruity between theory and 
practice. Meanwhile, Shiqaqi's Islamic Jihad captured the imagination of the 
Palestinians by taking the initiative in fulfilling the responsibility of Jihad against 
Israel.
588
 It appeared to these young affiliates of the Ikhwan that Islamic Jihad was 
winning the credibility and respect of Palestinian Muslims, and that all groups were 
now espousing the cause of Jihad.
589
 The Ikhwan's traditional position of Messianic 
fatalism had thus became indefensible and ineffective..  
As discussed previously, the first Intifada erupted after Islamic Jihad had begun 
its confrontation with the Israeli army, and the deaths of a number of the Islamic Jihad's 
members in 1987. After escaping from Gaza‘s Central Prison, four out of the six 
escapee members of Islamic Jihad were killed in an Israeli ambush. On 8 December 
1987, mass demonstration broke out and Palestinian public anger spread throughout the 
Occupied Territories. According to Khaled Hroub, on the following evening, the 
Political Bureau of the Palestinian Ikhwan in Gaza met and agreed that the reaction of 
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the public to Israeli aggression demonstrated the need to assign a top priority to the 
battle against the Israeli occupation. At the meeting, the first communiqué of Harakat 
al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya (Hamas) was written, and those present – Sheikh Yassin, 
Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi, Salah Shehadeh, Muhammad Sham'ah, Isa al-Nashshar, Abdel 
Fatah Dukhan, and Ibrahim al-Yazuri – became its founders.
590
 
In August 1988, Hamas published its Charter, declaring its ideological and 
political aspirations. The Charter highlights the group‘s strategy and specifically 
underlines that "Palestine is an Islamic trust". This charter sheds a light on common 
objectives between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hamas from its very beginning. 
Article 11, for instance, states that  
[t]he Islamic Resistance Movement [firmly] believes that the land of Palestine is an 
Islamic Waqf (Trust) upon all Muslim generations till the day of Resurrection. It is not 
right to give up nor any part of it. Neither a single Arab state nor all the Arab states, 
neither a King nor a leader, nor all the Kings or leaders, nor any organisation-Palestinian 
or Arab-have such authority because the land of Palestine is an Islamic Trust upon all 
Muslim generations until the day of Resurrection.
591
 
In Article 14 of Chapter three, the group states that: 
[t]he problem of liberating Palestine is related to three spheres; the Palestinian sphere, 
the Arab sphere, and the Islamic sphere. Every one of them has a role to play in the 
struggle against Zionism. Each has obligations to fulfil. It is a grave error, and extreme 
ignorance, to ignore any of these spheres, because Palestine is an Islamic land 
                                                 
590 Khaled Hroub, HAMAS:  Political Thought and Practice, USA: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000, p. 39. 
591 Muhammad Maqdsi, “Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine”, The Journal of 
Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, No.4 (Summer 1993), pp. 122-134. 
197 
accommodating the fist Qibla, the third Holy Sanctuary, the [place where the] ascent of 
the Messenger took place.
592
  
In regard to its outlook towards secularism, Article 27 of Chapter Two states: 
Secularist ideology is a total contradiction to religious ideologies, and it is upon ideology 
that positions, actions, and decisions are made. From here, with our respect for the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation and what is might become, and not understanding its 
role in the Arab-Israeli struggle, we cannot exchange the current and future of Islam in 
Palestine to adopt the secular ideology because the Islamic nature of the Palestinian issue 
is part and parcel of our din (ideology and way of life) and whosever neglects part of his 
din is surely lost.
593
  
Article 10 of Chapter Two also elaborates upon the movement's path: 
[w]hile the Islamic Resistance Movement is forging its path, it will be a support to the 
weak, a victor to the oppressed; while all its might, using all of its energy, to realise the 




Article 32 calls upon all Arab and Muslim peoples to work seriously and constructively 
in order to prevent "world Zionism and Imperialist powers" from taking over Muslim 
nations one by one. The Article states that: 
[t]oday it is Palestine and tomorrow it will be another country, and another, the Zionist 
plan has no bounds, and after Palestine they wish to expand from the Nile River to the 
Euphrates. When they totally occupy it they look towards another, and such is their plan 
in the in the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion. Their present is the best witness on 









What is most interesting in the Hamas Charter is the language used in 
expressing the group‘s ideological aspirations. It emphasises the land of Palestine as an 
Islamic waqf, and thus allows the Palestinian cause to transcend the boundaries of Arab 
nationalism. The chapter calls on Muslims and the oppressed to unify in order to 
liberate Palestine, and leaves no room for compromise with Zionism and imperialism. 
The Charter highlights the commonality between Hamas and the Islamic revolution in 
Iran. As I have argued in the previous chapters, Khomeini constantly emphasised the 
Islamic dimension of the Palestinian cause and called on all Muslims and the oppressed 
to salvage the land of Palestine from its occupiers. Both the Charter of Hamas and 
Shiqaqi's Islamic Jihad's brought Iran closer to the Muslim factions in Palestine, and 
opened a window for the Islamic Republic to view them as credible alternatives to 
PLO.  
The Charter of Hamas also opened a new window of opportunity for Israel to 
suppress politicised Islamic factions. In August 1988, Israel initiated its first mass 
detention against Hamas‘ leadership. Mass detentions in late 1988 and early 1989 
decapitated Hamas, with all of its first and second ranking officials and activists 
arrested.
596
 The Israeli campaign of mass detention and systematic suppression 
continued annually, and incarceration campaigns of 1990, 1991 and 1992 were on a 
large scale.
597
 Meanwhile, in December 1988, Yasir Arafat announced that the PLO 
accepted Israel's right to exist, thus paving the way for peace negotiations with Israel. 
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According to Tamimi, Arafat's compromise represented the forfeiture of the right of 
return for Palestinian refugees. Consequently, although PLO obtained recognition by 
the United States and Western powers, it lost credibility in the eyes of Palestinian 




Iran’s Strategic Alliance with Hamas from 1987 to 2006: a New Page in the 
Palestinian Struggle  
Following the PLO's declaration accepting the right of Israel to exist, Palestinian 
factions were divided into two camps: ‗resistance movements‘ opposed to any 
concessions with Israel, and ‗concessioners‘ under the umbrella of the PLO that were 
open to direct negotiations with Israel. Resistance movements were mainly from 
Islamic factions (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) and smaller left wing groups such as the 
PFLP-GC. Iran was determined to institutionalise its connection with the Islamist 
factions. To this end, the ‗Committee of Support for the Palestinian Islamic revolution‘ 
was formed in 1990. and in May 1990, the Iranian Parliament ratified a bill entitled 
"Law to Support the Islamic revolution of the Palestinian People". In the following 
paragraphs I discuss various rules and articles ratified by the Parliament in relation to 
Iran‘s relations with Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The first law consists of eight articles. 
Article One of the bill states: 
[t]he land of Palestine has belonged and does belong to the Palestinian people. The Quds-
occupying regime and the usurper regime of Zionists which has dominated the land and 
the Beit ul-Moqaddas through bullying, usurpation, and massacre is condemned as 
usurper and oppressor so that all truth-seeking nations and people of the world, the 
people and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in particular, are required to 
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support and defend the wronged, homeless and combatant Palestinian people through any 
way possible until they realise their inalienable rights.
599
  
Articles 3, 4 and 6 of the bill provide guidance for governmental institutions and 
agencies: 
[t]he Islamic revolution Martyrs Foundation and the Islamic revolution Underprivileged 
and War Disabled Foundations, after receiving approval of the Islamic revolution Leader, 
as well as the Red Crescent Society of the Islamic Republic of Iran are obliged to give 
support, within their material and spiritual capacity, to the families of martyrs, war 
disabled, captives and the missing of the occupied territories as well as other martyrs in 
other corners of the world who have given their lives in the path of liberation of 
Palestine.
600
 The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Ministry of Higher 
Education and Ministry of Health, Treatment and Medical Education are required to offer 
specified scholarship grants to Palestinian students in universities across the country on 
an annual basis.
601
 The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and the Islamic 
Republic Broadcasting Organisation (IRIB) are obliged to keep Palestine at the top of 
their international agenda and to champion the Palestinian-Islamic revolution.
602
 
The bill emphases Beit ul-Moqaddas as the "centre of the Palestinian Islamic 
Government in exile", and urges all Muslim countries to recognise the city as the 
"capital of the Palestinian Islamic Government in Exile".
603
 The bill concludes by 
prohibiting any economic or commercial relations with Israeli corporations or 
institutions and requests the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to identify and make a list of 
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all corporations and companies worldwide related to Israel. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was legally obliged to submit the list to the Cabinet and Islamic Consultative 
Assembly.
604
 The bill forbids individuals and agencies from making any investments, 
directly or indirectly, which would profit from the occupation of Palestine. It also bans 
the import and export of any commodities or services which are manufactured or 
rendered in the Occupied Territories or by legal entities affiliated to or nationals of 
Israel.
605
 The bill remains a legal blueprint of Khomeini's pro-Palestinian ideas,. The 
language of the bill is important as it emphases the "Islamic revolution" in Palestine. In 
other words, since the first Intifada, the Islamic Republic began institutionalising its 
connection with Muslim factions in Palestine, particularly Hamas and Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad.  
Following the ratification of the Law to Support the Islamic revolution of the 
Palestinian People, Iran organised a series of conferences in solidarity with the Intifada. 
The first conference was organised in October 1991.
606
 According to Hatina, high-
ranking religious figures and other delegates of Islamic movements from Arab and 
Muslim countries participated. The most important of these conferences – attended by 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hizbullah and Hamas and delegations from some 40 Muslim 
countries – took place in Tehran between 14-22 October 1991, scheduled in order to 
precede the Madrid peace conference.
607
 The presence of Hamas was a significant 
milestone in furthering dialogue between the former and Iran.
608
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On 30 October 1991, the Middle East peace conference convened in Madrid. 
According to Iyad Barghouti, while the attitude of secular Palestinian factions towards 
the Madrid conference was by no means homogenous, there was unity among Muslim 
factions such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. All of Palestine‘s Muslim 
factions rejected the Madrid conference, labelling it the "conference for selling 
Palestine and Jerusalem".
609
 Hamas and Islamic Jihad viewed the Madrid conference as 
an attempt to lend international legitimacy to the existence of Israel. Inspired by Iran's 
anti-Zionist message, Hamas sent greetings to Iran and participated in the Tehran 
conference. The event in Tehran also brought Hamas closer to Islamic Jihad. Both were 
motivated by their opposition towards the Madrid conference.
610
 The first event hosted 
by the Iranian Parliament took place in Tehran in October 1991, and was named the 
International Conference on Palestinian Intifada.
611
 High-ranking delegates and figures 
from various Muslim countries were invited –including Hamas and Islamic Jihad. 
Inviting delegates from Palestinian Islamic movements was a turning point in Iran's 
relations with Hamas. It paved a way for the institutionalisation of mutual diplomatic 
ties. 
Certain statements made by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic in 1991 
are worthy of attention, as they shedlight on Iran's ideological stance towards the peace 
negotiations during the post-Intifada era. In a meeting with the participants of the first 
Islamic Conference on Palestine, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated: 
Regarding the issue of Palestine, the goal is to liberate Palestine and wipe out the Israeli 
government. There is no difference between territories occupied before and after the year 
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1967. Every inch of Palestinian lands is part of Muslims' homeland. Any non-Muslim 
and non-Palestinian rule over Palestine is an illegitimate ruler. As our magnanimous 
Imam Khomeini said, "Israel must disappear". If Palestinian Jews accept Islamic rule, 
they will live in Palestine. It is not a matter of anti-Semitism. The problem is that a 
Muslim homeland has been occupied. If the heads of Muslim countries were not under 
the influence of global powers, they could achieve this. Unfortunately they failed to do 
so.
612
    
Prior to the Tehran conference, Khamenei – as a part of his message on April 1990 on 
Quds Day, highlighted the responsibility of the Islamic Ummah towards the Palestinian 
Intifada, stating: 
[t]he Islamic uprising of the people of Palestine has provided everybody with the 
ultimate proof and it has shown that in spite of the comprehensive pressure by the enemy 
and in spite of the deception and treachery of the friends, the sapling of resistance is not 
dead; rather, it has developed more roots and produced more fruit. Therefore, it is 
necessary for all people and governments to sincerely consider the Islamic issue of 
Palestine among their primary concerns and make as many contributions as they can.
613
 
In response to American efforts in organising the Madrid Conference, 
Khamenei highlighted the ideological importance of rejecting concessions and 
announced that responding to the Palestinian cries for help was a pre-condition for 
being a ‗true‘ Muslim. In October 1991, as a part of his message to Muslim nations and 
religious scholars, writers and intellectuals and students, he stated 
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[a]t this historical juncture, Muslims of the world should feel responsible. They should 
understand the duties that their Islamic faith has placed on their shoulders. On one hand, 
they have a duty to safeguard Islamic territories, which is necessary in Islamic 
jurisprudence. On the other hand, they have a duty to respond to an oppressed nation's 
cries for help....The Holy Prophet said, "A person who hears a Muslim's cries for help but 
fails to respond, is not a Muslim" [...] And today it is not just a single individual who is 
crying for help; it is an entire nation.
614
 
Ayatollah Khamenei clarified the Islamic Republic's position towards the Arab leaders 
who were participating in the peace conferences, and declared that any negotiations 
with Israel were forbidden. As a part of his message on 31 May 1991, on the occasion 
of the second anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini‘s death, he declared: 
The Palestinian nation should not, and cannot, seek its freedom and rights in conferences 
that are arranged by leaders of the Arab countries. These conferences, if not 
inauspicious-are useless and futile for the oppressed Palestinians. These leaders who 
have come together these days in the name of Palestine- if they were sincerely thinking 
about saving Palestine, they should have adopted a decisive and firm position against the 
hypocritical proposal by the American President and they should have decided to 
immediately provide weapons and financial and political assistance for the combatants 
who are fighting inside occupied Palestine [...]And if this does not happen - which has 
not happened yet and will not happen in the future either [...] Palestinian combatants 
should rely on God and their popular and Islamic forces.
615
  
From the very beginning of the Palestinian Intifada and following the Madrid 
Peace Conference, Iran committed its efforts to being head of the camp against 
‗concessions‘ with Israel. Hatina argues that Iran's stance against the peace negotiations 
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with Israel galvanised Hamas to perceive Iran as an ally.
616
 In an interview, Khaled al-
Qadoumi, the high representative of Hamas‘ leadership in Tehran, stated to me: 
[O]ne of the major elements within the Islamic Ummah is the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Keeping in mind that Hamas is an independent movement and that it pursues balanced 
relations with the Muslim Ummah, Hamas moved towards establishing and consolidating 
relations with Iran. Hamas from its very beginning began studying the Islamic 
revolution. The experience of the Iranian revolution has its own input in Hamas‘ ideas. 
The pro-Palestinian literature sponsored by the late Ayatollah Khomeini inspired us to 
get closer to Iran. We in Hamas view the Islamic Republic as one of the leading countries 
in the region. We remember when the first embassy of Palestine was established in 
Tehran and then the Israeli diplomats were removed. We also view our relations with the 
Islamic Republic based on our major policy of mobilising and gaining solidarity for the 
Palestinian cause.  To this end, we officially started our relations with Iran a year before 
the Madrid Conference. But, Hamas officially opened its office in Tehran in February 
1992, two years after the accreditation of the Hamas representative. Since that time, our 
office is active at different levels of media awareness, political relations with high 




By 1992 – a time described by Elaheh Rostami-Povey as one of mass detention and 
deportation of Palestinian academics, clergy, engineers, doctors and activists to 
southern Lebanon (where many were killed by the Israelis) – Hamas had emerged as a 
strong resistance movement. At this time, Hamas developed a closer connection with 
Hizbullah and consequently with Iran.
618
 In 1992, Israel expatriated 415 Palestinians 
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(most of whom associated with Islamist movements, mainly Hamas) to southern 
Lebanon. 
619
 Although 100 of these deportees were permitted to return, some remained 
for additional months. During their exile, these Palestinians came into contact with 
members of Hizubullah who imparted to them "techniques of resistance" including 
suicide terror attacks.
620
 Hamas had fostered the idea of suicide mission four years 
earlier, after its high ranking officials became attracted to the tactic in 1989. According 
to Rola el-Husseini, "in leaflet no.68 [of Hamas] [...] there was an invitation to the 
movement's loyalists to start engaging in suicide missions against Israeli targets". Yet 
no suicide operations had been conducted during this period. The time spent in southern 




The importance of Palestine for Hizbullah, Iran's closest ideological ally in 
Lebanon, should also not be understated. Dina Matar and Lina Khatib rightly argue that 
commitment to Palestine is one of the vital pillars in the construction of Hizbullah's 
identity.
622
 To this end, Hizbullah greatly emphasised the importance of Quds Day, the 
day announced by Ayatollah Khomeini during the first days of the Iranian Revolution. 
Hizbullah offered its moral support from the very beginning of the Palestinian Intifada. 
These narratives were captured in powerful metaphor or iconography. For instance, in 
October 1990, an al-Ahd report depicted a blood-spattered wall against a black 
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background, with a banner reading: "Massacre of al-Aqsa...the siege of resistance...O 
where are the Muslims?"
623
 
While resistance groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad have used the 
symbolism of al-Aqsa due to their constant battles with Israel in Jerusalem, it was 
Hizbullah that appropriated Jerusalem as the centre point of Muslim strugglers, 
defining its emancipation as the decisive jihad. This hence provided coherent pan-
Islamist imagery to compensate for the competing imageries of Jerusalem that had to 
that point been represented by many Arabs and Muslims up to the mid 1980s.
624
  
Hizbullah portrayed Israel as an aggressive, racist and expansionist entity, and the 
slogan "today Iran, tomorrow Palestine" emerged in Hizbullah's narrative to establish 
that the success of the Islamic revolution would be  liberation of Palestine.
625
 It was 
against the background of such pro-Palestinian ideas that during the early 1990s, 
Hizbullah received exiled members of Hamas in south Lebanon, and that Hamas 
subsequently expanded its relations with Hizbullah and the Iranian government. What 
is key to remember is that Hizbullah's pro-Palestinian stance is derived from the 
ideologies of the Islamic revolution in Iran, particularly as Hizbullah views Ayatollah 
Khomeini's ideas as its main ideological reference point. 
After the Intifada in 1987, the Islamic Republic directed its attention towards 
Islamic Jihad and Hamas. It soon established political relations with Hamas, only to be 
followed by the Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israel in 1993. Despite the 
propaganda from the PLO favouring the Oslo Accords, average Palestinians were 
frustrated by the PLO's recognition of Israel‘s occupation, and turned instead towards 
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Hamas and Islamic Jihad. After 1993, Hamas continued its strong electoral showing – 
beating Fatah in al-Najah student elections in 1996 and again in 1997. 
626
  
According to Rostamy-Povey, the Oslo Agreement legitimised Israel's seizure 
of Palestinian land and denied 5 million Palestinian refugees the right to return to their 
homeland.
627
 Following the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was 
established, and subsequently dominated by the PLO under the leadership of Arafat. 
The PA took control of the Gaza Strip and some parts of the West Bank. The Oslo 
Accords brought Iran, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hizbullah closer together. The Islamic 
Republic questioned the credibility of the Oslo agreement, and deepened its connection 
with Islamic movements in Palestine. Rostamy-Povey argues that Hamas had risen in 
popularity for its stance against Israel, while the PLO's popularity had shrunk.
628
 
Throughout 1995 and 1996, Hamas (supported by Iran, and inspired by Hizbullah) used 
suicide bombings as a tactic to deter Israeli attacks on the Palestinian population, in 
what it believed was a last resort.
629
 The first suicide operation took place in Palestine 
in the aftermath of a massacre in1993 in which 29 Palestinian worshippers were killed 
by an Israeli-American settler and army reservists, Baruch Goldstein.
630
 The strong 
relationship between Hamas, Iran, Hizbullah and Islamic Jihad continued into the 
1990s, and developed as a response to the creation of the PA. From the very beginning 
of the establishment of the PA, the PLO led media campaigns against Hamas, 
lambasting it for maintaining relations with Iran. According to Khaled Hroub, in late 
1992, Arafat accused Hamas of receiving as much as $30 million annually in support 
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from Iran, a claim that Hamas dismissed as being exaggerated.
631
 These allegations 
were nevertheless covered in depth by Arab and Western media outlets. 
Sheikh Yassin's historic visit to Iran 
In October 1997, the spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Yassin, was released 
from jail by the Israeli authorities.
632
 Sheikh Yassin returned to Gaza to find that he was 
widely regarded as a symbol of resistance and defiance for millions of Palestinians who 
felt betrayed by the PLO leadership.
633
 In April 1998, Sheikh Yassin made a state visit 
to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and was received by its highest leadership.
634
 During 
this historical visit, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei received Sheikh Yassin 
and praised the Palestinian resistance against Israel. Khamenei regarded Yassin and his 
followers as "the true representatives of the Palestinian resistance".
635
 Ayatollah 
Khamenei announced that "the Iranian nation is determined to maintain its righteous 
position in supporting the Palestinian struggle and it also perceives the consequences of 
supporting the Palestine nation as God's given glory".
636
 He stressed that the spirit of 
the Palestinian resistance had to be maintained, adding that "the American government 
and the Zionist authorities aim to force the world to forget about the Palestinian cause 
by any means".
637
 During his visit, Sheikh Yassin praised Iran's support for the 
Palestinian struggle against Israel, and emphasised that Palestine belonged to all 
                                                 
631 Khaled Hroub, HAMAS:  Political Thought and Practice, USA: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000,           
p. 178. 
632 Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: Unwritten Chapters, London: Hurst & Company, 2009, pp. 109-110. According to 
Tamimi, Sheikh Yassin was released in an exchange with two imprisoned Israeli agents whom were attempting 
to assassinate Khalid Mashal in Jordan.  
633 Ibid., p. 111. 
634 Ibid., p. 113. 
635 Khamenei.ir, Didar e Sheikh Ahmad Yassin Rahbar e Moqavemat e Felestin [The Visit of Sheikh Ahmad 
Yassin, The Leader of the Palestinian Resistance], http://farsi.khamenei.ir/news-content?id=11421 [Accessed 




Muslims. No government or party would decide its fate.
638
 Upon his arrival in Tehran, 
Sheikh Yassin stated that "I would not have been here if I did not know this Islamic 
Republic and its supportive position towards our cause".
639
 Following his visit to Iran, 
Sheikh Yassin travelled to the city of Qum and was warmly received by high ranking 
Shia clerics at the Hawza, including Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi and Ayatollah Seyed 
Kazem Haeri.
640
 All of this happened within a context of heightend US penetration of 
the Persian Gulf area after Operation Desert Storm, the absence of the Soviet Union as 
a Balancing power and military installations in Iran‘s geo-strategic neighbourhood. For, 
Iran creating strategic depth in the Arab world was a rational response to those 
devleopments and the issue of Palestine always came in rather handy to that end. 
Sheikh Yassin's historical visit to Iran went beyond a mere diplomatic state 
visit. Sheikh Yassin was received and regarded by the Iranian leadership and clergy as 
the champion of the Palestinian resistance. Appearing in his wheelchair with his grey 
beard, he was embraced by many Iranians as a strong-minded individual that in spite of 
his physical suffering and imprisonment by the Israelis continued to defend the 
Palestinian cause. The Iranian leadership appreciated Sheikh Yassin‘s visit to Iran after 
his release from jail, and perceived this as an indicator of the strong bond between Iran 
and Islamic movements in Palestine. Since then, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
intensified its rhetoric in favour of Hamas, describing it as the guardian of the Islamic 
resistance against Israel.  
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The Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon and the Second Palestinian Intifada   
The year 2000 was a turning point in the region's history. After two decades - in 
compliance with UNSC Resolution 425 – the Israeli army pulled its troops from south 
Lebanon, and dismantled its militias.
 641
  Some have attributed Israel‘s defeat in south 
Lebanon to Iranian and Syrian support for Hizbullah. According to Lina Khatib, the 
liberation of southern Lebanon on 25 May 2000 was a watershed because it was the 
first time that Israeli troops had been expelled from Arab lands "at the hands of an Arab 
paramilitary group" since 1948, when the state of Israel was formed.
642
 In May 2000, 
Hizbullah's leader Hassan Nasrallah directly addressed the Palestinian people: 
[w]e grant this victory to our oppressed people in Palestine in occupied Palestine and to 
the peoples of our Muslims and Arab Nations. Our people in Palestine [...] you can 
regain your land without any negotiations over a village or a street, you can return with 
your families to your villages and territories without begging and humiliation [...]Leave 
and discard all these pretexts and negotiations. The real intifada and resistance are the 
ones which restore your rights completely as in Lebanon [...] We give this ideal Lebanese 
pattern to our people in Palestine as a gift, an example to follow .
643
 
Israel's retreat from south Lebanon was widely covered by Arab media. Al-
Manar TV repeatedly broadcasted images of Israeli troops leaving southern Lebanon, 
and thousands of displaced Lebanese refugees returning to their homes and land after 
years of occupation.
644
 The jubilation of the Arabs and Muslims in the region followed 
by the disappointment with the Camp David summit, which – hosted by Clinton and 
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attended by the Israeli PM Ehud Barak and PLO's leader Yassir Arafat – ended on 25 
July 2000 without agreement.
645
 Frustration amongst the Palestinian population grew 
significantly due to the failed summits and the corruption of the PA.  
 Shortly after Hizbullah‘s triumph in south Lebanon, Israeli provocations ignited 
a second Palestinian uprising. On 28 September 2000, Ariel Sharon's uninvited visit to 
Haram al-Sharif – Islam's third holiest site – under heavy security protection by Israeli 
armed force triggered the second intifada, and united the Palestinians as never 
before.
646
 The peace negotiations proved to be fruitless for many Palestinians, as the 
Israelis failed to comply with many of the commitments required by the interim peace 
accords.
647
 At this point, the triumph of Iran's main ally, Hizbullah, in south Lebanon 
galvanised the frustrated Palestinian masses to follow the same path of resistance 
against the occupation. In other words, the idea that Israel could be forced to retreat the 
same way they retreated from south Lebanon led to popular uprising in the Occupied 
Territories. Here, the discourse of Islamic resistance championed by Iran and Hizbullah 
gained momentum even further during the Second Intifada. According to Laleh Khalili, 
Palestinian activists certainly consider Hizbullah a model or comrade in arms.
648
 
Shortly after the Second Intifada began, Marwan Barghuti, the respected and popular 
Fatah activist in the West Bank, stated admiringly of Hizbullah that "the thinking of 
entire new Palestinian generation is influence by the experience of our brothers in 
Hizbullah and by Israel's retreat from Lebanon".
649
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Iran and Hizbullah exhibited their strong moral support for and solidarity with 
the al-Aqsa Intifada. From 28-30 January 2001, the first Quds Conference was held in 
Beirut. It led to the establishment of the ‗Quds Foundation‘, with a temporary 
headquarters in the same city.
650
 The final resolutions included the following:  
 severing any engagement with the Middle East Peace process; 
 calling for resistance as well as political;  economic, diplomatic and media 
support for the intifada; 
 boycotting  American goods and using oil as part of a ‗carrot and stick‘ policy; 
 stopping all normalisation procedures with Israel; 
 affirming that Jerusalem was the capital of Palestine; and finally 
 lobbying in order to revive the UN Resolution 3379 that stipulates that Zionism 
is a form of racism
651
.  
The primary speakers at the conference were Nasrallah, and Ali Muhtashami 
(an Iranian reformist and ally of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami).
652
 
Muhtashami, the secretary general of the International Committee for the Support of 
Intifada, urged all regional countries to supply the Palestinians with arms to enable 
them to defend their ―legitimate‖ rights.
653
 According to Joseph Alagha, Muhtashami 
reiterated Iran's solution to the Palestinian crisis, namely, a general referendum that 
includes the "indigenous Palestinian people ", composed of adherents of the three 
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Abrahamic faiths worldwide to determine their future and the type of the government 
which they would adopt.
654
  In support of the Second Intifada, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran hosted the Second International Conference on Palestinian Intifada in Tehran in 
April 2001.
655
 According to Ali Akbar Velayati, representatives of more than 30 
Muslim and Arab states as well representatives of the Palestinian opposition groups and 
350 members of the Iranian parliament and high ranking religious figures participated 
in this conference.
656
 The Second International Conference on Palestinian Intifada 
began with a speech by Ayatollah Khamenei, and also featured speeches from Mahdi 
Karrubi (Speaker of the Iranian Parliament), the then President, Mohammad Khatami, 
Ramadan Abdullah (the leader of Islamic Jihad), and Khaled Mashal. 
According to Velayati, the second Conference was dominated by the reformists 
by virtue of being organised and hosted by Iran's sixth parliament. Velayati argues that 
this fact demonstrated that there existed a strong consensus amongst all Iranian political 
strata over support for the Palestinian cause.
657
 From Velayati's point of view, locating 
the International Conference on Palestinian Intifada in Tehran, and enlisting the 
participation of non-Arab Muslim countries and organisations, furthered the message 
that the Palestinian cause was an Islamic rather than merely an Arab cause. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran further reiterated that the fate of Palestine was intertwined with the 
fate of other Muslim nations.
658
 The second conference unanimously condemned 
Israel's aggressive actions and meticulous plans to alter the demography of Palestine, 
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and attempts at destroying Christian and Muslim sites in Jerusalem. The Conference 




Certain statements by Khamenei are worthy of attention, as they shed light on 
the Islamic Republic's perception of the Second Intifada. Shortly before eruption of the 
Second Intifada in December 1999, Ayatollah Khamenei detailed his outlook on the 
notion of peace-talks between Israel and the PA, and in the process also sent a message 
to the Palestinian people. He stated: 
[O]ne of the issues that is apparent today in order to erase the issue of Palestine from 
memories and prevent it from being raised by public opinion of the Islamic Ummah, is 
the so-called peace talks that are held between a group of Palestinians-namely Arafat and 
his gang and the Israelis: the issue of negotiations, the Palestinian "Authority" and other 
such things. This is one the most reprehensible tricks designed by the Israelis and 
unfortunately, certain Muslims and certain Palestinians have fallen into this trap.
660
 
Ayatollah Khamenei described the peace negotiations as "Israel's peace-plot", and 
appealed to Muslims and Arabs to support the Palestinians in their struggle. In 
December 1999, he stated that 
[O]f course , today mentioning the appealing word "Peace" is the trick that is used by the 
Zionists and their supporters- and America is their most important supporter [...] 
aggression is [part of this regime's nature [Israel]. Basically, the Zionist regime is 
founded on coercion, violence and cruelty and it is moving forward on the basis of these 
characteristics. It could not and will not, make any progress without cruelty and coercion, 
and yet you say Palestinians should make peace with this regime? What peace? No one 
                                                 
659 Ibid. 
660 Ali Khamenei, Selected Statements by Ayatollah Khamenei about Palestine (in English), p. 11.  
216 
would fight them if they were not greedy, that is to say, if they returned Palestine to its 
real owners and went away or if they asked the Palestinian government to let some of 
them or all of them stay in Palestine. The war started when they forced their way into the 
Palestinian homes [...] They are a threat to all nations now. Therefore they want to make 
peace and use it as a stepping -stone for further oppression. If a kind of peace is 




After the outbreak of the Second Intifada, Iran's leadership offered its solidarity with 
and support to the Palestinian uprising, and highlighted the Islamic nature of the al-
Aqsa Intifada. As part of his inaugural speech delivered on 24 April 2001 at the 
International Conference on the Palestinian Intifada in Tehran, the Supreme Leader 
stated 
[t]he main pivot of the al-Aqsa intifada is Beit ul-Moqaddas [Jerusalem]. In other words, 
the spark that provoked the anger of the Palestinian people was the Zionists' affront to the 
al-Aqsa mosque. Having realised their great mission to safeguard the sanctity of one of 
the most sacred Islamic sites, the Palestinian people entered the arena of struggle against 
Zionists. And relying on self -sacrifice, they started the sacred fire of struggle and 
resistance against the Zionist occupiers.
662
  
From Khamenei's point of view, there is a direct link between the fate of Palestinians 
and non-Palestinians. In this regard, the threat of Israel is not confined and limited to 
the Palestinians. In November 2001, in a meeting with government officials on the 
occasion of the religious day of Eid ul-Fitr, he expressed that 
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the issue of Palestine is the most fundamental issue of the world of Islam and it is 
intertwined with the destiny of non-Palestinians throughout the world of Islam. 
Government officials of Islamic countries should not think that if they leave the people 
of Palestine in the brutal clutches of their enemies, Israel would leave Muslim 




Ayatollah Khamenei in particular criticised the idea of western liberal democracy, and 
those in Iran and the region that advocated it. He highlighted the failure of humanism 
and democracy to recognise the predicament of the Palestinian people. This was 
directed against the United States at a time when there was more and more talk about 
liberal interventionism in the name of democracy and human rights – themes that also 
underlined the so called wars on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq at a latter stage in 2003. 
In a speech delivered in November 2001, Khamenei stated 
[t]here was a time when liberal democracy was claimed to be the highest point of 
perfection that human thought and action could ever achieve. It was claimed that nothing 
could be better than liberal democracy. I believe these claims are a sign of being narrow-
minded. It is wrong to claim that it is not possible for human beings to go beyond a 
certain achievement [...] This liberalism is what has given rise to the issue of Afghanistan 
and the issue of Palestine. This fake humanism of the west is what has ignored the 
Palestinian nation for fifty years and is determined to wipe it out. They do not ask 
themselves whether Palestine existed in the world or it is just a myth.
664
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As a part of the solution to the Palestinian predicament, Khamenei called on all Muslim 
countries, intellectuals and NGOs to accomplish their ‗duty‘ in supporting the 
Palestinian nation. He stated:  
[t]his is the duty of all governments. Today the Palestinian nation has certain legitimate 
expectations of the Islamic Ummah as well as Muslim governments. Today the great 
Islamic Ummah expects Islamic governments, specially the Arab governments, to cut off 
their relations with the usurping, oppressive and insolent Zionists. Today this is our duty 
and we hope we will be able to fulfil it. Today Islamic governments have a duty to assist 
them [Palestinians] and provide them with political, financial and propaganda 
assistance.
665
 Everybody is responsible in this regard. Muslim intellectuals, politicians, 
poets, writers, artists and academia are responsible. They are influential people. They can 
feed the media in an appropriate way.
666
   
At the conclusion of the Conference, Ayatollah Khamenei proposed general guidance 
for resisting against Israel: 
The following should be the general guidance for fighting the usurper regime: a) 
Containing the usurper regime within the borders of occupied Palestinian lands, 
constraining its economic and political breathing space and severing its links with its 
surrounding environment. b) Helping the Palestinian people resist and struggle within 




Khamenei's general guidance for Islamic countries were also perceived as a religious 
and political decree by the Islamic Republic – the blueprint of its foreign policy, and an 
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ideological and strategic recipe for its approach towards Palestinian factions after the 
Second Intifada. Velayati argues that one of the major achievements of the Second 
International Conference on Palestinian Intifada was that it empowered and harmonised 
the idea of resistance against the policies of "compromise and negotiations".
668
 In other 
words, it is safe to argue that the resistance narrative was now formally 
institutionalised. The representatives of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad were greeted by 
the Iranian leadership, including the reformists and the conservatives, and they were 
free to liaise with the leaders and representatives of Muslim countries that participated 
at the Conference.  
On 22 March 2004, Sheikh Yassin was assassinated by the Israeli armed forces 
on the orders of Ariel Sharon. Shortly after, on 17 April, Sharon authorised the 
assassination of Dr Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi (Sheikh Yassin‘s successor). According to 
Tamimi, the Israeli Prime Minister wanted to be sure that when Israel would eventually 
withdraw from Gaza, Hamas would not be in a position to take over.
669
 Condemnation 
of the assassination was widespread amongst all political strata of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. Ayatollah Khamenei issued an announcement  
I was informed that the hands of the occupying Zionist regime have committed the 
abominable crime of shedding the blood of Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed 
Yassin. Certainly, martyrdom was what this pious man aspired but this cannot play down 
the gravity of the crime the criminal Zionist occupiers committed. The blood of Ahmed 
Yassin will feed the Islamic resistance and will further flare up the wrath of the 
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Palestinians. The spirit of Sheikh Yassin is alive and his thoughts will be a source of the 
inspiration for Palestinian youth.
670
 
On 19 June 2005, the Iranian Parliament amended Article 1 of the "Law to Support the 
Islamic revolution of Palestinian People". According to the amendment, the presiding 
board of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament) was now required to deepen 
and expand its support for Palestine and – in due course – convene a conference of 
representatives of Islamic countries and other experts to that effect.
671
 The amended 
article stated that a permanent secretariat of international Palestinian conferences would 
be established, with the aim of convening these conferences and following up the 
suggestions of the Islamic Consultative Assembly regarding Palestine.
672
 The aim of 
this amendment was to intensify and further institutionalise Iran‘s support for 
Palestinian movements such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.  
Hamas Government: A new Page in Iran's Relations with the Islamic Resistance 
Movement 
Israel began the withdrawal of its armed forces from Gaza on 15 August 2005, 
and by 12 September 2005 it had completed this task. After 38 years, the occupation of 
Gaza had ended. Led by Hamas, the people of Gaza celebrated and attributed the 
victory to the defeat of Israel's superior military might. Tamimi argues that the failure 
of repeated peace negotiations – whether the Oslo Accords, Bush‘s Road Map, or 
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Sharon's disengagement policy – vindicated Hamas‘ approach.
673
 On 26 January 2006 
Hamas gained a landslide victory in Gaza‘s legislative elections. Running under the 
name ‗Change and Reform‘, Hamas won 74 seats in a 132 seat chamber (56 % of the 
seats), with Fatah coming in at second place with 45 (34%).
674
After Hamas won its first 
democratic election to the legislative, Ismail Haniyeh announced a new government in 
March 2006. Hamas‘ electoral victory came as an unpleasant surprise for Israel, the 
United States, and Fatah.
675
 US President George Bush refused to recognise the Hamas-
led government until it satisfied three demands: that Hamas recognised Israel, disarmed 
and renounced violence, and that it accepted all previous agreements between the PLO 
and Israel.
676
 Tamimi claims that Fatah's leadership put pressure on its members not to 
join the Hamas unity government, and insisted on Hamas accepting all pre-conditions 
laid down by the United States if they wish for Fatah to join their cabinet.
677
 The Fatah 
leadership in essence formed a parallel government to that of Hamas, maintaining 
policies diametrically opposed to those of Hamas.
678
 The most painful measures taken 
against Hamas were economic sanctions imposed by the United States and the 
European Union (EU). A freeze on aid from the United States and the EU was followed 
by the blockade of the delivery of money to the government. Fatah‘s leadership 
encouraged protests, escalating its opposition into acts of sabotage and armed clashes 
with Israel‘s security apparatuses.
679
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A poll conducted by the Mustaqbal Research Centre in early May 2006 revealed 
that almost 84% of the Palestinians in Gaza opposed the idea that the Hamas-led 
government should bow to the demands of the United States, EU and Israel.
680
 While 
the conflict between Hamas and Fatah continued for many weeks, Israel fired shells 
into Gaza allegedly taking pre-emptive measures against Palestinian rocket attacks. 
Subsequently, Israel invaded Gaza on 24 June, and kidnapped two members of 
Hamas.
681
 It is safe to say that Israel intervened in the Hamas-Fatah conflict in order to 
support Fatah and undermine Hamas‘s democratically elected government due to the 
ideological stance of the latter against Israel. Tamimi argues that there was little doubt 
that the Israelis sought to accomplish what their allies in Fatah had not been able to do. 
However, the world‘s attention soon diverted away from Gaza towards south Lebanon, 
as Hizbullah conducted what Tamimi believes was an operation aimed at supporting 
Gaza.
682
 During this operation, Hizbullah carried out rocket attacks and for the first 
time hit the port city of Haifa. 
Throughout this period, Iran continued to offer its political and financial 
backing to the newly established government of Hamas, not least in order to safeguard 
―access‖ to Israel as a means to securie its own security. On 8 December 2006, the 
Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh told thousands of Friday prayer worshippers 
at Tehran University in Iran that "[w]e will never recognise the usurper Zionist 
government and will continue our jihad-like movement until the liberation of 
Jerusalem". He also stated that "they (Israelis) assume the Palestinian nation is alone. 
This is an illusion [...] We have a strategic depth in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This 
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country (Iran) is our powerful, dynamic and stable depth".
683
 Following an international 
economic boycott, which plunged the Occupied Territories into economic crisis in late 
2006, Iran provided the Palestinian government with $120m (£61.2m) of aid.
684
 
Although talks on unity government with Fatah failed to achieve its goals in late 2006, 
Hamas appeared increasingly confident that its government could stay afloat without 
Western aid, mainly due to the help it received from countries such as Iran.
685
 In an 
interview, Hussein Royvaran, Director of the Society for the Defence of Palestinian 
Nation and former High Representative of Iran's Political Bureau in south Lebanon 
explained Iran's relations with Hamas: 
Fathi Shiqaqi absorbed Iran's revolutionary message of resistance against global 
arrogance. Following the establishment of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Palestinian 
Muslim Brotherhood, that was mainly focusing on social activities, changed its name to 
Hamas. To some extent, Hamas followed the model of active resistance from the Islamic 
revolution in Iran although it mainly has its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood. Since its 
very beginning the Islamic Republic offered its moral and political support to Hamas. 
When Hamas won the election and maintained its hegemony in Gaza in 2006, Iran's 
relations with Hamas improved considerably. The Islamic Republic recognised that 
Hamas has considerable support in the occupied territories and welcomed its electoral 
triumph. The victory of Hamas demonstrated that the Palestinian public endorsed the 
narrative of resistance and rejected the discourse of compromise and failed negotiations. 
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Royvaran also argued that the messages of the Islamic revolution of Iran was echoed by 
Hizbullah for the Lebanese and Palestinian publics:  
Hizbullah translated the Islamic revolution of Iran into a narrative that was easy and 
accessible for the local Palestinians to absorb. When Hizbullah demonstrated its military 
capability in the1980s, Palestinians championed the first intifada. When Hizbullah 
continued its resistance and gained victories, the Palestinians conducted the al-Aqsa 
intifada. When Hizbullah used martyrdom operations, it spread to Palestine. When 
Hizbullah began using short ranged rockets against Israel, Palestinian Islamic movements 
followed the same tactics and fought back against Israel. When Hizbullah entered the 
political process in Lebanon and demonstrated its willingness to be a part of the 
government, Hamas entered the general elections and institutionalised its presence within 
the government. Hence, this shows that the Islamic Republic has been influential in 
supporting the Palestinian resistance movements through Hizbullah.
687
 
The electoral victory of Hamas was important for Iran because it allowed Tehran to 
upgrade its relations with Hamas to government-to-government level. According to 
Abdullah Karami, Iran's political, moral and financial support for Hamas ensured that 
the West and the United States in particular would continue to label Iran as a supporter 
of ‗international terrorism‘. He argues that the Islamic Republic of Iran faced enormous 
pressure from the West to stop supporting Hamas and the Palestinian resistance 
movements. However, Hamas electoral victory exhibited to the Iranians and the Arab 
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streets that Iran was on the right side of history.
688
 Karami is certainly correct to 
identify that Hamas‘ electoral victory legitimised the group‘s discourse of resistance, 
and demonstrated that Iran supported a movement endorsed by the people of Palestine. 
In other words, the people of Palestine endorsed the discourse of resistance against 
Israel.
689
 Karami argues that the electoral victories of Hamas and Hizbullah, and the fall 




Rostami-Povey similarly argues that Iran's relations with Hizbullah, Hamas and 
the Iraqi and Syrian governments comprise a strong bloc of resistance against US and 
Israeli policies in the region.
691
 From her point of view, this support, together with 
grassroots' support for Iran's policies against the US and Israel, put Iran in a strong 
position to defend itself against possible attacks from these two countries. Hamas also 
benefited from Iran's support. It is also important to acknowledge that for the Islamic 
Republic, the Syrian government remained a vital element in the camp against Israel 
due to its supports for Hizbullah and Palestinian Islamic movements. I shall return to 
this topic in the next chapter as I analyse Iran's relations with Hamas after the Arab-
spring.  
Israel’s War on Gaza (2008–2009) and Iran’s Reaction 
Since the 2006 elections, Israel increased its systematic military campaign 
against the Hamas-led government and targeted Gaza routinely. One of the major 
military assaults on Gaza before the Arab Spring – known as the Gaza massacre – took 
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place between 27 December to 18 January 2009.
692
1,400 Palestinians were killed, and 
more than 400,000 Gazans were left without running water. Furthermore, 4,000 homes 
were destroyed or badly damaged, leaving tens of thousands of people homeless.
693
 In 
response to Israel‘s attacks on the Palestinians during the Gaza war in 2009, 
Hizbullah‘s supporters conducted three attacks on Israel from south Lebanon.
694
 The 
2009 war on Gaza is known in Iran as Jang-e 22 roozeh: the 22-Day War of Resistance. 
Iran strongly condemned the killings in Gaza, and criticised conservative Arab states 
for their inaction. Iran‘s Supreme Leader, in a letter to Ismail Haniyeh on 15 January 
2009, stated: 
Dear mujahid brother, Mr Haniyeh, we salute you for your patience. The patience that 
you and the brave and selfless people and mujahids of Gaza showed during the past 
twenty days in the face of one of the most tragic war crimes in history has raised the flag 
of grandeur in the Muslim world […] Today, not only Muslim nations, but many 
European and American nations sincerely acknowledge your righteousness[ …] 
Remember that ―Your Lord has not forsaken you, nor is He displeased‖ [the Holy Quran, 
93:3] […] the bloody and tragic events which are happening in Gaza, especially the 
killing of Palestinian civilians and the innocent children of Gaza, have caused our hearts 
to bleed […] The nations of the world support the people and mujahids of Gaza and 
those governments that do not support the people of Gaza only widen the rift between 
themselves and their people and their destiny is already clear […] I salute you and those 
that fight in Gaza, as well as your oppressed and resisting people. Besides all efforts 
                                                 




made by the Islamic Republic of Iran to support you, we pray for you day and night and 
we ask all the Exalted to bestow patience and victory on you.
695
 
In response to Israel‘s assault on Gaza in 2009, Iran organised the fourth International 
Conference in Support of Palestine from 4-5 March 2009 in Tehran, and named Gaza as 
the ‗symbol of resistance‘.
696
 The conference organisers issued a formal declaration. 
The participants agreed on 27 articles in support of the Palestinian people, and a 
declaration at the Conference condemned Israel‘s ―war crimes‖ against the people of 
Gaza. The Conference announced that the Palestinian issue was the most far-reaching 
issue the Islamic ummah faced, and on this basis all Muslims, Arabs and freedom-
loving individuals of the world had a duty to prioritise the issue and refrain from taking 
courses of action that could potentially damage the Palestinian cause.
697
 Crucially, the 
conference recognised Israel as ―a racist regime‖ and strongly condemned its brutal 
treatment of the Palestinians.
698
 The Gaza war in 2009 was defined by the declaration 
as genocide against the people of Gaza, and it called upon the entire Muslim ummah to 
unify in supporting the people of Palestine.
699
 The Conference organised a committee to 
follow up on the actions contained in the declaration. The conference in Tehran also 
called upon this committee to organise a series of annual political, cultural and 
promotional events and activities that would help facilitate conditions for the return of 
all Palestinian refugees.
700
 The Conference was important for giving publicity to the 
Gaza war, and in the process drew attention to the crisis in Gaza. The Conference 
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received considerable media attention within Iran and the region. More than 700 
delegates – including representatives from Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hizbullah – were 
in attendance.  
Following the Gaza war, the Islamic Assembly of Iran unanimously ratified an 
Act that established 18 January as ―Gaza Day‖ in the official calendar of the Islamic 
Republic.
701
 In the following year, the Islamic Assembly approved a law amending the 
Act of Supporting the Islamic revolution of Palestine, which had been ratified in 1990. 
According to the amendment, Iran‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was now obliged to 
present the case for sanctioning goods from the Zionist regime at world forums and 
international conferences, such as the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Moreover, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Broadcasting (IRIB) was prohibited from airing advertisements for any goods 
manufactured by Israel according to a list submitted by a specialist committee.
702
 
Finally, we should return briefly to Iran‘s main ally, Hizbullah, and its 
connection to the Palestinians. With regard to the relations between Hizbullah and 
Muslim movements such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Laleh Khalili provides a 
comprehensive account. Khalili accurately classifies Hizbullah‘s relationship with the 
Palestinians as a ―relation of solidarity‖.
703
 From Khalili's point of view, the extent and 
intensity of Hizbullah's support vis-à-vis the Palestinians has as much to do with 
solidarity on the basis of shared aspirations and ideologies as it does with finely-tuned 
politics (whether these politics are Hizbullah‘s relations with local Palestinian political 
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actors, Lebanese politics, or with Islamist and anti-imperialist mobilisation).
704
 Khalili 
argues that Hizbullah has, on the basis of ideological considerations, but also out of a 
genuine sense of identification, acted in solidarity with various Palestinian actors.
705
 
She adds that it would be analytically reductive and politically naive to conceive that, in 
its relationship with the Palestinians, ideological commitment and human sympathy are 
not affected by shifts in Hizbullah‘s role nationally, regionally, and beyond.
706
 To this 
end, Khalili examines factors that place limits on Hizbullah–Palestinian solidarity, and 
emphasises that such factors which ‗limit‘ solidarity demonstrate that ideological 
solidarity can be affected, but not completely extinguished. In other words, solidarity 
and shared aspirations provide guidance for actors to shape their relations: "identities, 
interests, and strategies of two actors in solidarity must be sufficiently compatible as to 
allow action in concert".
707
  
Let me conclude this chapter by returning to the theoretical framework of my 
discussion. Khalili's account of Hizbullah's relations with the Palestinians provides a 
reliable prescription for my analysis of Iran's relations with Palestinian Islamic factions. 
From my point of view the above discussion is compatible with Alexander Wendt‘s and 
Michael Barnett‘s identity arguments. As outlined at the beginning of this thesis, Wendt 
argues that actors shape their actions according to their beliefs and interests. From 
Wendt's point of view, identities refer to who or what actors are, and interests refer to 
what actors want. In other words, without interests, identities have no motivational 
force, and without identities, interests are directionless. In this formula, identities 
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belong to the belief side of the intentional equation (desire + belief = action).
708
 Wendt 
also argues that the most important structure in which interests are made of is ideas and 
not material forces. Ideas are what determine meaning and the content of power, the 
strategies by which states pursue their interests, and interests themselves.
709
 Wendt also 
highlights the vitality of "collective identity", or the sense of being part of a group or 
collective. He argues that collective interests mean that actors consider the welfare of 
the group entity an end in itself. When the cultural content of this group entity is 
threatened, actors will tend to defend it. Here I believe that the narrative of ―Islamic 
resistance‖ provides a ―we narrative‖ for the Iranian leadership, and for Palestinian 
Islamic movements, in particular Islamic Jihad. Their shared aspirations and ideological 
tendencies guide the Islamic Republic to continue supporting Palestinian actors. In this 
regard, Barnett provides a clear pattern for formation of alliances. Barnett specifically 
highlights the importance of identities and ideological solidarity in the formation of 
alliances. In short, he argues that identity potentially signals whom to balance against, 
and whom to bandwagon with.
710
 He adds that there is close connection between 
identity and threat, contending that identity is linked to the construction of the threat, 
but also represents a potential source of alliance formation. In this latter regard, identity 
makes some partners more attractive than the others
711
 In the context of this thesis, it is 
shared Islamic values with a radical content, anti-Zionist tendencies and common 
Islamist identities that are the foundation of Iran's alliance with the Palestinian Islamic 
movements. In the following chapter, I examine Iran's solidarity with the Palestinians 
against the background of the Syrian crisis, and will highlight some factors that have 
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acted as spoilers in Iran's relations with Hamas, not least in order to balance the 
analysis presented in this chapter.  
232 
Chapter Five 
Iran and Palestinian Islamic Movements in the post-Arab Spring Era  
At the tail end of 2010, widespread protests broke out in a number of Arab 
countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain and Yemen. These waves of unrest 
were referred to as the ‗Arab Spring‘, and subsequently spread into Syria, resulting in 
an enormous humanitarian catastrophe. The uprising in Syria against President Bashar 
al-Assad swiftly developed towards a mixture of civil war, armed clashes, and street 
protests. This chapter examines the impacts of the Syrian crisis on Iran's relations with 
Palestinian Islamic movements, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad. It is vital to note 
that this chapter will not explore the modus operandi of Iranian military involvement in 
Syria, which is beyond the scope of this discussion. Furthermore, regional 
developments such the Iranian nuclear negotiations and sectarian tensions in the region 
likewise are not the topic of this chapter. By examining the relationship between Iran 
and Hamas and Islamic Jihad during the Syrian conflict, I hope to contribute to our 
understanding of what motivates Iran's approach toward the Palestinian cause. To this 
end, I will highlight Iran's political behaviour during the Gaza-wars in 2012 and in 
2014 as an empirical case study. I believe that these wars after the Arab Spring acted as 
a litmus test for Iran's solidarity with the Palestinians. Drawing on the basis of 
fieldwork in Iran and formal interviews with representatives of Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad, as well as Iranian officials, and the analysis of the speeches of Iranian high 
profile authorities, I argue that Iran continues supporting the Palestinian Islamic 
movements. I argue that Iran perceives its relations with Hamas as both strategic and 
tactical, while it views its relations with Islamic Jihad as more ideological. However, 
within the framework of its pro-Palestinian stance, the revolutionary rhetoric changed 
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to something more pragmatic specially during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami 
and Hassan Rouhani because for the reformers and their ambition to open up Iran‘s 
international relations it was not condusive to be radical about the issue of Palestine.  
Iran and Syria: A History of Alliances, and the Champions of the Axis of Resistance 
As the crisis in Syria divided the population itself, it also dragged regional 
players into a pool of disagreements. A number of regional states including Turkey, 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia joined the United States and EU in demanding that Bashar al-
Assad stand down, and likewise  supported anti-government forces in Syria. Despite 
growing pressures within the region, Iran and Hizbullah stood behind their Syrian ally. 
One of the most important implications of this divide between those opposing and 
supporting Assad‘s government concerned Iran's relations with Palestinian Islamic 
movements. Both Iran and Hizbullah were caught off guard when their Palestinian ally, 
Hamas, joined the anti-Syrian coalition and turned its back on Damascus. Yet before 
discussing the impact of the Syrian crisis on Iran's relations with Hamas, allow me first 
to shed a light on the essence of Iran‘s historical alliance with Syria's Assad, and then 
evaluate the approaches of Iran and Hamas towards the Syrian conflict.  
Nadia von Maltzhan provides a comprehensive historical account of the roots of 
Iran's alliance with Syria. Maltzhan argues that during the first decade of the revolution, 
Iran's change of strategy towards Israel and its commitment to the Palestinian cause and 
anti Zionism naturally brought it ideologically closer to Syria. Both countries shared 
not only an antagonism towards Zionism, but also an anti-imperialist ideology 
primarily directed against US foreign policy in the region.
712
 During Iraq's invasion of 
Iran, Hafez al-Assad made the regionally unpopular decision of siding with Iran. 
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Damascus portrayed Iran as a "committed force in the general struggle against 
Israel".
713
 Strategically, it viewed its support for Iran against Saddam as a way for the 
Muslim world to concentrate all its forces against combatting "Zionism and 
Imperialism".
714
 Syria's Assad remained a loyal ally and supporter of Iran throughout 
the 1980s. For instance, in November 1981 and September 1982, during the Arab 
Summits in Fez, Syria could not be persuaded to drop its support for Tehran.
715
 Assad 
continued to condemn Saddam's war as the wrong war against the wrong enemy. To 
fight Iran was a folly, as it would inevitably exhaust the Arabs, fragment their ranks and 
divert them from "the holy battle in Palestine".
716
 
Iran's strategic alliance with Syria was further cemented in the Lebanese 
political arena. In the aftermath of Israel‘s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Iran strongly 
declared its support for Lebanon and dispatched military consultants to the Syrian 
border with Damascus‘ consent. With Syria‘s blessing, Iran played a leading role in the 
creation of Hizbullah in south Lebanon, and both Iran and Syria played key roles in 
reconciling Shia factions in Lebanon. With the initial goal of ending Israel‘s invasion, 
Hizbullah developed as a Shia resistance movement, remaining ideologically, 
spiritually and financially supported by Iran.
717
 For its part, Damascus used its alliance 
with Iran to mobilise support against the Israeli military presence in Lebanon.
718
 In 
other words, there have been mutual interests and shared values between Tehran and 
Damascus in containing Israel and empowering anti-Israeli forces.  
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After Khomeini‘s death, the Iranian-Syrian alliance remained strong and 
developed further as both sides cooperated in the region. In the aftermath of Iraq‘s 
invasion of Kuwait, Hafez al-Assad visited President Rafsanjani in Tehran, where both 
leaders announced the creation of a Syrian-Iranian Higher Cooperation Committee in 
November 1990, jointly condemned Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, and rejected foreign 
intervention in the region.
719
 Both Palestine and Lebanon were at the core of Iran's 
alliance with Syria, as both states opposed Israel. In 1991, following arbitration from 
Washington, Syria agreed to join peace negotiations with Tel Aviv which ended with 
little success. Although the Islamic Republic declared its opposition to negotiations 
with Israel, Syria‘s participation did not undermine its relations with Tehran. Although 
Washington pushed Assad to turn away from Iran in return for peace and financial 
supports, Damascus sustained its relations with Iran. According to von Maltzhan, "US 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher tried hard to persuade Assad to distance himself 
from Iran and sign a peace treaty with Israel, but in the end it all came to nothing".
720
 
President George Bush‘s invasion of Iraq in 2003 brought Iran and Syria even closer as 
both states opposed foreign interventions in the region. After the invasion, US attempts 
at breaking the Iranian-Syrian alliance backfired and brought the two allies towards 
each other even closer.
721
 Under Ahmadinejad's presidency, Tehran's relations with 
Damascus grew stronger, and Ahmadinejad's strong support of the resistance against 
Israel was viewed positively in Syria by its government and people, turning him into a 
popular figure in Damascus.
722
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Mutual support for Hizbullah and Palestinian resistance movements 
strengthened Iran-Syria ties. Iran in particular used ―good relations with Syria to further 
support anti-Israeli resistance, using the frequent trips to Damascus of its high officials 
to meet also with Hamas leader Khaled Mashal.".
723
 The Islamic Republic of Iran's  
policies towards Palestine and Lebanon were mainly conducted through its embassy in 
Damascus. In other words, Damascus became a platform for Iran's anti-Zionist 
activities in the Levant. Von Maltzhan is of the opinion that fostering solidarity 
amongst resistance groups remains one of the priorities of the Islamic Republic – an 
issue repeatedly highlighted during bilateral visits in Syria.
724
 In other words, Syria 
played a major role as a bridge between Iran and  Palestinian resistance movements and 
Hizbullah.  
During Israel's ground-assault on Gaza in January 2009, Saeed Jalili – a senior 
member of Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) – travelled to Damascus 
to visit Hamas‘ political leaders (including Khaled Mashal) and Islamic Jihad leader 
Ramadan Abdullah. During his visit, Jalili emphasised Iran's strong support for the 
Palestinian resistance movements and condemned Israel for its assaults on Gaza.
725
 On 
7 January 2009, Ali Larijani, speaker of Iran's Parliament, met several high level 
officials from Hamas at the Iranian embassy in Damascus, including Khaled Mashal, as 
well as leaders of Islamic Jihad, to discuss the situation in Gaza, and offered Iran's 
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strong support. According to Khaled al-Hariri,
726
 Iran and Syria played key roles as the 
primary backers of Hamas, and Syria hosted members of Hamas's exiled leadership, 
including Khaled Mashal, in Damascus.
727
 During a visit to Damascus in late 2010, 
Deputy Secretary of the SNSC Ali Baqeri referred to Iran and Syria as "strong pillars of 
resistance in the region".
728
 In Damascus, Syrian and Iranian officials accused the 
Americans of attempting to dominate the region and promoting instability. During his 
visit in 2010, Ahmadinejad stated that "the Americans want to dominate the region but 
they feel Iran and Syria are preventing that".
729
 He added, "[w]e tell them that instead 
of interfering in the region's affairs to pack their things and leave. If the Zionist entity 
wants to repeats its past errors, its death will be inevitable."
730
 In October 2010, 
Ahmadinejad awarded the Grand National Order of the Islamic Republic of Iran to 
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for his support for Palestine and Lebanon.
731
 
Hussein Ajorloo has delved into Iran's perception of Assad. He argues that Iran 
views the Syrian government as a crucial element within the ‗Axis of Resistance‘ due 
to its history of anti-Zionist activities and support for Lebanese and Palestinian 
movements. Ajorloo believes that Syria occupies a crucial place within the Islamic 
Republic of Iran's foreign policy for five reasons. First, Syria has been one the closest 
strategic allies of Iran in the region. Second, Iran and Syria foster common values based 
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on common discourses of anti-Zionism and anti-imperialism. Third, Syria is 
geopolitically important in the region due to it sharing borders with Israel, and hence, 
Syria allows Iran to contain and limit Israel's expansion closely from its borders. Forth, 
Syria has a vital role in maintaining the political equilibrium in Lebanon, which is 
valuable for the Islamic Republic's leadership. Fifth and finally, Syria has historically 
played a key role in supporting the Palestinian cause with "no compromise".
732
 In other 
words, in order to preserve its identity and national interests, Syria has played a 
considerable role in providing logistical and intelligence support for anti-Israeli factions 
in the region. Organically, it became a close ally to Israel's archenemy, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.
733
 Von Maltzhan also makes a point that opposition to Israel's 
occupation of Palestine is one of the cornerstones of the Syrian regime's foreign policy. 
According to her, "the issue of Palestine is certainly is a point of convergence in official 
Syrian and Iranian values and outlook, both sees themselves as part of resistance front- 
the Axis of Resistance".
734
 She furthermore argues that whilst Syria's pan-Arab secular 
ideas are at odds with Iran's pan-Islamic ideology, both states share anti-Zionist and 
anti-imperialist views, which facilitate their close alignment.
735
 
What is central to my reading of Iran's foreign policy behaviour towards Syria is 
that both regimes pursue the unifying discourse of anti-imperialism and resistance 
against Israeli occupation. It is necessary to gain an even deeper understanding of the 
roots of Iran's alignment with Syria before evaluating the impact of the Syrian uprising 
on Tehran's relations with Palestinian factions, particularly Hamas. The point I wish to 
underline is that it was against such background of anti-Zionism that the Iranian 
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leadership pursued a supportive policy towards the Syrian regime, and backed 
Damascus during the Syria crisis. 
Political Turbulence within the Axis of Resistance: the Syrian uprising 
In October 2010, shortly before the beginning of the Syrian uprising, in a 
meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Ayatollah Khamenei commented on 
the stability and continuous good relations between Iran and Syria over the previous 30 
years. The Leader of the Islamic revolution reiterated: "[t]here are no two other 
countries in the region that have enjoyed such firm and excellent bilateral relations for 
thirty years‖.
736
Ayatollah Khamenei further stated that "America is the main opponent 
of the axis of resistance in the region
737
".  Referring to the efforts by US officials to 
break this resistance, he commented that their  ―efforts [would] not achieve any results, 
just as they did not in the past‖.
738
 In that meeting, Assad stressed that ―Syria and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran are in the same camp and have the same goals‖.
739
 It is vital to 
recognise that throughout three decades of alliance with Syria, the Iranian leadership 
has routinely emphasised the two states‘ common values against a common enemy. 
With this in mind, Iran‘s leadership were cautious prior to the Arab- spring about plots 
by the United States and Israel to weaken the ‗Axis of resistance‘, and thus undermine 
the Iran-Syria alliance.  
In March 2011, the turbulent waves of Arab uprisings hit Syrian shores and 
spread throughout the country, jeopardising the very existence of the Syrian state. The 
trajectory of the Syrian uprising swiftly turned towards violence and factional 
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militancy, dragging in regional and global actors. From the very beginning of the 
Syrian uprising, the Islamic Republic of Iran cautiously navigated regional and 
international approaches towards the Syrian crisis. From Tehran's point of view, the 
Western and pro-Western states supporting  anti-Assad forces were an indication of a 
‗Zionist plan‘ masterminded by the Americans to eliminate the Syrian government 
because of its anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist stance.
740
  
According to von Maltzhan, Iran initially ignored the growing tensions in Syria, 
but nevertheless stood by it and supported the Syrian regime's reform initiatives, 
stressing the need for a political solution to the crisis.
741
 Criticising the United States 
and conservative Arab states (including Saudi Arabia) for supporting anti-Assad forces, 
Iran from the very beginning of the Syria crisis pledged its support for the Assad 
government. The Syrian crisis however presented a direct threat to Iran's grand-
strategic ideas of anti-Zionism and pro-Palestinian and pro-Resistance movements. In 
other words, one may safely argue that the collapse of the Syrian regime weakens Iran 
and Hizbullah's standing against their ideological enemy, Israel. The Iranian leadership 
is convinced that the fall of Assad's regime would incite hardliners in Tel Aviv to 
conduct military operations against Hizbullah and the resistance in Gaza, and 
subsequently damage the ‗Axis of Resistance‘ tangibly.
742
 The support for Syria was 
therefore aimed at sustaining the pro-Palestinian, pro-Hizbullah and anti-Israeli camps, 
and maintaining Iran's foothold in the Levant. In an interview, Mohammad 
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Amaanollah-zad, a high ranking official in the IRGC and a member of the Society for 
the Defence of the Palestinian Nation, stated 
[t]he Islamic Republic's support for the Axis of Resistance is based on its Ummah-centric 
approach. We decided to support the Syrian government not to salvage Bashar al-Assad 
as an individual, but to sustain and save the anti-Zionism factions in the region. Of 
course, supporting the Syrian government and resistance movements also serve our 
national interests. Our national interests are defined by our revolutionary and theological 
ideas. To this end we need to be in the position to lead the Islamic Ummah against global 
arrogance of Zionists and Imperialists. In doing so, we are obviously paying heavy costs 
as our efforts are labelled as sectarian-driven policies. We are accused by the 
conservative states and the West of interfering in the internal affairs of Syria and 
Palestine and Lebanon. However, we continue our efforts to help anti-Zionist forces in 
order to end the occupation of al-Aqsa. We shall support anyone that act in this direction. 
History proves to us that Syria's Assad constructively supported anti-Zionism in the 
region. We witnessed how Americans and pro-American regimes in the region began 
arming and supporting Takfiri-Salafi groups such as Al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front 
and the ISIS, hence, we have no doubt that the Zionists are attempting to undermine and 
to neutralise the Axis of Resistance. Therefore, we act according to our grand strategy of 
anti-Zionism and act accordingly to undermine their plans. We cannot simply sit and 
witness how Zionists are destroying the Axis of Resistance and expanding their 
hegemony in the region.
743 
 
Despite the fact that Tehran was engaged in heated debates over the Syrian crisis in 
2011, the Islamic Republic scheduled the Fifth International Conference for Supporting 
the Palestinian Intifada for 1-2 October 2011 in Tehran. The main motto of "Palestine: 
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the Homeland of Palestinians" was chosen for the fifth Conference.
744
 Parliamentary 
representatives of over 170 states joined the Conference after receiving invitations from 
the Islamic Shura Council of Iran. Both Khaled Mashal and Ramadan Abdullah Shalah, 
along with Ismail Haniyeh (the Prime Minister of the Hamas-led government), 
Mahmoud al-Zahar (a high ranking official from Hamas), and Nasrullah, were amongst 
the participants at the conference. Khaled Mashal delivered a speech in which he asked 
if the Palestinians would continue to seek recognition from the UN without making 
efforts to liberate the Occupied Territories.
745
 He stated ―[t]he Arab‘s abandonment 
years ago to the military option and wagering on what is so called peace without any 
point of strength require resistance, so does the failing of any settlement process and the 
International Community, as well as the American efforts for negotiations call for 
resistance.‖
746
 These were efforts by Iran to position itself prominently during a time of 
serious upheaval and to capitalise on its support of Palestine to that end.  
Some of Khamenei‘s comments at the inauguration of the Fifth Conference of 
Intifada shed light on the Iranian leadership‘s proposed solutions for the Palestinian 
predicament, and also demonstrates Iran's intention to bring all anti-Zionist factions 
under a unified frontline of the so called ―Axis of Resistance.‖ He stated  
[a]mong all the issues that deserve to be discussed by religious and political figures from 
across the world of Islam, the issue of Palestine enjoys special importance. Palestine is 
the primary issue among all common issues of Islamic countries. This issue has unique 
characteristics. The first characteristic is that a Muslim country has been taken away 
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from its people and entrusted to foreigners who have come together from different 
countries and formed a fake and mosaic-like society. The second characteristic is that 
this historically unprecedented event has been accompanied by constant killings, crimes, 
oppression and humiliation. The third characteristic is that Muslims' original qiblah and 
many respected religious centres which exist in that country have been threatened with 
destruction, sacrilege and decline. The fourth characteristic is that at the most sensitive 
spot of the world of Islam, this fake government and society has played the role of a 
military, security and political base for the arrogant governments since the beginning up 
until today.  
And the pivot of the colonialist west - which has been opposed to the unity, development 
and progress of Islamic countries for various reasons - has always used it like a dagger in 
the heart of the Islamic Ummah. The fifth characteristic is that Zionism - which is a great 
ethical, political and economic threat to the human community - has used this foothold as 
a tool and stepping stone to spread its influence and hegemony in the world [...] Our 
magnanimous Imam Khomeini announced that one of the goals of the Revolution was to 
liberate Palestine and to remove the cancerous tumour, Israel. The powerful waves of this 
Revolution, which engulfed the entire world at that time, conveyed this message 
wherever it reached: "Palestine must be liberated". Even the repeated and great problems 
that the enemies of the Revolution imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran failed to 
discourage the Islamic Republic from defending Palestine.  
The solution of the Islamic Republic to the issue of Palestine and this old wound is a 
clear....We propose a referendum among the Palestinian people. Just like any other 
nation, the Palestinian nation has the right to determine its own destiny and to elect its 
own government. All the original people of Palestine - including Muslims, Christians and 
Jews and not foreign immigrants - should take part in a general and orderly referendum 
[...] What is threatening the Zionist regime is not the missiles of Iran or resistance 
groups, so they can build a missile shield here and there in order to confront it. The real 
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and inescapable threat is the firm determination of men, women and youth in Islamic 
countries who do not want America, Europe and their puppets rulers, to dominate and 
humiliate them any longer .747  
Ayatollah Khamenei's speech is important because it explains how the Islamic Republic 
continued to highlight the importance of the Palestinian cause during the Arab Spring 
era, as the Palestinian question received less attention in the Arab world. In other 
words, the Fifth Intifada Conference was a political and social attempt to remind 
Muslim and the Arab worlds not to marginalise the Palestinian issue due to heated 
debates over the Arab Spring and internal disagreements. This has been central to the 
strategy to claim regional leadership and to position Iran as a strong regional power at a 
time of upheaval.  
 
Iran, Hamas and Islamic Jihad: a Crossroad Approach to the Syrian Crisis  
As the Syrian crisis prolonged, the political leadership of Hamas moved from 
Syria to Egypt and Qatar in February 2012, with Khaled Mashal and his aides moving 
to Doha and Ismail Haniya announcing his support for the anti-Assad uprising.
748
 Since 
1999, the Syrian government had welcomed and hosted the Hamas political bureau 
after the Jordanian authorities accused the group of using the country as a base for 
illegal activities, and briefly detained Khaled Mashal and a key aide.
749
 Hamas 
leadership had been provided with a safe haven, and enjoyed the luxury of receiving 
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financial and logistical support in Damascus from the Syrian government, Iran and 
Hizbullah.  
Iran and its allies were caught off guard when Hamas moved its offices from 
Syria, and endorsed the anti-Assad's forces. Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic's 
authorities avoided any direct criticism of Hamas, and maintained its channel of 
communication. In an interview, Hussein Royvaran explained the situation in which 
Hamas‘ leadership decided to pursue a different approach towards its traditional ally, 
the Syrian government in 2012. He stated: 
[d]isagreement and differences between the Islamic Republic and Hamas began during 
the beginning of the Syrian Crisis. Iran believes that the Syrian Crisis was an American-
Zionist plot against the Axis of Resistance. In fact, Hamas felt nostalgic and therefore 
celebrated the victory of Mohammed Mursi in Egypt. Because the Syrian branch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood acted against the Syrian government, hence, Hamas decided to 
stand in the line of Muslim Brotherhood and moved its mission from Damascus. From 
the Hamas political leadership point of view, if the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and 
other Arab states could gain governmental positions as they did in Egypt, Hamas could 
forge its own close circle of alliance. The triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
region could bring about a new bloc in the region and therefore, Hamas could reduce its 
dependency on Iran.  
The common goal between the Axis of Resistance and Hamas is their anti-Zionist ideas 
whereas the common goal between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood is about the 
organisation's ideology. During the Syrian Crisis, Hamas political leaders prioritised their 
common goals with their fellow Muslim Brotherhood over their common goal with the 
Axis of Resistance. The Hamas political leadership calculated that standing against the 
Syrian government will also open doors within the Gulf States, especially the wealthy 
state of Qatar. However, it is vital to note that the members of the Hamas leadership did 
246 
not simply pursue such changes of policies homogeneously. In fact, Khaled Mashal's 
faction within the Hamas political bureau used its influence to persuade its leadership to 
change its tactics. However, the Islamic Republic of Iran prioritised its anti-Zionist ideas 
and stood with the Axis of Resistance. On the other hand, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
pursued a pragmatic and neutral stance and did not turn its back on its traditional allies. It 
is vital to say that it was the Hamas political leadership that turned its back on the Axis 
of Resistance and not the Islamic Republic. In fact, Iran did not cut its relations with 
Hamas and remained open to Hamas as before.
750
  
In relation to Hamas moving its political bureau to Doha from Damascus, Mohammad 
Zarei argues that Khaled Mashal‘s decision was linked to his negotiations with the emir 
of Qatar in September 2011. According to Zarei, Khaled Mashal influenced Hamas‘ 
political bureau to tilt towards Qatar and benefit from Doha's financial and political 
support.
751
 According to Mehdi Lazar, the emirate of Qatar became aware of the unique 
opportunity that the Arab Spring presented in redistributing power across the region. He 
argues that Doha realised that the political climate of the Arab Spring would not last, 
and that it therefore attempted to gain as much political clout as possible through 
supporting the Muslim Brotherhood in the region, and its offshoot in Palestine in 
particular, in order to expand its influence.
752
 Hamas‘ leader Khaled Mashal lived in 
Qatar in the early 2000s, and resided there continuously after leaving Damascus in 
early 2012. In February 2012, Doha promised $250 million to Hamas – a sum that 
increased to $400 million. Lazar makes a valid point that Qatar's policy towards Hamas 
is mainly designed to counter Iran's increasing influence in the region. Iran still 
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maintained strong influence over Lebanese and Palestinian resistance movements, 
particularly since Syria‘s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005. Since Hamas political 
leadership left Damascus to Doha in 2012, Qatar seized an opportunity to separate Iran 
from Gaza by strengthening ties with Hamas. From Lazar‘s point of view, Qatar's 
policy towards Gaza should be viewed through the wider prism of Doha's regional 
policy, namely to strengthen the power of Sunnis in the Middle East and to counter 
Iran's foreign policy.
753
 The same policy is also implemented in Syria, where Qatar 
backs the insurgency against Assad, the key ally of Iran, from the very beginning of the 
Syrian uprising. According to Lazar, there is an added layer to Qatar‘s attempts at 
separating Hamas from Iran‘s point of view that goes beyond ideology. According to 
him, Qatar and Iran share the world's largest deposit of non-associated gas that lies 
between the waters of the two countries. Qatar's close relations with the United States, 
and the presence of a major American military base in al-Udeid (the largest outside of 
US soil), in addition to the political situation in Gaza after the Syrian crisis, all help 
Qatar to protract its ‗Sunni-policy‘ and isolate the Islamic Republic.
754
  
In October 2012, the Emir of Qatar paid a surprise visit to Gaza, and pledged 
$400m in investment in Gaza's infrastructure. Travelling to Gaza through Egypt under 
the Muslim Brotherhood government, the Emir seemed to confirm that "Qatar is the 
principal supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood‘s take over in Egypt and elsewhere".
755
 
One can argue that "Qatar was using the Muslim Brotherhood to replace Iran as the 
major player in the Palestinian issue".
756
 The emir's visit to Gaza in 2012 was seen in 
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part by the observers in the region as a "reward to Hamas for ending its support to 
Assad".
757
 Qatar had opposed Assad since the beginning of the Syrian uprising, aiming 




On the other side of the Palestinian political spectrum, Islamic Jihad maintained 
its position within the Axis of Resistance. Following the eruption of the Syria crisis, the 
Islamic Jihad's leadership refused to cut relations with Damascus and maintained its 
neutrality. In January 2012, Ramadan Abdullah and his delegation visited Ayatollah 
Khamenei in Tehran. During the meeting, Khamenei referred to conditions in Syria, 
stating: ― [r]egarding Syria, if the developments are considered from a broad and 
comprehensive perspective, it becomes completely clear what plot America has designed for 
Syria and unfortunately certain countries inside and outside the region are cooperating with 
America in this plot.‖
759
 The Supreme Leader added that "if the Syrian government 
promises the Americans that it will stop supporting the Islamic resistance of Palestinian and 
Lebanese groups, all issues will come to an end. Supporting resistance groups is the only 
crime that Syria has committed‖.
760
 He reiterated: "[t]he position of the Islamic Republic 
regarding Syria is to support any kind of reforms that would benefit the Syrian people and to 
oppose the interference of America and its followers in the internal affairs of Syria
761
". In 
the meeting, Ramadan Abdullah clarified the position of Islamic Jihad, stating that the 
"Islamic Awakening and the regional developments are a very valuable opportunity for 
Muslim nations, particularly for the people of Palestine, and everybody should watch out for 
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the enemies' efforts to cause sedition". He also referred specifically to developments in 
Syria, and expressed that "Westerners are trying to take Syria - which is a base for resistance 
in the region - away from the camp of resistance.‖
762
Ramadan Abdullah's meeting with 
Khamenei in early 2012 was important as both sides were able to underline the importance 
of their alliance during an especially turbulent period of time. Ayatollah Khamenei's 
discussion with Ramadan Abdullah was aimed at appealing directly to the Palestinian 
streets, and at explaining the Islamic Republic's rationale for supporting the Syrian 
government. Ramadan Abdullah's statement in Tehran likewise was aimed at assuring the 
Iranian leadership that Islamic Jihad would remain an important pillar of the so called Axis 
of Resistance. In an interview, Nasser Abu-Sharif, the high representative of Islamic Jihad 
who had accompanied Ramadan Abdullah during the 2012 meeting, stated  
[w]e in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad understood Iran's concerns over the Syrian Crisis. 
Our only priority is to liberate the land of Palestine and to this end we value Iran's anti-
Zionism ideology and its historical pro-Palestinian stance. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
rejects and denounces sectarian discourse within the Islamic Ummah. We also believe 
that Takfiri extremists' activities in Syria were not serving our interests as they pursue 
divisive policies within the Ummah. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad's leadership values the 




Although the Hamas leadership pursued a different path from Iran and its allies 
in Syria, Tehran nevertheless maintained the channel of communication with it. On 10 
February 2012, Ismail Haniyeh arrived in Tehran for an official visit, and was received 
by high ranking officials of the Iranian government, including the Supreme Leader and 
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the President. In a meeting with Ismail Haniyeh, Iran's Vice president Mohamad-Reza 
Rahimi described Iran‘s support for the Palestinian nation as a ―lofty aspiration‖ 
pursued since the victory of the 1979 Islamic revolution, noting that the Iranian nation 
was still committed to this ideal. Rahimi highlighted that Iran‘s backing of ‗oppressed 
peoples‘ around the world, especially those of the Palestinian nation, and opposition to 
the Zionist regime, all formed a dominant ideological principle of the Islamic Republic. 
Haniyeh for his part expressed "Iran has stood beside the Palestinian nation since the 
victory of the 1979 Islamic revolution and we have witnessed the Iranian nation's 
strong support for the oppressed Palestinians."
764
 In a symbolic gesture, during a rally 
to mark the 33rd anniversary of the Islamic revolution at Azadi (Liberty) Square in 
Tehran in February 2012, Haniyeh stood beside Ahmadinejad. Addressing the crowd, 
Haniyeh congratulated the Iranian nation and government on the occasion of the 33rd 
anniversary of the victory of the Islamic revolution and said that "Iranians play a role in 
constructing a bright future for the Palestinians".
765
 Khaled al-Qadoumi, High 
Representative of Hamas and who had accompanied Haniyeh in Tehran, described the 
moment as follows: 
[o]n the eve of commemoration of the Islamic revolution in 2012, Ismail Haniyeh stood 
in Azadi Square and delivered a speech to the Iranian audience who were cherishing the 
Palestinian struggle and were praying for the liberation of Palestine and al-Aqsa. He flew 
over the large crowd beside the Iranian president and saw a brave nation that was 
gathering to welcome him.
766
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Despite disagreements over the Syria crisis, Iran maintained its connections with 
Hamas‘ leadership through Hamas representatives in Tehran during 2012. At the NAM 
Summit, held in Tehran in August 2012, Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbass announced 
that they both received and accepted invitations from Iran. However, President Abbas – 
leader of Fatah –threatened to boycott the summit if Hamas were in attendance. 
Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad al-Malki proclaimed that "President Abbas will not 
take part in the Non-Aligned summit if Ismail Haniyeh is present, no matter what form 
his attendance takes."
767
 The Iranian authorities later made following statement; ‖Up to 
now, no official invitation from the Islamic Republic of Iran and the person of President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been sent to Hamas‘ popular Prime Minister Ismail 
Haniyeh.‖
768
Hamas later announced that its political bureau received an invitation from 
the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and Mahmoud al-Zahar and Marwan Issa 
from al-Qassam brigades visited Iran.
769 
 
The 2012 Gaza War: Iran, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad  
On 14 November 2012, the Israeli army launched a massive military offensive 
in Gaza. The operation, dubbed ‗Pillar of Defence‘, lasted 8 days, and began after the 
assassination of Ahmad al-Jabari, Chief Commander of Hamas‘ military wing (al-
Qassam Brigade), in a missile strike in Gaza city.
770
 Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood 
president, Mohammad Morsi, was reported to have pressured Hamas to agree to a 
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 During the operation, the Israeli army bombarded Gaza indiscriminately, 
and its targets included civilian buildings and governmental institutions. In response, 
Palestinian Islamic movements launched rocket attacks against the Israeli heartland 
with Fajr-5 missiles. Its targets included Tel Aviv.
772
 After eight days of war which 
destroyed Gaza's civilian infrastructure, a ceasefire was successfully mediated by 
Egypt's Morsi and US authorities on 21 November 2012.  
The most important implication of the Gaza war was the impact of Iran's 
support for Palestinian Islamic movements on their military performance. During the 
eight days of resistance, the Palestinian Islamic movements demonstrated their ability 
to strike back  against Israel. During the conflict, Palestinians utilised a rocket – the 
Fajr-5, developed by Iran and supplied to Hizbullah – with a range of up to 75 km, 
which allowed them to strike Israel‘s capital.
 773
 In an interview with Al-Alam, Ziad 
Nakhleh, Deputy Leader of Islamic Jihad, stated  
[t]hanks to our generous brothers in Iran, we have Fajr 3 and Fajr 5 missiles. Our Iranian 
brothers helped us to obtain these missiles. Iranian technology helped us considerably to 
change the equilibrium of power. For the first time we were able to strike back and we 
proved to the Israelis that we can target their towns the way they target ours. The 
Palestinian resistance forced the Israelis to accept a ceasefire. We continue our resistance 
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despite intense pressure from the world powers. No one could dream that we can return 
the enemy's fire and target Israel's heartland.
774
 
Major General Mohammad Jafari, head of the IRGC, confirmed in November 2012 that 
Iran supplied military assistance to Hamas and to other resistance movements in Gaza, 
including technology needed to manufacture long-range Fajr-5 rockets. Jafari stated 
that "Gaza is under siege, so we cannot help them. The Fajr-5 missiles have not been 
shipped from Iran. Its technology has been transferred and (the missiles are) being 
produced quickly."
775
 He clarified the ideological reasoning for Iran supplying 
technology of manufacturing rockets to Hamas: ―[w]e offer all Muslims technological 
aid to help them stand up against arrogant powers and we offer to give them our 
experiences to defend their people‖.
776
 The Iranian commander added that "Iran 




Iran‘s Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani echoed Iran's concern and support for 
the Palestinians during the Gaza war. In November 2012, Larijani called for immediate 
international and regional action to support the people of Gaza. To this end, Larijani 
liaised with the parliamentary speakers of other Islamic countries, including Iraq, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon and Syria and Jordan, as well as the 
Secretary-General of the Inter-Parliamentary Union Anders Johnson, about Israel‘s 
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ongoing war on Gaza, urging unified action to help the people of Gaza.
778
 Addressing 
MPs, Larijani expressed solidarity with the people of Gaza, stating ―Iran is proud of 
defending the Palestinian people and will continue to help Palestine at difficult times 
[…] We are proud that our assistance was material and military in 
nature.‖
779
Addressing the Arab countries, the Iranian Majlis speaker stated, ―The 




Without claiming credit for providing missile technology to the resistance 
movements, Ayatollah Khamenei praised the Palestinians for their resistance during 
eight days of war:  
[a]n 8-day war broke out between the people of Gaza and the Zionist regime which 
claims to have the strongest army in the region [...] Would anybody have believed ten 
years ago that one day there would be a war between the Palestinians - not all 
Palestinians, a group of them in Gaza - and the Zionist regime and it would be the 
Palestinians who set conditions for a ceasefire? Well done to the Palestinians. Well done! 
Well done to Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the soldiers who fought in Palestine and Gaza 
for their outstanding courage. What they did is a perfect example of courage. I want to 
express my gratitude to the Palestinian soldiers for their sacrifices, their efforts and their 
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Such sentiments towards the Gaza war in 2012 were not limited to the government 
however, and the Shia Marajii also made separate statements aimed at the Iranian 
public. Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi delivered a statement praising the Muslim fighters 
for defending the defenceless people of Gaza during eight days of war. In his statement, 
he castigated the conservative regimes of Saudi Arabia and Qatar and praised Iran for 
supporting Gaza with weaponry, and emphasised that the Islamic Republic of Iran was 
honoured to be the main supporter of the Palestinians during their darkest days, and 
would continue its duty to support the Palestinian people.
782
 This was obvious 
propagance to buttress Iran‘s claim to regional leadership at a time of increasing 
escalation of the Saudi-Iranian Cold War. Palestine, as I have repeatedly stated, was 
also a Trojan Horse for Iran‘s strategic preferences and national interests.  
On the other side of the spectrum, one of the most notable implications of Gaza 
war in 2012 was the reaction within Gaza towards Iranian support. According to Nidal 
al-Mughrabi, Gazans offered very public thanks to Iran for helping them fight against 
Israel on 27 November 2012, as Iranian-manufactured rockets were fired out of the 
Palestinian enclaves towards Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.
783
 Large billboards on three 
major road junctions in the Gaza Strip bore the message "Thank you Iran" in Arabic, 
English, Hebrew and Farsi. The posters also depicted the Iranian Fajr-5 rockets. It was 
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the first time that there has been such public admission of Iran's role in the arming of 
the Islamic fighters in the territory.
784
 Khader Habib, a senior official in Islamic Jihad, 
stated that it was "natural to show gratitude for Iran's role in the conflict".
785
 He told the 
Reuters that "Iranian rockets struck at Tel Aviv, they reached out to Jerusalem. 
Therefore it was our duty to thank those who helped our people".
786
 He added that "We 
have distinctive, good relations with Iran and such a relationship will continue as long 
as Iran supports the Palestinian people and backs up the resistance".
787
 
Asmaa al-Ghoul highlights some other reactions in Gaza among Islamic 
movements who benefitted from Iran's support. According to her, Daud Shihab (media 
spokesman for Islamic Jihad) did not conceal that Iran is the movement's major 
supporter. He acknowledged that "[a]ll of the weapons in Gaza are provided by Iran, be 
they weapons intended for the Hamas movement or for the PIJ. Perhaps Hamas even 
has more Iranian weapons than us; and everyone knows that Iran is financing us.‖ 
Shihab states that ―the PIJ is a resistance movement, and while there are many parties 
in the Arab and Muslim world offering support for the resistance, the largest share of 
this financial and military support is coming from Iran.‖
788
Shihab downplays 
allegations concerning Islamic Jihad‘s inclinations towards Shi‘ism, and that it acts 
according to Iranian guidance. Specifically, he highlights Islamic Jihad‘s neutrality on 
Syria as an example of the group‘s independence from Iran. Shihab states that the 
pivotal element that defines Islamic Jihad's relationship with various states is the extent 
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to which these states are close to the Palestinian cause. Hence, Iran supports the 
Palestinian people and the resistance, and is not ashamed of this support, but 
nonetheless confronts a lot of pressure because of it. Therefore, he adds, the 
relationship between Iran and Islamic Jihad is solid and strong.
789
 
The Fall of Muslim Brotherhood Government in Egypt, and Hamas' dilemma 
After the Muslim Brotherhood came to dominate the government in Egypt, 
Hamas‘ political bureau under Khaled Mashal saw an opportunity to break its regional 
isolation. As I suggested, Hamas political leadership began to prioritise its ideological 
ties with the circle of Muslim Brotherhood in the region and distance itself from Iran 
over the Syria crisis. Under Mashal, Hamas‘ political leadership hoped that a new 
alliance under the umbrella of the Muslim Brotherhood could provide Hamas with 
more power to achieve its goals. However, on 3 July 2013, Morsi's Muslim 
Brotherhood was toppled and replaced with a government dominated by the military. 
Henceforth, General Fatah al-Sisi, the new head of government in Egypt, put pressure 
on Hamas by isolating it economically and politically in an effort to purge the country 
of the Muslim Brotherhood. Due to its own differences with the Muslim Brotherhood, 
Saudi Arabia supported al-Sisi's government, which put Hamas under further regional 
pressure. Shortly after Morsi was toppled, the Egyptian army destroyed many of the 
smuggling tunnels that ran under the Egypt-Gaza border, which had provided the 
cramped coastal enclave with commercial goods as well as weaponry, damaging Gaza's 
fragile economy in the process.
790
 Losing its strong base in Syria after moving its 
offices from Damascus, and having caused disagreements with its traditional ally, Iran, 
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Hamas seemed more isolated than ever. Shortly after the removal of Morsi, the 
campaign against Gaza‘s tunnels caused Hamas to be unable to cover its payroll in 
Gaza. Hamas was reportedly hit by a downturn in its relations with its main backer Iran, 
which had previously provided the organisation with arms and funds estimated at $250 
million dollars a year.
791
 The situation in Egypt, and Hamas‘ isolation, caused Hamas 
leadership to reconsider its approach towards its allies Iran, Hizbullah and Syria. 
Hence, the discourse of ‗Islamic solidarity‘ reappeared.  
In October 2013, the Deputy Chief of Hamas Musa Abu-Marzouk stated that 
"Khaled Mashal was wrong to have raised the flag of the Syrian revolution on his 
historic return to Gaza at the end of last year."792 Nasrin Akhtar argues that Abu-
Marzouk's statement suggested a conspicuous change of policy for Hamas. According 
to her, "coming as it did in the wake of a reconciliation agreement with Hezbollah in 
July 2013 at a meeting hosted at the residence of the Iranian ambassador to Beirut, the 
first visit by a Hamas representative there in some two years, Hamas appears to be 
reaching out to its erstwhile resistance allies".793 In an additional blow, Hamas‘ close 
connection with Qatar was also dented during the summer of 2013. The Emir of Qatar, 
who visited Gaza and promised millions of dollars in donations, abdicated in June 
2013, and "his heir has shown much less interest in Hamas.794 
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With regard to Hamas‘ perception of its foreign policies, Hussein Royvaran 
explained to me that 
Hamas is the biggest Islamic Movement in Palestine and it has a complex structure and 
therefore it is not a homogenous movement. Hamas leadership's decision to turn its back 
on its traditional allies was not a homogenous decision based on an absolute consensus. 
There are different trends within Hamas. Khaled Mashal's trend is more pro-Qatari and 
intent to tilt towards the Sunni-conservative Arab states, Muslim Brotherhood and even 
Turkey's Erdogan who has pro-Muslim Brotherhood tendencies. However, some 
prominent figures within the movement like Emad al-Elmi and Mahmoud al-Zahar and 
more importantly, al-Qassam brigade are closer towards Iran's Axis of Resistance. It 
seems that Hamas‘ political bureau succeeded in persuading the Hamas leadership to 
move from Damascus and publically support the anti-Assad forces. However, the 
military-backed coup against Mohammed Mursi and increasing economic and political 
hardship and the subsequent isolation of Hamas in late 2013 inspired the other factions 
within Hamas to voice their disagreement with Khaled Mashal and to try to reconcile 
with their traditional allies, particularly with Iran.
795
  
Due to the factors mentioned above, Hamas aimed to repair its ties with its allies, and 
particularly with Iran. According to Mohammad Zarei, during the second half of 2013, 
Hamas demonstrated its willingness to return to the Axis of Resistance. After the Gaza 
war 2012 and the fall of Morsi in Egypt, Hamas witnessed internal disagreements over 
its regional policies. He argues that the pro-Iranian trend within Hamas actively lobbied 
within the movement to repair its political ties with Iran, and that such attempts 
highlight their commitment to maintaining resistance as the most effective option for 
the liberation of Palestine. To this end, pro-Iranian members liaised with Iranian and 
Hizbullah officials to restore ties. Throughout the rapprochement, relations between 
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Iran and the Islamic Jihad remained as strong as before, although Islamic Jihad‘s 
headquarters did move to Lebanon due to security reasons. Between 2012 and 2013, 
Islamic Jihad continued to receive aid from Iran, which it distributed amongst 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.
796
  
Gaza War of 2014 – A Litmus Test for Iran's Commitment to the Palestinian Cause  
In July 2014, Gaza was heavily bombarded by the Israeli Defence Force, and an 
intensive military campaign ensued. Israel‘s aim was to eliminate the Palestinian 
Islamic movements‘ fire-power. After 10 days of indiscriminate aerial bombing, Israel 
launched a ground campaign on 17 July 2014 supported by gunboats, fighter jets and 
tanks. It was reported that the Israeli assault on Gaza was triggered by the killing of 
three Israeli citizens in the West Bank in June 2014.
797
 While the details of the Gaza 
War in 2014 and the scale of devastations on the ground, as well as the rationale behind 
the Israeli invasion of Gaza, are beyond the scope of this discussion, Iran‘s reaction 
towards Israel‘s actions are worthy of attention. Specifically, it is important to examine 
the solidarity expressed by Iran and Iranians during the 51 days of the devastating war. 
Throughout the conflict, Iran demonstrated that its pro-Palestinian values had remained 
intact since the 1979 Islamic revolution. It is vital to note that the war on Gaza 
coincided with a period in which  Iran was engaged in a series of marathon negotiations 
with the world powers over its nuclear programme. Tehran was also at the time 
supporting the Syrian regime, and still faced disagreements with Hamas‘ political 
bureau over the Syria crisis. Throughout the following paragraphs, I will look into both 
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Iran's government and non-governmental actors' behaviour towards the Gaza War in 
order to inform my argument that the country‘s support to the Palestine cause has been 
largely consistent.   
One of the most notable pro-Palestinian reactions in Iran came from the 
pragmatist President Hassan Rouhani, elected in August 2013. Rouhani assumed office 
due to two main election promises: de-escalating tensions with the West over the 
nuclear dossier, and conducting economic and political reforms within the government. 
Shortly after the Israeli invasion of Gaza, on 12 July 2014, Rouhani commissioned 
Mohammad Javad Zarif Iran's (Foreign Minister) to concentrate all of NAM‘s activities 
towards condemning Israel's "inhuman acts in the Gaza strip".
798
 Rouhani stressed to 
Iran's FM the necessity of taking care of Gaza‘s residents, especially those wounded 
during the attacks. As head of the NAM, Iran requested that the UN Security Council 
heed its responsibilities towards the oppressed Palestinians.
799
 On 12 July 2014, 
Rouhani issued a declaration as the head of NAM which strongly condemned Israel's 
military assault on Gaza. Rouhani concluded the declaration by stating 
I, as the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the rotating head of the Non 
Aligned Movement [NAM], while seriously condemning the systematic, illegal, and 
inhumane crimes against the Palestinians, ask the entire concerned regional and 
international bodies to heed their legal responsibilities immediately, in line with 
immediate and full lifting of the Gaza siege and in forwarding of humanitarian aids for 
the Palestinian people, as well as blocking the path for more aggressive acts and the 
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greater massacre of the oppressed Palestinian people through adoption of an effective 
legal and international mechanism to pursue and put to trail the criminal Zionists.
800
 
In July 2014, Rouhani issued a letter calling on heads of Muslim states to do their 
utmost in support of an immediate end of the blockade in the Gaza Strip, adding that 
―[h]elping the oppressed Palestinian people and preventing the aggressive acts of the 
Zionist regime are the shared responsibility of all international institutions and the 
world‘s freedom-seeking countries‖.
801
At the cabinet session on 20 July 2014, Rouhani 
expressed outrage at the "Zionist-regime‘s crimes against humanity in Gaza", further 
stating that the "Iranian government and foreign ministry will draw attention of the 
international community to what is going on in Gaza".
802
 Rouhani dismissed Israel‘s 
attempted justifications for the massacre of Palestinians, and accused Israeli leaders of 
ethnic cleansing in Gaza. He castigated the global community for its silence and stated: 
"[g]lobal reactions unfortunately reveal that the western governments and many Arab 
and Muslim governments have kept silent toward the crimes or their reactions fall short 
of the extent of the catastrophe underway in Gaza Strip."
803
 
 On 23 July 2014, Hussein Dehghani, Ambassador and Charge d‘Affaires of 
Iran to the UN, delivered a statement before the meeting of ambassadors of the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation to the UN. The statement reads 
[t]he Iranian people, like other peace-loving people all around the world, are shocked by 
the savagery committed by the Occupying Zionist regime against the innocent 
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Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in the besieged Gaza 
Strip." In line with the Islamic precious values of brotherhood among Muslims, unity of 
the Islamic Ummah and supporting the oppressed, the Islamic Republic of Iran is ready 
and appeals to all Members of the OIC and the OIC institutions, to extend their moral 
and humanitarian support to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during this difficult time [...] 
Like always I would like to reiterate that the Islamic Republic of Iran is and will remain 
by its Palestinian brothers and sisters in pursuit of their aspirations for their land, 
freedom, justice and dignity.
804
 
In a public message to a gathering of Iranian children in Tehran (a public show of 
solidarity dubbed "Gaza children and Iranian Children") Rouhani expressed that "[i]t is 
not only human being [sic] which is killed in Gaza, but it is the humanity [sic] as a 
value being victimized".
805
 Rouhani appealed to western governments to support the 
oppressed people of Palestine, despite any interests they had in maintaining an alliance 
with Israel. He stated "[b]ombardment of schools and killing of children in Gaza is a 
clear example of genocide in the world today."
806
 Rouhani was amongst tens of 
thousands of Iranians attending the Quds Day demonstrations in July 2014 in Tehran, 
showing his government‘s solidarity with the people of Gaza. During the 
demonstrations, Rouhani stated that "those who have kept silent in the face of these 
crimes are and will be ashamed and history will judge them. Innocent people and 
children are being killed, and they – Western countries – either keep silent or support 
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 Following Rouhani's recommendations, Zarif called on the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate Israel‘s actions during the 2014 Gaza 
War 2014, and prosecute it. He stated "Israel has committed serious crimes in Gaza 
which need to be prosecuted by an international court."
808
 On the condition of 
anonymity, one employee of Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained to me that 
[t]he atrocities of Israel in Gaza in 2014 coincided with the negotiations over the nuclear 
issue with the world powers. Although Mr Rouhani's focus was on solving the nuclear 
dossier and the removal of imposed sanctions, but, he and Mr Zarif did not neglect the 
people of Gaza. Since the atrocities began in Gaza, we were commissioned to speed up 
our activities and to liaise with other countries through our diplomatic missions and to do 
all we can diplomatically to help the people of Gaza, I personally expected Rouhani's 
administration to prioritise the removal of sanctions than the war in Gaza, but, it seemed 
that helping Gaza was as important as the Nuclear issue for Rouhani's administration. I 
was worried that shifting all diplomatic efforts to Gaza War could have had negative 
impacts on the removal of the sanctions at such critical moment. However, it was clear 
that although Rouhani was using a more diplomatic language than his predecessor, but 
his administration effectively demonstrated its uncompromising commitment towards the 
Palestinian cause.
809
   
Both conservatives and reformists factions within the Iranian Parliament unanimously 
voiced their strong support for the people of Gaza. During the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union troika meeting of the OIC in Tehran on 24 July 2014, Ali Larijani particularly 
praised Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hizbullah for their resistance against Israel. Larijani 
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called on the OIC Inter-Parliamentary Union to use its power to support the Palestinian 
people and requested that the Egyptian government open the Rafah border crossing for 
the passage of humanitarian and medical aid to the people of Gaza.
810
 Despite the 
differences between Iran and Hamas over the Syria crisis, Larijani voiced Iran‘s full 
support for the ―oppressed Palestinian nation's righteous struggle for the liberation of 
their homeland" in a phone call with Khaled Mashal in July 2014.
811
 The speaker of 
Iran‘s Parliament also confirmed that Iran had liaised with the Egyptian government 
and requested that it permit the Iranian Red Crescent to send humanitarian aid to Gaza 
through Egypt.
812
 President Rouhani commissioned the Iranian Red Crescent Society 
(IRCS) to harmonize with Palestinian and Egyptian Red Crescent societies in order to 
deliver Iranian medical aid, medical equipment, physicians, as well as relief and rescue 
workers through the Rafah Passage to Palestinians in Gaza. Rouhani also 
commissioned Zarif to announce Iran's readiness to treat injured Palestinians in Iranian 
hospitals, and to arrange for their safe transfer to Iran for the same purpose.
813
 
Nevertheless, Iranian officials received no resolute response from Egyptian authorities, 
and they instead attempted to send aid through the International Committee of Red 
Cross (ICRC). Zarif, however, remarked that "although the Egyptian foreign minister 
has promised twice that he will do his best in this regard and we hope to see results."
814
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Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei defined the Israeli war against the 
people of Gaza as "genocide". According to Arash Karami, despite their differences 
over the Syrian Civil War, Iran has worked to maintain close ties with Hamas.
 815
 
During the Eid al-Fitr address to Iranian government officials, Ayatollah Khamenei 
strongly criticised calls from Western nations to disarm Hamas. Khamenei stated that 
the 
president of America issued a fatwa that the resistance must be disarmed. Yes, it‘s clear; 
you want this [minimal] attack in response to all of these crimes not to happen. We say 
the opposite. The entire world, especially the Islamic world, has a 
responsibility: whatever it can do to equip the Palestinian people...Our clear message to 
Islamic governments is this: Let‘s help the oppressed rise and show that the Islamic 
world will not be calm in the face of oppression. To realize this goal, all Islamic 
governments, irrespective of their political and non-political differences, [must] 
accelerate help to the oppressed.
816
 
Following the examples of Khamenei, President Rouhani, and the Iranian 
Parliament, the the governmental agencies of the Islamic Republic rushed to voice their 
support as well. The commander of the IRGC, Major-General Mohammad Ali Jafari 
highlighted the readiness of his forces to continue supporting Palestinian resistance 
movements in their battle against Israel. He remarked ―[w]hen speaking about 
defending the Muslims, Shias and Sunnis are of no difference to us, and our devotion 
and dedication goes to the entire Muslim world and the oppressed‖. 
817 Praising the 
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resistance exhibited in Gaza during 51 days of war, General Jafari stated that "the Gaza 
war displayed that the power of the Resistance (front) has no end."818 Jafari 
commented that the number of rockets fired at Israel demonstrated that the power of 
resistance was growing tangibly. Defining the Palestinian cause as the backbone of 
Islamic unity, he stated that "the Zionist regime [of Israel] will collapse soon as a result 
of the unity among Shia and Sunni Muslims and we are ready for that day.‖
819
 More 
notably, support for the people of Gaza was echoed most vociferously within the 
volunteer sections of the IRGC: the Basij. Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza Naqdi, 
the Commander of the Basij, announced that there was no limit to Iran's humanitarian 
support for the people of Palestine. He announced that "the Iranian nation's aids to the 
Palestinian people recognizes no boundary and whatever they need, it will be included 
in our aid packages."
820
 High ranking Iranian officials underlined Iran's military support 
for Palestinian resistance movements too. Ex-Commander of the IRGC, and head of the 
Expediency Council, Mohsen Rezaei, announced that the resistance groups – including 
Hamas – now had the capability to make and launch rockets ―thanks to technology 
transfer from Iran.‖
821
 Rezaei emphasised that the transfer of defence know-how should 
be continued in order to enable the Palestinians to make weapons to defend themselves 
against Israel, and reiterated Iran's commitment to the Palestinians in their battle to 
liberate their homeland.
822
 In other words, the Gaza war overshadowed Iranian politics 
once again and facilitated a consensus amongst political factions within the regime. The 
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 and  Ayatollah Noori-Hamedani,
825 all issued individual statements 
supporting the people of Gaza and condemning Israel. They called on all Muslims to 
forge unity and put aside their differences in order to support the Palestinian nation. 
These clerics defined the commitment to the Palestinian cause as taklif [religious duty].    
Iranian Public Reaction to Gaza War  
It is vital to acknowledge that opponents of the conservatives in Iran equally 
voiced their support for the Palestinians during the Gaza war. According to one Al-
Monitor correspondent, the Iranian political establishment was clearly shocked by the 
fact that the opposition had managed to completely take over the streets on Quds Day in 
2014.
826
 Although the political establishment attempted to accuse supporters of the 
Green Movement of being ignorant towards the Palestinian issue, many of its 
supporters responded with clear solidarity with the people of Gaza. Al-Monitor reported 
that Iranians posted thousands of pictures with hashtags in support of Palestinians on a 
daily basis on social media. Many showed their support for Gaza by publishing pictures 
of murdered men, women and children, along with a poem.
827
 On 24 July, members of 
a group known as ‗Iranian Mothers for Peace‘ – including the mother of an Iranian 
activist within Green Movement killed by the security forces in the aftermath of the 
                                                 
823
 For more information on Ayatollah Mazaheri's statement, see 
http://www.almazaheri.ir/farsi/Index.aspx?TabId=0003&ID=585 [Accessed 6 May 2016] 
824 
For more information on Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, see 
http://makarem.ir/main.aspx?typeinfo=4&lid=1&mid=326226&catid=0&start=1&PageIndex=0 [Accessed 6 
May 2016] 
825 
For more information on Ayatollah Noori-Hamedani statement, see 
http://www.noorihamedani.com/fa/news/view/1864/567 [Accessed 6 May 2016] 
826 
“Gaza demonstrations in Iran draw Reformists”, Al-Monitor, 3 August 2014, http://www.al-





2009 elections and subsequent protests – gathered outside the UN office in Tehran 
alongside other civil-rights activists and held up signs reading ―End the massacre in 
Gaza‖.
828
 On the same day, Khatami – though without access to government dominated 
media platforms – used his Twitter account to invite his followers to participate in Quds 
Day, and show their support for the Palestinians. Mohammad Khatami expressed that 
the ‗honourable‘ people of Iran always stood with the deprived Palestinian nation. 
Condemning Israel for its atrocities in Gaza, Khatami stated that "exhibiting support for 




Iran‘s Youth Cinema Society, alongside a number of artists, organized blood-
donation events for the children of Gaza in August 2014. The humanitarian movement 
was staged simultaneously on 2 August 2014 at different centres of Iran‘s Blood 
Transfusion Organization. 
830
 After donating blood, a large number of Iranian artists, 
actors, writers and directors wrote an open letter to the children of Gaza. Some 
sentences from the letter are worthy of attention, as they demonstrate the feeling of the 
Iranian public towards Palestine 
Greetings, people of Gaza, Children, Infants, Mothers in late pregnancy, Grandfathers, 
Grandmothers [...] We have heard it has been rainy over there, these last few days [...] 
Rain lets children shelter their dolls under their umbrellas. What rain is this that makes 
the dolls into umbrellas for children, entangled with them, in their graves? I saw a cat, 
roving in the rubble of Gaza, lost, lamenting, Avoiding the shreds of flesh, detritus of the 
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lives of the Children of Gaza. She recognizes the children who shared their meagre meals 
with her, in rainy days past. The lady of Gaza/Palestine: If the rain over Gaza gives you 
leave to carry your baby on your back out of the wreckage, do not forget to take along 
pen and paper. Write my lady; say: ―Rain gave me leave to leave [...] Lady 
Gaza/Palestine: We have heard that your neighbour yonder – the same one who came 
over in 1948; the same one with whom you shared your bread and water, The same 
neighbour of 1948 who bemoaned the horrors of Hitler‘s crematoria, The same 
neighbour who had told you your home is the cradle of the prophets, The same neighbour 
who had told you: Palestine is the land revelation, The same neighbour who had told 
you: are Muslims not famed for their hospitality? 
Lady, we have heard that your neighbour yonder now watches your slaughter from 
hilltops in jubilation, as if from the galleries on an amphitheatre [...] Lady 
Gaza/Palestine: You were hospitable to the unannounced guests of 1948 [...] Lady 
Gaza/Palestine: We are left on this shore, pen and camera in hand. We are left 
astonished: what is to be done? How do we come to pay homage to your prone body? 
Your shameless neighbour has blocked all of the paths to us — your guests [...] Lady 
Gaza/Palestine: We were thinking: now that bullets rain on you, Now that the deluge of 
blood has carried away your children, May be we can infuse life into your children‘s 
innocent bodies, from our own veins.
831
 
The Iranian Oscar-winning director Asghar Farhadi began a media campaign 
condemning the killing of the Palestinians, and posted a picture on his Facebook of 
himself holding a banner that read "stop killing your fellow human beings".
832
 More 
notably, Iran's legendary actor Izzatollah Entazami issued a statement which called on 
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the Iranian people to gather outside the UN Office in Tehran in solidarity with the 
people of Gaza. In his statement, Entezami stated that  
it is about a month since all this genocide began in Gaza that I can neither sleep, nor eat 
well, I cannot rest and I cannot calm down. I do not understand how one can see all these 
wounded children in Gaza and still sleep at night [...] I call on all my beloveds that their 
hearts beat for the sake of humanity and are disgusted by this genocide to join me in 
condemning the crimes of the Zionists.
833
 
Such statements assert the genuine solidarity of many Iranian people with the 
Palestinian nation. They also show a connection to the Islamic revolutionary ideas of 
supporting Mazloomin [suppressed] against Zalemin [suppressors], the same narratives 
that unified the Iranian nation during the Islamic revolution in 1979. This is not to say 
that that all Iranians are homogeneous in expressing sympathy with the Palestinians, 
and certainly some have criticised the Islamic Republic's approach towards the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In this regard, one MP with no affiliation to either 
conservatives or reformists, on the condition of anonymity, explained to me that 
Since I became an MP in 2012, I have noticed that when there is a discussion on Gaza 
and on the Palestinian cause, my fellow MPs have a strong consensus and become more 
Palestinian than the Palestinians. However, on other issues, they may have 
disagreements. I was astonished when I visited an Arab country for inter-parliamentary 
meetings that some fellow Arab MPs had no ideas about the historical depth of Iran's 
prop-Palestinian ideas. They were mainly discussing with me about Iran's supports 
towards the Shia communities in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. Ironically those who were 
asking me questions about sectarianism in Iran were from an Arab country that has 
relations with Israel. To me this was frustrating. I believe we should focus on our 
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economy and unemployment-rate and allow our Arab brothers to pay more attention to 
the Palestinian cause. We need to update ourselves with the global Market and solve our 
budget deficit. Although it is vital to mention that my colleagues in the Parliament do not 
agree with me on this case.
834 
  
Similarly, one taxi driver explained that 
Every year I see hundreds of thousands of people pour into the streets of Tehran for the 
Quds Day, bringing their children, carrying the Palestinian flags. Some of them have no 
affiliation with the regime including my brother in law. But, when we watch news, we 
hear some Arab states blame us for Shia-Sunni conflict and some [of them] even call us 
non-Muslims. Then we hear about Emirates and Saudi Arabia keep calling Iran to give 
up our islands in the Persian Gulf. We hear that Israel has embassies in some Arab 
countries. We see photos of this Emir or that Sheikh with the American president. We 
hear those Emirs and Kings enjoy seeing us not allowed trading our oil so they can sale 
theirs with higher price. We hear that our government relentlessly spends millions of 
dollars to help Hamas and other Palestinian groups. I have no doubt that the Israelis 
unjustly invaded the Palestinian lands. But, we should let the Arab regimes to deal with 
this and help the poor Palestinians too. We have been paying heavy costs because of our 
anti-Israeli and Anti-imperialist tendencies. Since the revolution, we are witnessing more 
and more sanctions every year. Where are those [Arab] regimes that were supporting 
Saddam during the war, to see the [Iranian] people in the streets, chanting; Down to 
Israel since the revolution? We do not even have borders with Israel but we are louder 
than all the Arab and Muslim states in voicing our support for the Palestinians. I 
remember my late mother was praying for the Palestinians when she was hearing news 
about them and she never had political agenda. It is because we believe we are Muslims 
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These countering opinions demonstrate the frustration amongst some Iranians with both 
the Islamic Republic's handling of internal affairs, and with ever-escalating regional 
conflicts. Both statements above imply disappointment with some Arab states for not 
acknowledging Iran‘s historic and genuine solidarity with the Palestinian nation. These 
opinions, however, continue to be marginal to the mainstream political discourse in 
Iran, both within civil society and certainly the state.  
The Gaza War and its Impact on Gaza's Islamic Factions' Perception of Iran 
One of the most tangible outcomes of the 2014 Gaza War was its impact on the 
Palestinian Islamic movements' relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran‘s 
support for the Palestinian resistance in Gaza after the Arab Spring once again 
demonstrated that it was a reliable ally for the Palestinian resistance movements. 
According to Hussein Royvaran, the strong resistance shown by Hamas during the 2014 
war consolidated its reputation in the eyes of Iran. Likewise, Royvaran argues that 
many prominent figures in Hamas also realised that Iran's military and political support 
were invaluable in the fight against Israel. Unwilling to lose their offices in Tehran, 
Hamas demonstrated a willingness to improve its ties with Iran by visiting Iranian 
officials in Tehran. To this end, Ramadan Abdullah played a central role in mediating 
between Tehran and Hamas. Royvaran sheds a light on Iran's approach towards the 
Palestinians and argues that Iran's support towards Hamas is "tactical", but that Iran's 
approach towards the Palestinian cause remains ideological and therefore 
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uncompromising. He states "the tactics are defined by the ideologies and therefore 
ideologies influence tactics". Royvaran explains 
For the Islamic Republic, supporting the Palestinian cause and the Ummah is about 
fulfilling taklif, it is like daily prayers for a Muslim, It cannot be terminated or 
abandoned because we feel not liking it. The Islamic Republic is aware that few elements 
within Hamas attempt to make political manoeuvres in region and to widen their 
networks of support from all regional players such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. 
Similar things happened in regards to our relations with PLO during the first decade of 
the Islamic revolution, but, the difference is that Hamas and its military wing are 
committed to the resistance. Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic never requires to be 
thanked for fulfilling its taklif. As the Quran says; We feed you only for the countenance 
of Allah .We wish not from you reward or gratitude [76:9] [...] The Islamic Republic 
supports any movements that is committed to the resistance against Zionism.
836
 
Since the end of the Gaza War in 2014, and at the time of writing, representatives of 
both Hamas and Islamic Jihad make routine visits to Tehran. Osama Hamdan, Director 
of Hamas, headquartered in Beirut during his visit to Tehran in February 2016, reiterated 
that the Islamic Republic of Iran had a role in terms of political, financial and direct support 
in all of Hamas‘ victories. In an interview with the Office of Iran's Supreme Leader, 
Hamdan acknowledged 25 years of Iranian support for Hamas and described Iranian 
support towards the Palestinian nation as valuable. Declining to explain the details of Iran's 
supports for Hamas, Hamdan stated  
I will say that any victory the resistance has gained, our Iranian brothers had a role in it... 
In the year 2014, the occupiers believe that the Islamic Republic was too busy with the 
events in the region and the Arabs distanced themselves from the Palestinian issue. 
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However the outcome shocked the enemies because missiles reached Tel Aviv and Haifa. 
They were traumatized by seeing the forces of resistance combat the occupiers on the 
front lines. As a precaution, we say it is difficult to talk about the details regarding Iran‘s 
support for the resistance [...] Iran is not one of those countries who would brag and 
boast about supporting the resistance; in fact Iran‘s support for the resistance is more a 
matter of faith and belief than a political one [...] In 2014, the world witnessed this 
support and its consequences in facing the enemy.
837
 
Similar to Hamas officials, the High representative of PLO and the Palestinian 
Ambassador to Tehran, Salah al-Zawawi, praised Iran for supporting the Palestinians 
during the Gaza War. He stated "I want to thank the Islamic Republic of Iran for 
providing us with training, financial support and weapons and also thank the country 
for its political and diplomatic stances on Palestine."
838
 Al-Zawawi explained to me that 
"since years of representing the Palestinian Authorities in Tehran, I feel I am at home 
here. Everywhere I go and when I say I am a Palestinian, the Iranian people show their 
genuine solidarity. I cannot express my gratitude towards the Iranian nation for their 
hospitality and support and solidarity."
839
 
It is worth noting that Iran's support for Palestinian cause also brought with it 
some political implications in Gaza, as some adherents of the Islamic revolution and 
followers of Shaqaqi established a relatively small group that emerged from Islamic 
Jihad. In May 2014, a new Muslim faction emerged in the north of Gaza which 
expressed strong ideological affiliation with the Islamic Republic of Iran. This new 
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movement was called Harakat al-Sabireen, Nasran li Filastin (Al-Sabireen Movement 
for Supporting Palestine (HESN). It was established by Hesham Salem, who was 
himself a leading member of Islamic Jihad.
840
 In an interview with Al-Monitor, Salem 
denied that his movement represented a split from Islamic Jihad, but nevertheless noted 
that his movement view Islamic Jihad‘s founder Fathi al-Shaqaqi as a father-figure and 
inspiration: ―[The movement] will preserve the embodiment of Shaqaqi‘s ideas without 
any changes.‖
841
 Salem denied accusations that his movement is Shia, and stated: "This 
is untrue. We have always believed in Islamic unity, and I see no reason to separate 
Sunnis and Shias.‖ On the similarity of his movement‘s banner with that of Hezbollah, 
he said: ―This is an unintended coincidence. All the banners of the Palestinian factions 
are similar in terms of their content and symbols.‖
842
 Salem rejected the discourse of 
sectarianism and denounced the prevalent beliefs in Palestinian society that Shias 
constitute an existential threat to Sunnis. Salem argues, ―I don‘t think that Shias don‘t 
like Sunnis. I am suspicious of that. The Shias are providing substantial assistance to 
the Sunnis, and an example of that is the historic Iranian support to Palestinian 
parties.‖
843
 The al-Sabireen movement has also publically expressed its gratitude 
towards the Iranian nation for its historical support towards the Palestinian cause. The 
emergence of al-Sabireen demonstrates that the Islamic revolution and its pro-
Palestinian discourse continues to attract the attention of the Palestinian fighters, many 
of whom are frustrated by the global inaction against Israel's ongoing wars. Such 
Palestinians are keen to continue their resistance against Israel. Just as the Islamic 
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revolution's message attracted Fathi Shaqaqi as a follower in 1979, it is still being 
received by those who believe in Shaqaqi's ideological discourse in spite of current 
sectarian divisions in the region. 
At the same time, Iran continues to consolidate its strong ties with Islamic Jihad. 
Islamic Jihad‘s leadership routinely visits Tehran, and its delegates are received warmly 
by high ranking authorities. In May 2016, Ramadan Abdullah and his accompanying 
delegation visited Tehran and met with the Supreme Leader. During the meeting, 
Ayatollah Khamenei highlighted that "supporting Palestine is an obligation Iran will 
fulfill."
844
 Thanking the Iranian authorities for their support, Ramadan Abdullah 
reiterated Islamic Jihad's commitment to resistance and clarified the position of Islamic 
Jihad towards regional developments  
Americans and the countries that follow them are after presenting an unreal image of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and of the Zionist regime – that has been consigned to an 
afterthought. They are also after disintegrating the region through provoking a war 
between Shia and Sunni. This is why pressures on Lebanese Hezbollah have increased, 
but Islamic Jihad of Palestine has insisted on supporting Hezbollah and resisting America 




Concluding this section, a conversation with Nasser Abu-Sharif – High Representative 
of Islamic Jihad – is worthy of attention. Abu Sharif sheds a light on the situation in 
Gaza, explaining that 
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there are a number of Salafi groups in Gaza and West Bank that are supported by some 
Arab states that follow their own political sectarian agenda. To this end they promote 
sectarian and anti-Iranian ideas. Before, they [Salafi groups] had little opportunities to 
promote their agenda in Palestine. However, since the eruption of the Syrian crisis, the 
Salafi groups gained a momentum to amplify their sectarian discourse against the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. Despite of all this propaganda, Iran is appreciated by many people in 
Palestine. The followers of the Islamic Jihad always appreciate Iran for its historical pro-
Palestinian stance. Such sectarian propaganda advocated by the Salafi groups will have 
no negative impacts on our relations with Iran. We are the followers of Fathi-Shiqaqi and 
we remember Iran‘s historical pro-Palestinian stance. 
846
  
Indeed, Israel's policies in Gaza have united Iran‘s political factions. All sides of the 
political spectrum in Iran have emphasised their uncompromising commitment to the 
Islamic revolutionary ideas, which encompass support for the Palestinians and 
opposition to Israel. The wars in Gaza in 2012 and 2014 acted as a litmus tests for Iran's 
revolutionary commitment towards the Palestinian cause. As I have argued in this 
chapter, the war in Gaza in 2014 occurred at the time that the Iranian regime and 
Hamas were deeply at odds over the Syrian crisis. At the time of writing, the Islamic 
Republic and Hamas have yet to reach a consensus over the Syrian conflict, and 
Tehran's disagreements with Riyadh and other Sunni Arab states such as Qatar are yet 
to be resolved in other areas (such as over Yemen and Lebanon). Nevertheless, Iran has 
maintained and sought to improve its relations with Palestinian Islamic factions, 
particularly Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.  
Many commentators would expect Iran to sever its ties with Hamas following 
the Arab Spring after the latter turned its back on its traditional allies (Iran and Syria). 
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However, Iranian society and government both unanimously voiced their support for 
Muslim resistance groups in Palestine during the Gaza war. During the Gaza War of 
2014, Iranians once again demonstrated their support for the people of Gaza. Although 
Iranians had been following the Iranian nuclear negotiations anxiously, the situation in 
Gaza during this conflict continued to be central to the discourse of the state, its 
ideational self-image and policies. Gaza is viewed in Iran as the symbol of ‗resistance 
against global arrogance‘. For the Iranian political establishment, the importance of the 
Palestinian cause largely transcends internal politics and external sectarian conflicts. If 
we return to the conceptual framework that  tried to sustain throughout the thesis, we 
may safely conclude that the Iranian regime continues to stick to its support to the 
Palestinian cause. The discussion in this chapter and throughout the thesis is therefore 
compatible with Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett's arguments concerning 
identity. Iran‘s reaction to the wars in Gaza after the Arab Spring proves that states 
shape their actions according to their beliefs and interests. It also proves that identity 
potentially signals whom to balance against, and whom to bandwagon with. I have 
suggested in this thesis that the Islamic Republic of Iran acted in solidarity with various 
Palestinian Islamic actors committed to resistance against Israel on the basis of 
ideological consideration or reasons of state as well as a genuine sense of identification 
with them. For this reason, it is likely that the Islamic Republic of Iran will continue to 
demonstrate strong solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Iran‘s commitment to 




The Trajectory of Iran's pro-Palestinian Stance  
Our politics is the same as our religion, and our religion is the same as our politics. 
Ayatollah Seyed Hassan Modarres (1870-1937) 
The subject of this study has been to give a history of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran's relations with Palestinian resistance groups, and the question of what drives 
Iran‘s support for the Palestinians. The history of Iran's relations with Palestine is, in 
turn, relevant to the broader methodological question concerning the best way of 
approaching the Palestinian cause in Iran's foreign policies after the Islamic revolution. 
The preceding chapters aimed at responding to these questions within a case study that 
covered sequential periods in the history of Iranian relations with Palestine. As the 
analyses in the preceding chapters shows, this study has offered a discursive 
interpretation of Iran‘s approach towards the Palestinian cause in the post-
Revolutionary era. To this end, the study – following from Alexander Wendt and 
Michael Barnett's emphasis on identity politics – treated state-identity as the cardinal 
framework for shaping strategic interests. In itemising the theoretical skeleton of this 
study, notions of Islamic and revolutionary solidarity, and religious and revolutionary 
values, were deployed and explored in order to better characterise the depth of the 
history of Iranian support for the Palestinian cause. I have shown that the strategic 
interests of the Islamic Republic are influenced by these values and ideas.    
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Chapter One analysed the discursive construction of Iran's pro-Palestinian ideas 
that were shaped and championed by revolutionary Iranians during the pre-
Revolutionary era. It was argued that decades prior to the triumph of the Islamic 
revolution, Iranian revolutionaries (including prominent left-wing activists) showed 
solidarity with the people of Palestine. It was also argued that Iranian revolutionaries 
reached an informal consensus on the necessity to support the Palestinian cause. The 
empirical evidence surveyed in this chapter demonstrated that prominent Iranian clerics 
were among the first figures to voice their strong support towards the Palestinians from 
the very beginning of the Occupation. The depth of the ideological commitment of 
Iranian revolutionaries towards the Palestinian cause is captured in Ayatollah 
Mottahari's expression of the duty of Shias with regard to the Palestinian question: 
What would the holy prophet do if he was alive today? [...] The problem that would fill 
Imam Hussein's heart with sorrow today is this [Palestine]  issue [... ] was Imam Hussein 
present today, he would say if you people would want to mourn for me today [...] your 
slogan must be Palestine [...] Shimr of 1300 years ago is dead, he is gone. Get to know 
your Shimr today [...] It is a shame to call ourselves Sh'as of Imam Ali. The same Ali 
when he heard that Muslims were attacked said; I swear by God I have heard the enemy 
has ravaged our fellow Muslim lands and murdered and imprisoned their men and 
violated their women [...] The same Ali to whom we offer our respect and obedience 
towards him says; if a Muslim hears these and dies out of sorrow, he is not to be blamed. 
Are they not Muslims? Don't they have loved ones? Who in the world today can deny the 
fact that Palestinians have rights to return home? [...] By God it is compulsory, just like 
our prayers, just like fasting, it is a compulsory infaq.
847
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Along with the primary research conduced for this research, chapter one 
attempted to demonstrate that the Iranian revolutionaries regarded the Palestinian cause 
as almost ‗sacrosanct‘. Support for Palestine and opposition to imperialism and Israel 
became a unifying principles which guided opposition to the Shah's pro-Western 
regime. The sacredness of such ideas was especially emphasised by the most prominent 
leaders of the revolution, including Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Taleqani and 
Ayatollah Mottahari. Calls to support the Palestinians were received warmly by many 
disfranchised Iranians due to their sense of Islamic solidarity, shared history of battling 
against colonialism and imperialism, as well as common religious values. 
Chapter Two covered the post-Revolutionary era under Ayatollah Khomeini and 
analysed the institutionalisation of these beliefs as indispensible mainstays of Iran‘s 
strategic preferences. Prior to the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini emphasised the dual, 
interlinked obligations to liberate Muslim states and Third-World countries from 
imperialism. After the revolution, one of the first moves of the new government in Iran 
was to institutionalise its anti-Zionist and pro-Palestinian discourse through replacing 
the Israeli mission in Tehran with a Palestinian embassy. Symbolically, the first part of 
Israeli territory ceded to the Palestinians was transferred during the heydays of the 
revolution in Tehran. Ayatollah Khomeini embarked upon the process of ‗Islamising‘ 
the Palestinian cause by symbolically declaring the last day of every Ramadan as Quds 
Day, and calling on Muslims around the world to exhibit solidarity. The pan-Islamic 
ideas of Khomeini reiterated that the Islamic regime had an obligation to protect 
Muslims wherever they resided, but particularly the people of Palestine against the state 
of Israel.  
Chapter Three demonstrated the importance of identity and the role of Iran's 
Islamic values in influencing the hearts and minds of Palestinian activists, with a main 
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focus on the founder of Islamic Jihad (Fathi Shiqaqi). It was suggested that Ayatollah 
Khomeini's definition of common Islamic values were warmly received by some 
Palestinian activists, and ultimately turned a new page in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Shiqaqi was ideologically motivated by the Islamic revolution in Iran, and his 
movement changed the course of the Palestinian struggle by re-activating the discourse 
of Jihad and armed resistance in the struggle against Israel. Up until this point, pan-
Arab ideas had monopolised the Palestinian political field. This chapter also 
emphasised that though ideologically inspired by the Islamic revolution in Iran, Islamic 
Jihad remains an independent movement. Subsequently, based on ideological solidarity, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran has re-formulated its alliances with the Palestinian factions 
and found natural allies in Palestine amongst Islamic movements, particularly after its 
disagreements with the PLO. This chapter further supported Michael Barnett's 
argument that identity represents a potential source of alliance formation.
848
   
Chapters Four and Five provided a comprehensive account of Iran's relations 
with Hamas since it was first established by Sheikh Yassin. One of the major impacts 
of the Islamic revolution on Palestinian political life was the emergence of Islamic 
Jihad, and this factor galvanised the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood to engage in 
armed struggle and establish what became known as Hamas. The establishment of 
Hamas coincided with two historical developments: the Palestinian Intifada, and the 
PLO‘s rapprochement with Israel. Relations between Iran and Hamas flourished after 
Hamas‘ political cadre were sent into exile in south Lebanon, where they were free to 
enjoy support from Iran and Hizbullah. Hamas's anti-Zionist ideology and  popular 
support on the Palestinian streets inevitably meant that it would be perceived by the 
                                                 
848 Michael Barnett, in Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 
Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 403. 
 
284 
Islamic Republic as a reliable and powerful ally against Israel. The impact on the Arab 
Spring on Iran's relations with Hamas was also examined. It was highlighted that 
although Hamas‘ support for the opposition to Assad challenged its position within the 
so called ‗Axis of Resistance‘, the wars in Gaza proved that Iran would be unwavering 
in its support for the Palestinians.  
This study has supported various arguments put forth by Wendt and Barnett 
concerning identity politics. I agreed with Wendt's argument that without identities, 
interests have no direction and without interests, identities have no motivational 
force.
849
 I also agree that ideas determine the meaning and content of power, the 
strategies by which states pursue their interests, and interests themselves.
850
 My 
analysis of the Islamic Republic's support towards Muslim resistance groups in 
Palestine likewise echoed Barnett's arguments that "identity not only provides some 
leverage over the choice of an alliance partner, but it also proposes that maintenance of 
that alliance can be dependent on the parties‘ mutual identification."
851
 In other words, 
Islamic and revolutionary values of the Islamic Republic determined the interests, 
identity, and policies attainable to the Islamic Republic's leadership in ways that 
impacted its alliances. 
The Islamic Republic's Projection of Power and Influence – the Dream of Leading 
the Islamic Ummah  
It is perhaps stating the obvious that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a state 
underpinned and infused by revolutionary values and Islamist politics. Anti-Zionism, 
                                                 
849 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 231. 
850 Ibid., p. 309. 
851 Michael Barnett, in Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 
Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 410. 
285 
suspicion towards the United States, and the Ummah-centric approach of Iran sit 
comfortably alongside the Islamic Republic's strategic interests and ideological outlook. 
In other words, strategic interests compliment the identity of the state. I would add 
however that the primary reason for why Iranian revolutionaries from diverse political 
backgrounds have comfortably reached a consensus on supporting the Palestinian cause 
is the universal acceptance of the need to defend what is perceived to be a just cause. 
The depth of this was registered during the Islamic revolution with the introduction of 
the words mastazaafeen (oppressed) and mostakbereen (oppressors).  
At the same time, this study has suggested one must add that like all states, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran aims to expand its political and ideological hegemony 
throughout the region. In this regard, the Islamic Republic perceives that it has the right 
and the might to lead the Islamic Ummah in its ideological struggle against so called 
global arrogance, a term routinely used to refer to the United States. Support for 
Palestine serves Iran's strategic interests of projecting power and expanding its 
ideological and political influence throughout the Muslim world. In other words, the 
expansion of influence and struggle for hegemony within the region complements the 
Islamic Republic's beliefs about leading the Ummah. By amplifying its pro-Palestinian 
rhetoric, the Islamic Republic attempts to extend its reach into the Arab world in order 
to maintain its position within the Ummah as its ‗leader‘.  
Hence, the Palestinian cause has become strategically advantageous for the 
Islamic Republic in the sense that it has allowed Iran to convey its political discourse of 
resistance and emancipation throughout the region, which in turn has given Iran power 
and influence in the region. Various factions in the Islamic republic  underline the 
Islamic revolution's ideas in an attempt to boost Iran‘s credibility as a ‗leader‘ of the 
Islamic Ummah. Iran‘s leadership has likewise constructed the Palestinian cause as a 
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yardstick for quantifying Muslim resistance against ‗global arrogance.‘ This logic is 
echoed by Yvette Hovsepian-Bearce, who argues that  
The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khamenei perceives Iran to be 
the leader of the Muslim World and foster parent of Palestine. As such, he regards 
Palestine's and Iran's interests as one. According to the leader, Iran's ability to export its 
cultural revolution and vigorously fight as Palestine's champion against Israel is part of 
Iran's global appeal to oppressed nations. He will continue to assert this militant stance 
against all internal and external criticism of Iran's support of the Palestinian cause.
852
 
While the Islamic Republic does not credit itself with having solely ushered in the 
Muslim resistance groups of Palestine, it does regard Palestine as the main frontline 
against Zionism and imperialism. Although the emancipation of Palestinian land is 
respected first and foremost as a Palestinian obligation, the Islamic Republic has 
remained a major supporter of the Palestinian resistance within the convenient 
legitimating framework of ‗Islam‘. Since the Islamic revolution, the Iranian leadership 
seems determined to avoid bargaining over its commitment towards its principled 
support for Palestine and resistance against Zionism.  
For the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Palestinian cause transcends geography 
and thus sits comfortably with its strategic objectives due to the ease with which it 
reflects its revolutionary ideological values. The trajectory of Iran's pro-Palestinian 
position provides a number of vital analytical lessons. First, ideological principles – 
such as the desire for independence, resistance against the hegemony of superpowers, 
or solidarity – are not simply imaginary constructs, but strategic preferences which 
appeared and materialised due to Iran's contemporary history. Second, ideology and 
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national interests can be conjoined. In the Islamic Republic's discursive fabric, 
revolutionary values are synchronised and conciliated with the state's national interests 
and therefore can be mutually reinforcing. This approach helps us to understand Iran's 
aims to widen its outreach towards the Arab world, and particularly towards the Levant. 
Some of the Islamic Republic's strategic aims – particularly those related to Palestine 
and the Ummah – can be complex for some to comprehend unless we are able to 
position them within a proper ideological context. The decisive objectives of the 
Islamic Republic are the renunciation of Zionism, and the rejection of dependency on 
foreign powers.  If we return to the conceptual framework followed in this study, we 
can safely deduce that there is a continuity in how Iran expresses its pro-Palestinian 
stance, and its actual policies. Iran‘s policy towards Palestine did not, however, simply 
develop only after the Islamic revolution. The pre-revolutionary era demonstrates that 
many opponents of the Shah‘s regime also expressed solidarity with the people of 
Palestine. Hence, this study has also suggested that Iran's relations with Palestine 
cannot be simply reduced to opportunism or a desire to exploit the Arab world for 
material benefit. While some in the Western world and even within Arab states may 
regard Iran's pro-Palestinian stance as solely opportunistic, such analyses overlook six 
decades of solidarity demonstrated by Iranian activists – including those with left-wing 
ideological tendencies – towards the Palestinian cause.  
At the same time this study has highlighted the fluctuations of the 
discourse about Palestine within the Iranian state. Radical confrontation was 
repeatedly subdued to achieve major diplomactic openings. As indicated, the state 
in Iran has the ambition to become a regional power with deep strategic access to 
the Arab-world. Palestine became increasingly important to that end, as long as it 
did not jeopardise Iran‘s other strategic preferences. This is best exemplified in 
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the negotiations which lead up to the JCPOA nuclear agreement. It is worth noting 
that the Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif used a more pragmatic tone in regard 
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the nuclear negotiations. For instance in  
an interview on 2 February 2014 in Berlin following his attendance at the Munich 
Security Summit, Zarif  stated "it was up to the Palestinians to determine if they 
were satisfied with the agreement, and that Iran would not interfere".
853
 In 
response to a question about what would happen if Palestinians reach an 
agreement with Israel, Zarif said  
If the Palestinians are happy with the solution, then nobody, nobody outside Palestine, 
could prevent that from taking place. The problem for the past 60 years is that the 
Palestinians have not been happy. The Palestinians have not been satisfied. And they 
have every right not to be satisfied, because their most basic rights continue to be 
violated and people are not ready to redress those.
854
 
A few hours after Zarif and Federica Mogherini, announced the nuclear 
agreement with the world powers on 13 July 2015, concluding a 13-year standoff 
over Iran‘s nuclear program, Zarif stated "I believe that this deal will remove a 
smokescreen [behind] which Israel was standing and hiding its criminal activities 
against the people of Lebanon and the people of Palestine  .
855
 In responding to 
why Israel opposes the nuclear deal, Zarif said  
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Unfortunately, they need crisis and wars to continue to hide their aggressions and 
their inhumane policies against the people of Lebanon, Palestine and the people 
of the region, so peace is an existential threat to them.
856
 
Addressing the Fifth Extraordinary OIC (Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation) Summit on Palestine and Al-Quds in the Indonesian capital of 
Jakarta in March 2016, Zarif stated that Iran will not abandon the policy of 
supporting the Palestinian cause against Israel, even though the country has been 
subjected to nearly four decades of western pressure.
857
 Hence, the discourse 
switched to a rather more confrontational language when the nuclear agreement 
was reached. Undoubtedly, there are fluctuations in Iran‘s references to Palestine 
in accordance with the international context which does not mean, however, that 
there has been a wholesale sacrifice of the strategic preferences of the state.  
In a similar vein, during the Sixth International Conference in Support of 
the Palestinian Intifada (Uprising) in Tehran on 22 February 2017, President 
Hassan Rouhani stated  that the Islamic Republic believes the Palestinian crisis is 
the biggest problem facing the Muslim world, adding that the Tehran conference 
shows "the unbreakable will" of Iranians in supporting the Palestinian cause.
858
 
He also stated that "The Iranian people have paid a huge cost for backing 
Palestinians and opposing the Zionist regime, but they will definitely continue 
their support."
859
"A very difficult path lies ahead for Muslims to restore the rights 
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of Palestine, but a nation that pursues jihad to defend its rights will prevail," 
Rouhani expressed in typical language 
Moreover, these proclamations came at a time when Iran was vying for 
regional suzerainty with Saudi Arabia and must be read in conjunction with the 
proxy war of two countries in Syria, Yemen and Iraq. Indeed, those proclamations 
were made amid reports that the Trump administration, a major supporter of 
Israel, is discussing the Palestine conflict with four Arab countries, namely Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the UAE, aiming to settle their differences with Israel 
and form a united front against Iran. 
In other words, it can be safely argued that the revolutionary rhetoric 
changed to something more pragmatic whenever necessary especially during the 
presidencies of Khatami and Rouhani. This is because for the reformers and their 
ambition to open up Iran‘s international relations, it was not conducive to be 
radical about the issue of Palestine. The constructive language during the nuclear 
agreement by Rouhani demonstrates that the Iranian state is capable of changing 
the discourse towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflct in accordance with 
international events. 
At the same time during my research, I observed that the revolutionary culture 
of ‗permeating the issue of Palestine is inscribed even in the very linguistic fabric of 
Iranian cities. Today, there is no major urban area without at least one street or 
boulevard bearing the names Quds or Palestine. The rejection of Zionism and resistance 
against the occupation of Palestine are likewise now embedded in the dictionary of 
contemporary Iran. In this regard, stripping the pro-Palestinian and anti-hegemonic 
discourses from the dictionary of the Islamic republic would require a revolutionary 
change of state identity, and therefore a change of regime. In other words, support for 
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the Palestinians represents a crucial part of the Islamic Republic‘s DNA, in spite of the 
fluctuations in the discourse that I have highlighted.  
     Finally, I would like to add that I am aware of the limitations of this study. It 
was stated at the outset that my analysis was not intended to be a theoretical excavation 
of Iranian-Palestinian relations. I used applied theory on the basis of social 
constructivist concepts. One additional restriction of the study was that it could not 
cover Iran's relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Jordan in detail. Furthermore, the 
thesis was not able to provide a detailed analysis of Hizbullah's military and financial 
relations with the Palestinian movements.     
     Future research could choose to investigate Palestinian relations with Iran, 
and how the Palestinian public, particularly the younger generation, perceives the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Another fascinating area of research would be to investigate 
how the sectarian discourse in the region has affected the Palestinian struggle, and how 
the Saudi-Iranian Cold War interacts with the internal politics and external policies of 
the PA. Yet another fascinating area of research would be to examine the leadership of 
the Iraqi Shias approach towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Hopefully, this study 
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[2003]. 
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